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Like most dissertations, this project began looking significantly different from the 
final product. My first research trip to Guatemala was inspired not by an interest in police 
documents or the repression of underground mobilization attempts, but as an 
investigation into the spatial distribution of some of the most overt forms of political 
repression—government massacres. When I arrived in Guatemala in the Summer of 2009 
to gather data on massacres committed during  the  country’s  civil  war,  I  was  aware that an 
archive of police documents was wrapping up its digitization process, but I also knew 
that at that point the archive was closed off to researchers. Speaking with one member of 
Guatemala’s  robust  human  rights  community  after  another,  I  learned  that  the  archive  had 
recently been granted a legal statute to open its doors researchers. In a surreal moment 
that   is   burned   in  my  memory,   I  met   the   archive’s   director,  Gustavo  Meono—a former 
insurgent commander in the Guatemalan Army of the Poor—on a rooftop above the 
offices of the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation, where their staff worked 
diligently  below  us  to  uncover  clues  on  the  country’s  vast  history  of  human  rights  abuses  
from the bodies of exhumed victims. When I discovered I was to be granted full access to 
the newly opened Archive of the Guatemalan National Police, it was clear that this was 
an opportunity to use these documents to tell a new story about the form and 
consequences  of  human  rights  that  had  remained  hidden  for  far  too  long.  To  the  archive’s  
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staff, who worked diligently protecting, cleaning, and digitizing these records, I could not 
be more grateful.  
In total, I spent about a year and a half working in the archive and read more than 
a quarter million formerly classified police files. The choice to systematically cover the 
breath of the archive meant that I was forced to translate the real suffering of thousands 
of victims into interchangeable quantities. As a consequence, while the dissertation takes 
on matters of mortal significance, it rather callously glosses over the suffering 
experienced by the individual victims. It is important to acknowledge that these are real 
people, whose stories deserve to be told. Research collected for this dissertation has been 
used as evidence to prosecute at least two cases related to human rights violations in 
Guatemala. In the first trial, data I collected was deployed by the prosecution to make the 
case   that   Hector   Bol   de   la   Cruz   (the   country’s   former   chief   of   police)   had   been  
responsible for crimes against humanity. In a second case, I worked to produce evidence 
used  to  prosecute  the  country’s  former dictator, Efrain Rios Montt. This historic trial was 
the first time a national court had tried a former leader on charges of genocide. But 
despite these court cases,   Guatemala’s   post-conflict justice processes have stalled. To 
those who continue to pursue truth and reconciliation in Guatemala, I am both indebted 
and grateful. 
  As I read through the police documents, I saw that the government displayed a 
distinct interest in non-violent organizational behaviors, such as teach-ins, information 
distribution, and fundraising efforts, which were generally private and relatively 
unthreatening to the regime. These behaviors, which I would later refer to as 
“mobilization   activities,”   seemed   to   preoccupy   political authorities, yet were largely 
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absent from existing theoretical work on government repression. Reading about the 
government’s   concern   with   dissident   mobilization   led   me   to   consider   not   only   why   a  
government might be interested in repressing these forms of behavior, but also why these 
actions had been missing form how we commonly think about government repression. 
This led to the first study of this dissertation, which generates a forward looking theory of 
repressive behavior and argues that contemporary reactionary understandings of 
repression result in part from biases in the news materials commonly used to study the 
topic. The implications then lead me to consider how the repression of mobilization 
impacts   civil   society   and  what   this  more   “preemptive”   theory  of   repression   implies   for  
when we should expect governments to improve their respect for human rights, which 
formed the subjects of the second and third studies in the dissertation 
As this project evolved over successive stages, I was aided by the continuous 
support of my advisor, Christian Davenport. I could not be more grateful for the 
mentorship, sage advice, and never-ending creativity he has generously given over the 
many years (and many institutions) we have known one another. The project was also 
significantly improved through close readings by the other members of my committee—
Allan Stam, Mark Beissinger, and Kiyo Tsutsui. Key pieces of the dissertation were read 
by Will Moore, Rory McVeigh, Courtenay Conrad, Emilie Ritter, Amanda Murdie, 
Charles Brocket, Elizabeth Wood, Scott Straus, Rosio Titiunik, Naunihal Singh, Michael 
Coppedge, Javier Osorio, and Suparna Chaudhry. For their time and constructive 
criticism, I am grateful. Charles Brocket and Chris Farriss kindly shared data they have 
gathered and Patrick Ball provided helpful guidance on working with data in Guatemala. 
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I am deeply indebted to Alfredo Garcia and Mario Muralles, who worked 
alongside me in the Guatemalan police archive. Their research assistance and feedback 
helped guide the project through many challenges, and their camaraderie makes me 
nostalgic for the months we spent working in the police barracks. In the United States, I 
am grateful to Lauren Demeter and Melissa Guinan, who demonstrated their excellence 
as research assistants time and time again. 
Successive research trips to Guatemala were supported by the Kellogg Institute 
for International Studies, the Social Science Research Council, and the National Science 
Foundation. Without the support of these organizations, the fieldwork at the core of the 
dissertation project would not have been possible. The Program on Order, Conflict, and 
Violence  at  Yale  University’s  MacMillan  Center  supported  my  final  year of writing. The 
time and feedback provided by OCV and its faculty were invaluable in developing the 
project.  
Finally, I am deeply indebted to my fiancé, Megan Maraynes, whom I met in 
Guatemala at the beginning of this project. She has supported me tirelessly over years of 
travel, research, and writing. And through all of it she has displayed a sense of grace and 
generosity that I could only hope to aspire to. I feel unduly lucky for the time we have 
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This project examines attempts by government authorities to undermine overt, 
collective challenges, such as riots, protests, and acts of terror, by targeting activities that 
precede and/or support such behavior. After providing a theory of how repression and 
resistance develop, the study examines unique data drawn from the confidential records 
of the Guatemalan National Police to assess the use of repressive action during the years 
between 1975 and 1985. Empirical tests confirm that 1) government forces anticipate 
challenger development by identifying the mobilization activities nascent challengers rely 
on to initiate and sustain overt, collective challenges; 2) the use of repression to 
undermine such efforts is specifically designed to contain the spread of radical (i.e., 
highly transformative) mobilization; 3) political repression directed at mobilization 
diminishes subsequent challenges against the government; and 4) decisions to liberalize 
repressive practices occur only after radical mobilization attempts have successfully been 
purged from society. Implications are drawn for how we understand and study political 











Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation examines three intricately related questions: (1) why do governments 
violate the human rights of their citizens, (2) what impact do human rights violations 
have on civil society, and (3) when do human rights violations end. Such questions form 
the foundations for understanding important macro-level phenomena such as civil war, 
regime change, and state failure. They also impact the lived experience of individuals at 
the micro-level,   including   citizens’   exposure   to   violence,   the   rights   and   liberties  
apportioned to them, and the capacity for citizens to express political opinions without 
fear of sanctions.  
In the dissertation, I develop a novel theory to account for the causes, effects, and 
decline of human rights violations that focuses on governments efforts to subvert the 
development of overt, collective challenges to political order (such as riots, protests or 
acts of terror). While it is often suggested that one of the key reasons that collective 
challenges are not observed in a particular situation is because expectations of repressive 
action (i.e., fear) prevent dissidents from organizing, existing theory provides few details 
on how governments might anticipate the development of collective challenges or how 
they attempt to undermine this behavior. What my research argues is that governments 
are able to subvert the development of the most costly challenges by identifying the 
organizational activities that precede and/or support collective action (what I refer to as 
mobilization) and applying repression when mobilization supports radical 
transformations of political power. Based on this understanding, the theory yields 
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predictions specifying when, where, and against whom repressive action can be expected, 
what its effects are, and when it will abate. 
I test these expectations using unique data collected from the previously confidential 
records of the Guatemalan National Police. Because the police records were constructed 
for bureaucratic performance rather than for public dissemination and were released 
without oversight by the agency responsible for producing the documents, the 
Guatemalan police records contains one of the most comprehensive and unbiased 
collections of information on political repression identified to date. During my field 
research, I utilized these records to construct an events database of government and 
dissident behavior occurring in Guatemala between 1975-1985.  
Through quantitative analysis of this database, I find that when organizers support 
radical transformation in political power, governments do not wait for challenges to 
materialize. In such settings, political repression is directed at the initial mobilization 
attempts of would be dissidents. I find further that repression targeting mobilization 
deters subsequent challenges, whereas repression directed at ongoing challenges 
increases challenger activity. This resolves a puzzle within the existing literature about 
whether human rights violations increase or decrease collective challenges; revealing that 
they do both, depending upon what aspect of a challenge someone is considering. Finally, 
the analysis shows that violations of human rights persist long after challenges have 
abated, lasting until the state has successfully removed attempts to mobilize in support of 
transformation of the political order.  
Taken as a whole, this work demonstrates that existing conceptualizations of order 
must be amended to recognize how political repression is used to expunge attempts to 
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organize around the idea of transforming the political order. The success or failure of 
these repressive policies holds strong implications for political expression during times of 
relative peace as well as the likelihood for observing the onset or escalation of political 
conflict. 
 
Dissertation Structure  
The dissertation is comprised of three intricately related, though structurally 
independent, studies. Each specifies predictions derived from a common theory of 
political repression and evaluates them empirically using original data collected from the 
Guatemalan security apparatus. 
The first paper identifies patterns of repression that have largely been ignored within 
existing research on human rights violations—repression directed against non-disruptive 
mobilization activities. The study articulates an argument for why governments direct 
repression at mobilization activities specifically when mobilization supports radical 
transformations in politically power. Explanations are also provided to account for why 
previous work has failed to capture this dynamic.  Data biases within the media sources 
most commonly utilized to study patterns of repression and dissent have lead to the 
omission of mobilization activities from existing work as well as any potential repression 
directed at those behaviors. Empirical analysis of the confidential police data reveals how 
radical mobilization activities are as robustly related to the use of repression as overt, 
collective challenges. However, when the analysis is replicated on data derived using 
more conventional newspaper based data, political repression appears only to be 
motivated by government responses to ongoing challenges. The study concludes that 
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government repression is much more proactive than is commonly assumed within 
existing research. 
The second study builds on the foundations of the first. If it is true that governments 
do not always wait for overt, collective challenges to materialize before committing 
repression, and in some settings choose to apply repression against non-challenging 
mobilization activities, what implications does this have for how we understand the 
impacts of repressive behavior on challenger development? Using an instrumental 
variables approach to identify seemingly exogenous variation in repression directed at 
mobilization and overt, collective challenges, the study reveals how repression can have 
divergent effects on subsequent challenger behavior depending on the forms of behavior 
it targets. When governments identify mobilization activities and target this behavior with 
repression, it diminishes the organizational foundations necessary to inspire and sustain 
participation. Consequently, future challenges decline. But when governments respond to 
ongoing challenges, for example by policing an ongoing protest, this leaves the 
organizational infrastructure in place to publicize abuses and promote future challenges. 
Finally, the third study demonstrates the implications of the argument for government 
decisions to liberalize and improve their respect for human rights. The study shows how 
monopolizing control over territory does not appear to be sufficient to inspire 
liberalization. At the same time, domestic institutions and international pressures are 
ineffectual for curbing human rights abuses. Even in the face of such pressures and in 
sites where the state has succeeded in monopolizing control, liberalization takes place 
only after the state has removed attempts to mobilize in support of radical transformation 
of the political order. Where radical mobilization activities persists, governments face 
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concerns that liberalization could inspire emergent forms of contention that 
fundamentally threaten their hold on power. Repression only begins to abate once radical 
mobilization has ceased and the government has assurances that the types of threats likely 
to emerge following liberalization will not fundamentally challenge the political order. 
 
Extensions and Implications 
Cumulatively, the findings that emerge from this dissertation hold at least three 
implications that should transform the way we understand political repression and the 
violation of human rights.  
First, the work demonstrates the significance of grievances and challenger demands 
for understanding repressive behavior. As Tilly (1978) articulates, governments intent on 
remaining in power should consider the potential threats emerging from society in terms 
of both the scope of the physical challenge and the scale of the demands they hope to 
achieve. But within the vast literature studying repression that has developed over the 
past several decades, scholars have overwhelmingly been concerned with challenger 
behavior, while assuming that challenger grievances are either constant or insignificant 
for explaining repression (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; 2007; Moore 2000; 
Earl et al. 2003; Valentino et al. 2004; Carey 2010; see also Gartner and Regan 2002). 
The findings that emerge from this study reveal that even in sites where the behavior of 
potential challengers is relatively non-threatening, repression is deployed against 
individuals organizing in support of radical transformations in political order. Looking 
forward, it will no longer be sufficient to look for the causes of repression exclusively in 
government responses to ongoing behavioral challenges. Scholars will need to consider 
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how the demands emerging from challenger organization shape the use of political 
repression. 
Second, the study demonstrates how order and conflict are contingent on the strategic 
interaction of governments and challengers. Much of the existing work that has been 
developed to understand the stability of order or the onset of conflict has focused how on 
structural factors, such as regime institutions, ethnic composition, or state capacity, 
should influence the outcomes of interest (e.g., Hegre 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Davenport 2007; Cederman et al. 2010). This dissertation reveals how the onset, 
escalation, and de-escalation of political conflict result not from structural determinants, 
but from strategic choices made by governments and challengers in response to one 
another’s   actions.   Structure   is   insufficient   for   accounting   for   these   dynamics in part 
because the most prominent structural factors that emerge in the literature are likely to be 
endogenous to the outcomes of these repression-dissent interactions. Particular patterns 
of institutionalized order are observed when governments successfully identify and 
repress radical mobilization attempts, while conflict cycles can be expected when 
movements outpace or evade efforts to repress mobilization. 
Finally, the study identifies the patterns of repression that, while remaining largely 
hidden, underlie the institutional foundations of politics practiced during times of 
apparent  peace.  Inverting  Clauswitz’  classic  dictum  regarding  war  and  politics,  Foucault  
(2003 [1975]) argues that politics practiced during times of peace are the continuation of 
conflict, confrontation, war. What the present study demonstrates is how government 
strategies practiced during times of contention are designed to influence how politics are 
practiced in the post-conflict period. To begin, the study reveals the expansive use of 
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repression against private mobilization activities. Because such repression is largely 
hidden, it is not commonly considered by scholars conceptualizing political order.  
Perhaps more significantly, if (1) governments are only directing repression at particular 
types of mobilization (those that support radical transformations in political order), (2) 
the repression of mobilization effectively reduces the probability that the mobilized ideals 
are realized into public expression, and (3) repression persists until mobilization in 
support of radical ideals has been eliminated, then what is observed as a decline in 
repression and the onset of apparent peace is actually a signal that the government has 
succeeded in constraining the ideological distribution of civil society. The expectation is 
that   the  onset   and   stability  of  peace   are   contingent  on   the   government’s   elimination  of  
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Chapter 2: Undermining Resistance: Mobilization, Repression, and the 
Enforcement of Political Order 
 
Abstract: This paper examines attempts by authorities to undermine overt collective 
challenges, such as riots, protests, and acts of terror, by targeting activities that precede 
and/or support such behavior. After providing a theory of how repression and resistance 
develop, the study examines unique data drawn from the confidential records of the 
Guatemalan National Police to assess the use of repressive action during the years 
between 1975 and 1985. Empirical tests demonstrate that 1) government forces anticipate 
challenger development by identifying the mobilization activities nascent challengers rely 
on to initiate and sustain overt collective challenges; and 2) that the use of repression to 
undermine such efforts is specifically designed to contain the spread of radical (i.e., 
highly transformative) mobilization. Implications are drawn for how we understand and 




How do governments enforce political order? Prevailing views correspond to a 
relatively simple sequence of events. Episodically, dissidents are able to overcome the 
internal barriers to mobilization and engage in overt collective challenges, such as 
protests, strikes, riots, or armed attacks (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Gates 2002; Lim 
2008; Lind and Stepan-Norris 2011; McAdam 1986; McAdam et al. 2001; McCarthy and 
Zald 1977; Tarrow 1994). To protect political order, governments respond to overt 
collective challenges with repression (Carey 2010; Davenport 1995; 1996; 2007a; 2007b; 
2010; Earl et al. 2003; Moore 2000; Pion-Berlin 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 
1999; Valentino et al. 2004).1 Contestation then ensues as governments and challengers 
engage in open conflict (Cunningham et al. 2009; Davenport forthcoming; Kalyvas 2006; 
Lujala et al. 2009; Lyall 2009; Moore 1998; Pierskalla 2010; Ritter forthcoming).  
Although useful in many ways, the view adopted above is limited. For example, 
while it is often suggested that one of the key reasons that challenges are not observed in 
a particular situation is because expectations of repression prevent dissidents from 
organizing (e.g., Conrad and Ritter 2012; Muller 1985; Muller et al. 1991; Pierskalla 
2010), existing theory provides few details on how governments might anticipate the 
development of overt collective challenges or how they attempt to undermine this 
behavior (e.g., Danneman and Ritter forthcoming; Herrerros and Criado 2009; Nordas 
and Davenport 2013).  
                                                        
 
1 Repression  refers   to,   “coercive  actions  political  authorities   take   to   inhibit   the  will  or  capacity  of  people  
within  their  jurisdiction  to  influence  political  outcomes”  (Ritter forthcoming). Overt collective challenges 
refer   “a sustained, organized   [and   public]…effort   making   collective   claims   of   target   authorities”   (Tilly  
2004, p 53). 
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Understanding how governments anticipate and/or undermine overt collective 
challenges is important because if authorities attempt to eliminate threats without 
exclusively relying upon repressive responses to overt activity, then models that fail to 
identify relevant state action have misspecified how contention begins and is sustained. 
Indeed, if government forces incapacitate individuals who are hoping to challenge the 
regime,  this  form  of  “preemptive”  repression  provides  a  novel  mechanism  for  restraining  
political threats. Under this circumstance, explanations for civil conflict will have to be 
amended to account for the selection of surviving movements into subsequent 
conflagrations. 
The current study provides insight into why repression is applied in anticipation 
of and in conjunction with overt collective challenges as well as when and against whom 
such repressive action can be expected. Rather than simply engage with overt behavior, 
governments seek to subvert the most costly challenges by applying repression against 
mobilization (i.e., the formation and support of an opposition organization from which 
overt collective challenges can be initiated and sustained). Governments do not attempt to 
address all challengers but focus their efforts on those mobilizing in support of highly 
transformative redistributions of political power. Upon  observing  “radical”  mobilization,  
authorities repress to eliminate influential leaders, deplete organizational resources, and 
subvert overt challenges.  
This study provides empirical evidence to support these claims by analyzing new 
data collected from the confidential records of Guatemalan National Police. These 
records contain unprecedented details on both the myriad of covert mobilization as well 
as overt collective activities engaged in by challengers and the spectrum of repressive 
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behavior employed by the government. Analysis of the police data reveals how 
government forces employ coercion to subvert challenges by directing repression against 
radical mobilization.  
While exploring these issues, the investigation demonstrates how misconceptions 
regarding the dynamics of political repression manifest themselves empirically as well as 
theoretically. By comparing results generated from the Guatemalan National Police 
records against data collected from international and Guatemalan newspapers, the 
analysis reveals how biases in newspaper data predispose analysts to the conclusion that 
governments only employ repression in response to overt collective challenges. The full 
range of repressive activity and useful insights into its application will only be revealed 
when new and better data are brought to bear.  
The article proceeds as follows: First, I review the academic literature on political 
order and conflict. Second, a model of repressive action is presented that distinguishes 
the repression of mobilization from repression directed against overt collective 
challenges. I then present the data, research design, and analysis. Finally, in the 
conclusion, I discuss the implications of the study for understanding political order and 
conflict. 
 
Defending Political Order  
Over the past few decades, research on political repression and human rights 
violations, social movements, and civil war has sought to explain how governments 
enforce political order. Each approach has had a somewhat different but generally 
overlapping understanding of the topic. 
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For instance, one body of work has emerged on government coercion, such as 
political imprisonment, torture, disappearances and mass killing (e.g., Carey 2006; 2010; 
Conrad and Moore 2010; Davenport 1995; 2007a; 2007b; Gartner and Regan 1996; Gurr 
1986; Moore 2000; Pierskalla 2010; Poe and Tate 1994; Regan and Henderson 2002; 
Shellman 2006; Stohl and Lopez 1984; 1986; Tilly 1978; Valentino et al. 2004). Often 
referred   to   as   the   “threat-response   theory”   (Earl   et   al.   2003),   but   alternatively   as   the  
“nobody-moves-nobody-gets-hurt thesis”   (Davenport   2010)   or   the   “law   of   coercive  
response”   (Davenport   2007b ), the dominant model expects governments to employ 
higher levels of repression in response to an increase in observed dissident threats.2 The 
theory has as its underlying foundation a conceptualization of policymaking in which 
governments respond to overt, collective challenges to the regime by engaging in 
repressive behavior to control or eliminate challengers (e.g., Davenport 1995; 2007a; Earl 
et al. 2003; Gurr 1986; Pion-Berlin 1989; Poe 2002; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999; 
Poe et al. 2000). Recent studies are beginning to push in the direction of a more forward-
looking model, but such work remains limited in part because the micro-foundational 
mechanisms that link prospective decision-making to the repression of specific events or 
individuals have yet to be well articulated (e.g., Danneman and Ritter forthcoming; 
Herrerros and Criado 2009; Moore 1995; Nordas and Davenport forthcoming; Pierskalla 
2010; Walter 2006). 
                                                        
 
2 Despite early work pushing scholars towards definitional clarity (e.g., Davenport 1995), the concept of 
threat remains imprecisely defined in the literature (e.g., Carey 2006, 3; Earl et al. 2003, 586; Poe et all. 
1999, 293). Most often scholars conceptualize threats to the state as a function of the scope (e.g., Earl et al. 
2003, 583; Valentino et al. 2004, 386;) or form (e.g., Carey 2010, 171; Poe et al. 1999, 293; Valentino et al. 
2004, 386) of overt collective challenges. Specific forms of overt collective challenges that have come to 
signify threats to the state include protests (Earl et al. 2003), riots (Carey 2010), terrorism (Carey 2010), 
civil war and insurgency (Poe et al. 1999; Valentino et al. 2004). As these challenges increase, the 
expectation is that states will subsequently escalate levels of repression.  
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At the same time, a rich literature on social movements has focused directly on 
the emergence of challenges to political order. Since  Olson’s  (1965)  seminal  study,  it  has  
generally been assumed that the internal barriers to collective action are so great that 
nonparticipation can be taken as a default position, rather than a facet of the existing 
interactions between governments and challengers. As a result, studies of social 
movements have tended to focus on factors influencing the capacity of organizations to 
overcome their internal collective action problems while overlooking the competition for 
resources that occurs between governments and challengers during mobilization (e.g., 
Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Conrad and Ritter 2012; Lind and Stepan-Norris 2011; Lim 
2008; Klandermans 1984; McCarty and Zald 1976; Siegel 2009; Snow and Benford 
1988). Where repression enters such research, causal explanations have centered on how 
unobservable expectations of repression hinder resolution to the collective action 
problem, rather than on any systematic and observable efforts authorities engage in to 
anticipate and subvert the development of political challenges (e.g., Muller 1985; Muller 
et al. 1991; Pierskalla 2010). And where scholars have examined the effects of repression 
on social movements empirically, research has not yet systematically addressed the 
effects of repressive behavior directed against activities other than overt collective 
challenges (e.g., Davenport et al. 2005; Daxecker and Hess 2012; Dugan and Chenoweth 
2012; Lyall 2009; Moore 1998; Rasler 1996). 
Among scholars studying the emergence of large-scale conflicts between 
governments and challengers (i.e., civil wars), opportunity-based arguments stress how 
the ability of insurgents to challenge the government results in part from the limited 
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coercive capacity of weak states (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003).3 But such work sees state 
repression as largely structurally determined and only briefly references the strategic 
interplay between nascent insurgents and the government, marginalizing the role of 
repressive efforts to restrain dissident mobilization (e.g., Cederman et al. 2011; Collier 
and Hoeffler 2002; Hartzel et al. 2010; Ross 2004; Weidmann 2009).4  
In sum, understandings of conflict could be improved with increased attention to 
government efforts to subvert the development of potential challenges. If governments 
anticipate and/or undermine overt collective challenges without engaging this behavior 
directly, then existing theories will have to be revised in a number of important ways. 
First, prevailing models of political repression will have to be amended to recognize that 
government forecasts of future challenges are as important for inspiring repressive 
behavior as responses to ongoing threats and, perhaps, even more so. Second, theories of 
social movement mobilization will need to pay greater attention to understanding how 
movements attempt to outpace government attempts to undermine mobilization. Finally, 
rather than the dominant concern with structural variables theorized to influence 
challenger or state capacity, understandings of the emergence of large-scale conflict will 
need to pay greater attention to how the interaction of these two dynamic forces 
(repression and mobilization) will impact prospects for conflict escalation. When 
government forces successfully demobilize the opposition, the absence of overt collective 
                                                        
 
3 More generally, the literature on political opportunity structures argues that social movements develop 
when favorable political environments provide access to new resources (e.g., Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; 
Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1986; Tarrow 1994), with repression constituting part of the political opportunity 
structure. However, by treating repression as a structure, this literature has downplayed state strategies to 
work within structural constraints (McAdam et al. 2001, pp 43-45) and has experienced difficulty 
accounting for temporal variation in conflict (Young 2008).  
4 This is at least partially because theories of civil war have been constructed around bodies of evidence 
that negate potential challengers who would have emerged if not for the actions of the state (Lewis 2012).  
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challenges occurs not because movements could not organize internally but because the 
government was able to outcompete challengers and reduce their capacity to engage in 
overt challenges. This will impact prospects for conflict escalation as well as the 
possibility for a change in political order. 
 
From Mobilization to Repression 
 
This section presents an argument for how and why governments employ 
repression to subvert the development of overt collective challenges. Like much of 
political science, the argument begins with the assumption that governments wish to stay 
in power. They extract some rents from being in office and allocate concessions and 
repression in order to manage threats and maximize their net resources. In choosing to 
apply concessions or repression, governments consider the costs of these policy 
instruments and their impacts on both ongoing and future challenges.5  
Moving beyond extant theory, this paper argues that governments not only 
consider the presence of observable challenges (e.g., Davenport 1995; Earl et al. 2003; 
Poe et al. 2000; Valentinio et al. 2004) or unobservable, latent probabilities of challenges 
(e.g., Danneman and Ritter forthcoming; Herrerros and Criado 2009; Nordas and 
Davenport 2013), but aim to improve the specificity of their expectations by monitoring 
their citizenry to identify and repress the observable indicators that herald the 
development of the most threatening overt collective challenges. Governments recognize 
                                                        
 
5 The present study aims to understand decisions to repress. While the relative costs of concessions are 
theorized to influence repressive decision-making, a more expansive understanding of decisions to make 
concessions is beyond the scope of this research. For relevant work see Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), 
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), Moore (2000), Rasler (1996), Ritter (2013) and Shellman (2006).  
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that the outcome of repression targeting overt collective challenges is highly 
unpredictable (e.g., Davenport et al. 2005; Moore 1998). At the same time, the repression 
of those not directly engaged in challenges is costly as it involves resource allocations, 
the possible sacrifice of human life, and potential political backlash.  
As a result, governments must balance the costs of repressive attempts to subvert 
challenger development against (1) the probability of a threat being realized into overt 
collective challenges, and (2) the probable costs of dealing with those challenges should 
they materialize. To improve their forecasts of the likelihood and costs of future overt 
collective challenges, governments must consider two factors. First, they focus on the 
behaviors of potential challengers, seeking to identify the most relevant actions signaling 
challenger development. Second, they attend to the demands challengers are likely to 
make should a challenge occur, seeking to identify the potential costs of conflict 
bargaining should overt collective challenges materialize.  
Below, I present a model of challenger development in order to specify the 
behaviors and demands inspiring repressive efforts to subvert challengers. Based on this 
model, I develop hypotheses specifying where and when such repression can be expected. 
 
Mobilization, Repression and the Enforcement of Political Order 
Political order is often conceptualized as a dyadic relationship between the 
powerful and the (potentially) compliant (e.g., Arendt 1970; Huntington 1968; Lukes 
2005). However, it is perhaps better conceived as a triadic relationship between the 
powerful, the (potentially) compliant, and the (existent or non-existent) organized 
opposition. This is the case because opportunities for challenging the regime vary to the 
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extent that there is, in fact, a viable alternative to compliance. In the absence of an 
organized opposition, many who would otherwise resist government authority find 
compliance to be in their self-interest. Resistance can take the form of foot dragging or 
other   “weapons   of   the   weak,”   but   without   a   viable   alternative   to   the   existing   power  
structure to align with, individuals often find open resistance personally impractical 
(Scott 1985; 1990).  
At times, small bands of individuals are able to overcome such restraints and 
engage   in   “mobilization,”   which   describes the process of forming and supporting an 
organized alternative to the government through small, generally private activities such as 
organizing meetings, articulating organizational objectives, distributing information, 
campaigning for funds, training members, and recruiting new participants (Gaventa 1982, 
pp 24-2; Tilly 1978, p 54). 6  Distinct from overt collective challenges to political 
authority, which are outwardly focused, mobilization is designed to draw individuals and 
resources into an organization in order to sustain a platform from which overt collective 
challenges can be planned, communicated, and directed (Chong 1991; McCarthy and 
Zald 1977).  
Mobilization is difficult and requires extensive contributions from a small number 
of individuals (Olson 1965). Several studies have shown that while participation in 
collective action is generally dictated by the participation of others, there exists a core 
group of organizers for whom participation is driven by personal characteristics rather 
than social influence (e.g., McDoom 2011; Oliver 1984). These organizers must be 
                                                        
 
6 According   to   Tilly,   (1978,   p   192),   mobilization   contributes   to   situations   of   “multiple   sovereignty,”   in  
which,   “previously   acquiescent   members   of   that   population   find   themselves   confronted   with   strictly  
incompatible demands from the government and from an alternative  body.”   
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willing to overcome incentives to comply with the regime and act as the first movers in a 
potential challenging organization. Such actions are demanding both because they require 
personal contributions to a highly uncertain effort and because early action leaves 
organizers vulnerable to identification by the state. But the contributions of core members 
are critical because organizers cannot inspire others to participate in overt collective 
challenges without first reaching the minimal threshold of mobilized resources necessary 
to express collective demands and coordinate collective behavior (McCarthy and Zald 
1977; Tilly 1978).  
From the core group of organizers and the resources they mobilize, overt 
collective action can spring up, be sustained, and potentially grow. Overt collective 
challenges have the potential to set in motion cascades of participation (Granovetter 
1978; Shelling 1978). As a result, challenges have the capacity to escalate rapidly from 
seemingly insignificant degrees to levels that threaten the regime (Kuran 1989; Lohmann 
1993). However, cascades of participation cannot proceed unless organizers are able to 
mobilize sufficient resources to spark and sustain such behavior (Marwell and Oliver 
1993).  
Governments recognize how significant mobilization is for inspiring and 
sustaining overt collective challenges and translate their beliefs about mobilization into 
expectations for future threats. Prior experiences dealing with challengers along with the 
evidence from neighboring states provide the background necessary to formulate 
expectations for the development of challenges to political order (e.g., Moore 1995; 
Ritter and Danneman forthcoming; Shellman 2006). Sophisticated surveillance 
apparatuses are established to monitor social behavior and detect movements toward 
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overt collective challenges (Lewis 2012). Governments look to identify behaviors such as 
meetings, seminars, fundraising, and recruitment drives, which do not directly threaten 
the government, but involve the coordination of individuals organizing in support of 
collective challenges. 
Where mobilization is identified, it presents clear incentives for government 
forces to intervene with repression. Allowing such behavior to progress means accepting 
the possibility that overt collective challenges can be coordinated and sustained, which 
means risking open contestation with challengers. Upon observing mobilization, 
governments can direct repressive activities, such as wire-tapping, surveillance, arrests, 
or targeted attacks, against organizers as they attempt to coordinate overt collective 
challenges. Repressing mobilization drains the mobilizing organizations of critical 
individuals willing to put time and effort into mobilization and depletes the resources 
available to inspire and sustain overt collective challenges.7 Government forces can target 
the core group and remove influential individuals who are often difficult to replace. This, 
in turn, diminishes the willingness of others to contribute not only by intimidation but 
also by reducing popular perceptions that dissident organizations can successfully convert 
participation into public or private benefits. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
 
Hypothesis 1:      Mobilization is related to increased political repression. 
 
                                                        
 
7 To be clear, this conceptualization is concerned with repression directed at particular groups attempting to 
mobilize, rather than blanket restrictions on civil liberties.  
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In deciding to repress mobilization, governments must not only consider the 
probability that overt collective challenges develop, but also weigh the potential costs of 
coercion against the potential costs of challenges should they materialize. Repression of 
this sort is costly and government forces cannot reasonably be assumed to have the 
capacity for repressing all forms of mobilization. Yet at the same time, not all forms of 
mobilization are equally threatening and worthy of government attention.  
The anticipated demands of potential challengers are critical in this calculation. 
Governments must prioritize the threats posed by different mobilization efforts based on 
the expected costs of dealing with challenges should they develop. Of greatest concern 
for political authorities are those mobilizing in support of radical transformations in 
political power, such as the institutionalization of new rules for participation, the removal 
of   existing   authorities   or   the   division   of   the   state’s   territorial   integrity   (Gamson   1975;;  
Gartner and Regan 1996; Tilly 1978). If challenges are expected to emerge, but 
challengers are likely to make demands that fall short of radical redistributions of power, 
governments have the opportunity to negotiate with challengers and retain power at 
minimal costs.8 But if challengers are expected to make radical demands, negotiations 
become more problematic. In this case, conflict bargaining can be expected to center on 
issues considered indivisible by governments and challengers, leading to longer conflicts 
that are both more costly and more difficult to resolve (Thomas 2012; Walter 2009).9  
                                                        
 
8 Decisions to fight or negotiate with non-radical challengers are expected to be made based on the scope of 
the realized overt collective challenges (e.g., DeNardo 1985). In either case, the expectation is that conflict 
should be resolved quicker and at substantially less costs for the government than conflict with radical 
challengers.   
9 The risks associated with these conflicts are also much greater for governments as a loss can threaten the 
survival of the regime. 
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Because mobilization supporting radical ideals has the potential to spark and 
sustain more protracted and costly overt collective challenges, government forces weigh 
the utility of repressing this form of mobilization differently from repressing non-radical 
mobilization.10 Should radical mobilization materialize into overt collective challenges, 
government forces will need to expend greater effort attempting to subdue challengers. In 
this case, governments find repression to be an attractive option. Governments attempt to 
suppress the development of the most costly overt collective challenges by targeting the 
radical mobilization efforts that inspire and sustain such activities. 
If this conception is correct, then there exists an entire realm of political 
contestation not captured in existing research on political repression, social movements, 
and civil war. In this view, challengers work to mobilize critical resources necessary to 
initiate and sustain overt collective challenges, while governments aim to anticipate 
and/or undermine the development the most costly overt collective challenges by 
directing repression at radical mobilization. The argument leads to the following testable 
hypotheses: 
 
  Hypothesis 2a:  Increases in political repression are expected to take place 
when mobilizers support radical redistributions of political power. 
  Hypothesis 2b:  Increases in political repression are not expected to take 
place when mobilizers support less radical demands. 
 
                                                        
 
10 Similarly, the government has difficulty negotiating with radical mobilizers as the potential concessions 
these groups would demand to hold back overt collective challenges would vastly exceed the costs of other 




Identifying the repression of radical mobilization requires data that track the 
covert and overt activities of government forces as well as challengers. To acquire such 
information, I created an events database using records found in a unique archive of 
confidential police documents. The database is built from unprecedented information on 
different forms of challenger and government behavior contained in the Archivo 
Histórico de la Policía Nacional (AHPN), which was produced by the Guatemalan 
National Police between 1975 and 1985 (Morales Alvarado 2009). 
During most of the 20th century, the Guatemalan National Police employed a 
central depository to store the records produced by the inner workings of their 
bureaucracy (e.g., memos passed up and down the chain of command, arrest records, log 
files summarizing daily activity, and investigative reports produced by local divisions, 
the central command, or other specialized units). This warehouse and the millions of 
documents it contains were abandoned following the signing of the peace accord and the 
disbanding of the national police in 1996. After this time, the documents lingered on the 
outskirts of Guatemala City for approximately ten years before being discovered by the 
Human Rights Ombudsman in 2006 (Doyle 2007; Smith 2009). Following a lengthy legal 
struggle, the decision was made to clean and index the documents into the newly formed 
Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional. The digitization and archiving process has 
recently been completed, and this study is one of the first to have been granted access to 
the  Archive’s  full  1975-1985 collection.  
Records at the AHPN were archived following the administrative structure of the 
National Police, with each file indexed according to the office that received that 
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particular memo or report. The National Police had jurisdiction over the entire country 
and were divided into ten cuerpos (divisions) based on geographic location. Three 
additional divisions handled administrative tasks, major criminal investigations, and joint 
operations with the military, respectively. The Director General oversaw the entire force.  
A  purposefully  selected  subset  of  the  Archive’s  collection  was  coded  as  an  events  
database of state and dissident actions. The subset is composed of the entire selection of 
records from two offices, the Director General of the Police and the Commissioner for 
Coordinating Joint Operations with the Military.11 The resulting dataset was constructed 
by reading all 300,000+ records sent to the two offices and preserved in the AHPN. All 
forms of political activity were coded as discrete events. This includes all forms of 
political behavior participated in by mobilizers and challengers as well as all forms of 
repressive state behavior directed at such groups.12 In total, the project coded more than 
seven thousand acts of state and dissident behavior.13  
Because the AHPN records were constructed for bureaucratic performance rather 
than for public dissemination and were released without oversight by the agency 
responsible for producing the documents, the Archivo contains one of the most 
comprehensive and unbiased collections of information on the inner workings of the 
state’s   repressive  apparatus   identified   to  date.14 Still, data taken from police records are 
                                                        
 
11 A  pilot  study  that  employed  random  sampling  from  the  archive’s  full  collection  identified  that  more   than 
95% of the relevant documents were contained within these two offices. Greater detail on the pilot study 
and the coding protocol can be found in the Supplemental Information. 
12 Inter-coder reliability checks consistently demonstrated reliability rates above 85%.  
13 The codebook can be found in the Supplemental Information accompanying this project. 
14 U.S. readers might want to imagine a successful Freedom of Information Act request for which the FBI 
was required to turn over all of its documents, unredacted, for a 10-year period. 
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not without problems, and it is important to recognize that all sources of conflict data are 
likely to present incomplete and potentially biased representations of political events.15  
With data from the police, one needs to be conscious of parochial incentives that 
could lead to biased reporting for professional gains. For example, with reference to the 
reporting of  repression,  given  the  Carter  administration’s  emphasis  on  human  rights,  it  is  
clear that the regime was consciously trying to improve its international human rights 
reputation by concealing evidence of massacres (Doyle 1999). While the records were 
only accessible to those within upper levels of the police, it is still possible that they 
contain some bias against the reporting of atrocities. Moderating the scope of repression 
could bias the study against identifying a relationship between mobilization and 
repression.  
However, with regard to the reporting of challenger behavior, the direction of bias 
is less clear. Organizations might develop an interest in overestimating the threat of the 
movement in order to increase their budget (Stanley 1996). Alternatively, they might 
develop an interest in downplaying movement behavior to demonstrate professional 
success (Reiner 2010). What is evident is that because the Guatemalan government had 
significantly more resources than did news organizations and because it had extensive 
networks designed to identify political activities, the AHPN provides better detail on a far 
larger spectrum of political activity than other sources of information on the Guatemala 
conflict.  
                                                        
 
15 As an example, Maney and Oliver (1998) show how, in Madison, Wisconsin, the events covered by the 
newspapers but not identified by police records tended to be nondisruptive and to occur in private homes. 
This does not appear to be true for Guatemala, where the police records contain significantly more 
information on nondisruptive private gatherings than do the newspapers. 
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Indeed, because they contain a more extensive list of political events, government 
records have been used widely to help identify the form and extent of bias in newspaper 
coverage (e.g., Baranranco and Wisler 1999; Beissinger 2002;Maney 2000; McCarthy, et 
al. 1996; 1998; McCarthy, et al. 2008; Oliver and Myers 1999; Oliver and Smith et al. 
2001). With regard to the present topic of study, one of the factors contributing to the 
empirical   validation   of   “threat-response”   theories   of   political   repression   may   be   that  
employing traditional newspaper-based data to study the topic has biased existing 
understandings of when political repression is applied. While part of the difficulty in 
studying the repression of radical mobilization has been conceptual—scholars studying 
political order have focused theories on the most overt forms of behavior—there are 
corresponding empirical challenges, as these overt forms of behavior are also the 
activities most commonly identified in events databases on the topic. If we are more 
aware of larger acts of challenger activity, then when it comes time to articulate where 
and when states repress, larger and more intense incidents of overt collective challenges 
will be more easily conceptualized as catalysts (e.g., Brocket 1992; Danzger 1975; 
Davenport 2010; Drakos and Gofas 2006; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Wooley 2006). And 
when newspaper data are used to evaluate theoretical claims, the omission of smaller, 
nonviolent events from events databases can result in spurious correlations consistent 
with such theories (e.g., Barranco and Wisler 1999; Davenport and Ball 2002; Earl et al. 
2004; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Oliver and Maney 2000; Oliver and Myers 1999; Snyder 
and Kelly 1977). At the same time, description biases in newspaper coverage of 
contentious politics can lead to the assumption that governments respond to claims 
makers only in self-defense (Davenport 2010; Smith et al. 2001). 
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To empirically evaluate how the data sources employed in the analysis of political 
order and conflict influence understandings of state repression, this study replicates its 
analysis on a separate database of political activities reported in Guatemalan and 
international newspapers. The expectation is that the relationship between mobilization 
and repression will be apparent in the analysis of the AHPN data, but we are not likely to 
observe this relationship using data gathered from newspapers. The newspaper data for 
this replication were compiled from several sources. The first is a database of contentious 
events reported in the Guatemalan press, which was generated by Brocket (2005) for a 
study on repression and dissent in Central America.16 Brocket’s   data   collection   effort  
involved hand coding the largest local and national daily newspapers in Guatemala using 
a system for measuring government and dissident behavior that is consistent with the 
protocol  used  at  the  AHPN.  I  then  supplemented  Brocket’s  data  with  my  own  coding  of  
political activity in Guatemala reported in the New York Times as well as thee 
Guatemalan newspapers, Prensa Libre, El Diario, and La Hora, using the same coding 
system as applied at the AHPN. When combined, the newspaper dataset identifies more 
than two thousand incidents of political activity.17 
For the analysis, both the AHPN data and the newspaper-data event catalogs were 
transformed into a cross-sectional time-series of repression and dissent. For each of 
Guatemala’s   22   departments,   the   time-series identifies monthly counts of each specific 
                                                        
 
16 Brocket coded El Imparcial as well as clippings from the Inforpress Centro America news aggregations 
service. 
17 An extensive discussion of how media bias pertains to the case of Guatemala can be found in the 
Supplemental Information along with a more extensive comparison of the AHPN and newspaper data.  
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form of activity (as reported in the two datasets) occurring between January 1975 and 
December 1985.18  
 
Operationalization 
For the purposes of this study, mobilization is operationalized as small, generally 
clandestine efforts to influence individuals affiliated or unaffiliated with a social 
movement to participate in collective action. Examples include the distribution of 
information, organized training programs, soliciting for funds, recruitment efforts, and 
organizational meetings.  
Mobilization was further divided into two subtypes based on the claims made by 
challengers and identified in the AHPN records. Radical mobilization is operationalized 
as those activities carried out in support of expressed demands for overthrowing or 
displacing the political system.19 Practically, this list includes all mobilization activities 
engaged   in   to   support   the   overthrow   of   the   government   and/or   division   of   the   state’s  
territorial integrity. Examples include radical student and labor organizations, separatist 
groups, and Marxist insurgent organizations. 20  Non-radical mobilization is 
operationalized as those events carried out in support of demands that do not directly call 
for overthrowing  the  political  system  and/or  a  division  of  the  state’s  territorial  integrity.  
Examples of non-radical mobilization include mobilization to support ideals and demands 
such as community development, land rights, and freedom from persecution.  
                                                        
 
18 Departments are the third smallest administrative units in Guatemala and are approximately the size of 
U.S. counties. 
19 More accurately, given the data, these are mobilization activities that the government associated with 
support for radical ideals.  
20 Though the coding schema allowed for this form of activity, no examples of separatist mobilization were 
identified in the AHPN data. 
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Overt collective challenges are operationalized as public, outwardly focused 
demonstrations of organizational strength targeted at political authorities. Examples 
include strikes, demonstrations, marches, roadblocks, targeted killings, arson, 
kidnapping, and the taking of hostages.21  
Measures of repression are divided into two categories: covert and overt 
repressive actions. The purpose of the categorical division is somewhat different here 
than above, however. Acts of dissent were divided in order to test propositions regarding 
how different challenger activities influenced repressive action. By contrast, the two 
forms of repressive action are divided in order to counter a possible objection that 
repressive behavior related to mobilization differs in kind from repression related to overt 
collective challenges. More specifically, it could be argued that mobilization produces 
repressive activities that are more covert in nature, such as surveillance and other 
investigative practices, while overt collective challenges produce more overt repressive 
activities, such as raids or torture, which can be more easily observed.22  
To counter such an objection, political repression is divided into overt and covert 
activities and the analyses below estimate the effects of different forms of dissident 
behavior on each. Overt repression is operationalized as public (and commonly violent) 
displays of coercive force in which the targets are aware of the action and of the identity 
of the perpetrator. Examples include death threats, torture, disappearances, shootings, 
                                                        
 
21 Overt collective challenges were not divided based on claims because the expectation in the literature is 
that  all  forms  of  overt  challenges  spark  an  increase  in  repression  (see  the  above  discussion  on  the  “law  of  
coercive  response”  [Davenport  2007b]).  This includes studies analyzing concessions as well as repression 
(e.g., Rasler 1996; Shellman 2006). A replication effort divided overt collective challenges into radical and 
non-radical claims and found that both were positively and significantly related to repression. All other 
results proved substantively identical to those presented below.  
22 On the distinction between overt and covert repression see Davenport 2005. For more on the functioning 
of covert repressive activities see Cunningham (2005), Davenport (2011), and Marx (1988). 
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raids, protest policing, and politically motivated arrests. Covert repression is 
operationalized as private (and often non-violent) coercive actions in which the target is 
intended to be unaware of the activity. Examples include surveillance, wiretapping, 
informing other officers, initiating an investigation, and drafting security plans. 
 
Repression and Dissent in Guatemala, 1975-1985 
The period under investigation for this study was an extremely turbulent period in 
Guatemalan history. Armed struggles occurred between a variety of Leftist social 
movement organizations (including unions, peasant cooperatives, land rights groups 
Catholic activists, students, urban revolutionaries and Marxist insurgents) and a fractured 
military government aligned with the landowning and capitalist classes (Archdiocese of 
Guatemala 1999; Ball et al. 1999; Brocket 2005; Carmack 1992; Garrard-Burnett 2011; 
Manz 2004; Schirmer 1998; Stoll 1993).  
Political conflict emerged at different points in time and with varying intensity 
depending on where in the country one was located, and this variation is captured by the 
AHPN data. In some departments, such as Guatemala City or Escuintla, the AHPN 
records identify conflict behavior during the first few months under review. On the other 
end of the spectrum lie El Petén and Zacapa, two departments that appear to have been 
spared from the worst forms of violence. Once initiated, mobilization, overt challenges, 
and repression each ebbed and flowed in each department as challengers attempted to 
press claims against authorities and the government engaged in coercion to suppress such 
efforts (Brocket 2005; Stoll 1993). 
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Because of the wide variation in repressive behavior occurring in Guatemala, 
studying this case can provide lessons for an encompassing variety of repressive states, 
ranging from those engaged with lower level abuses to those committing more egregious 
violations. The period witnessed some of the most heinous acts of political repression to 
take place in the latter half of the 20th century. Over the course of the 10 years under 
review the Guatemalan government was responsible for killing more than 100,000 of its 
citizens (Ball et al. 1999). Yet at the same time, there were periods of peace, both in the 
time leading up to and away from violence and in locations unaffected by the fighting 
(Gulden 2002; Stoll 1993). In this way the case of Guatemala functions as a unique 
laboratory for examining a wide variety of challenger behavior and related repression 
while holding relatively constant other important factors such as regime type or 
international pressures theorized to influence decisions to repress.23 
Prior to 1977, a date often used to mark the onset of the civil war (e.g., Brocket 
2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003), mobilization and sporadic protests were organized by 
student organizations and labor unions operating in the capital. Acts of terror waged by 
urban revolutionaries and insurgent assassinations of large landowners have also been 
documented during this period (Brocket 2005; Garrard-Burnett 2011; Stoll 1993), while 
in the highlands, nascent insurgent organizations were engaged in their initial 
mobilization attempts (Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999). On the side of the government, 
surveillance of social activity, arrests of suspected dissident leaders without charge, 
killings, disappearances and the application of torture all appear to have been common 
                                                        
 




(Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999; Ball et al. 1999; Carmack 1992; CEH 1999; Falla 
1994; Manz 2005; Perera 1993; Schirmer 1998). 
As the violence moved into the rural highlands (beginning 1979-1980), the 
available indicators document a sharp increase in repression (Ball et al. 1999; CEH 
1999). Human rights organizations identify how rampant abuse occurred during this 
period; tens of thousands were killed and many more displaced from their homes 
(Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999; Ball et al. 1999; CEH 1999; Sanford 2004). The strong 
overlap between identified political conflict and racial segregation led to charges of acts 
of genocide levied at government forces (CEH 1999). 
Government estimates of insurgent mobilization subsequently dropped rapidly, 
from a high of more than 3,000 troops in 1982 to fewer than 300 in 1984 (CIA estimates 
from Doyle 1999) and government forces appeared to reestablish control throughout the 
country (Kobrak 1997; Schirmer 1998). Measures of repression similarly decreased 
steadily in 1983 and 1984 (Ball et al. 1999). With the imposition of constitutional rule in 
1985, it appears that most of the violence had ended (Schirmer 1998).  
 
Analysis 
In line with the arguments above, it is expected that repressive action is related to 
challenger mobilization and that the repression of mobilization is specifically targeted at 
those mobilizing in support of radical ideals. To evaluate these contentions, the analysis 




The methods most commonly employed to identify the causes of political 
repression are cross-sectional time-series models examining correlations between lagged 
measures of dissent and subsequent levels of repressive activity (e.g., Davenport 1995; 
2007b; Poe and Tate 1994). A similar method is employed here. The units of analysis are 
department-months and the functional form for the model is specified as negative 
binomial due to the nature of the dependent variables, which are count data that display 
over dispersion (Winklelman 2008). The models include a number of controls out of 
concern that they might influence both lagged mobilization and ensuing repression. These 
include  a  log  of  the  department’s  population,  the  percentage  of  indigenous  persons  living  
in the department, the occurrence of electoral campaigns, democratic institutions, and 
twice-lagged measures of political repression.24  
As designed, the empirical investigation first examines the relationship between 
mobilization, overt collective challenges and political repression across the entire time 
period, before engaging in a similar analysis to identify how the repression of 
mobilization might be conditional on the ideals, radical or non-radical, around which 
groups are mobilizing. The aim here is to identify whether mobilization is having an 
independent effect on decisions to engage in political repression, while controlling for the 
ebb and flow of overt collective challenges. Because of the level of temporal and spatial 
aggregation, it is difficult to tell whether overt collective challenges committed in the 
same department-month as mobilization are co-occurring or are being carried out by 
another organization elsewhere in the department or later in the month. However, given 
                                                        
 
24 Population and ethnic composition come from census data  (ANONYMIZED), electoral campaign data 
come from a list  of  campaign  registries  found  in  the  AHPN,  and  democracy  is  measured  using  Vreeland’s  
(2008) X-Polity scores.  
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the integral role mobilization plays in sustaining as well as inspiring overt collective 
challenges and the fact that repression is expected to be related to both behaviors, it is 
important to include a control for measures of overt collective challenges in order to 
identify any independent impact mobilization may have on repression. 
Subsequent analyses extend these ideas by limiting the analysis to time periods in 
which there are no overt collective challenges taking place. In this context, the objective 
is to test how mobilization is related to subsequent decisions to repress particularly 
during periods when challengers are not engaged in any overt threats.
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Table SI-I: Evidence of the Causes of Repressive Action: Negative-Binomial Regression Models using the AHPN Data 
 Full Sample of Department-Months 1975-1985 
 Model 1 IRR Model 2 IRR Model 3 IRR Model 4 IRR 



































































































































N 3568  3568  3568  3568  
Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One -Tailed Test).  
IRR=Incident Risk Ratio. All Lagged Variables Measured at t-1, Twice Lagged Variables Measured at t-2. 
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In a final examination, the study replicates the analysis using data derived from 
newspapers. Here the aim is to investigate how the source material used to study the topic 
might influence our ability to observe the repression of mobilization. 
The results of the first set of analyses are displayed in Table I. For each variable 
in the model, the table presents the coefficient, standard error, and level of statistical 
significance. To aid in interpretation, the table also presents the incident rate ratio (IRR) 
for significant coefficients.25  
Models 1 and 2 present the results estimating the effects of all forms of 
mobilization on the repressive actions of the state, while controlling for a host of 
important covariates. In Model 1, the analysis examines the covert repressive actions, 
while in Model 2 the analysis focuses on acts of overt repression. Both models examine 
the full sample of department-months from 1975-1985. 
Results disclose that government forces respond to overt collective challenges 
with repressive activity, but that repression is also directed at the covert mobilization 
activities that inspire and sustain overt behavior. The analysis thus supports conventional 
wisdom in that overt behavioral threats prompt repression, but it also reveals that the 
conventional understanding of the topic only captures part of the story, missing the less-
overt-mobilization aspect of contention.  
As a general trend, as mobilization increases, government forces increase 
repression. This suggests that governments do not simply respond to overt collective 
challenges, but that they anticipate and undermine challengers by identifying and 
                                                        
 
25 The IRR is calculated as the rate of predicted counts of repressive actions when a variable is increased 
one standard deviation above zero over the rate of predicted counts when that variable is held at zero. All 
other variables are held at their means. 
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repressing the mobilization activities that inspire and sustain overt behavior. On average, 
increasing the number of mobilizing activities in a department during one month is 
predicted to increase the amount of covert repressive actions in the department during the 
next month by 10% and the predicted number of overt repressive actions by 11%.  
 
Radical and Non-Radical Mobilization 
 The evidence presented in the first two models demonstrates that there exist 
strong correlations between mobilization and repression. Models 3 and 4 in Table I 
analyze the ways in which the ideals of those mobilizing influence decisions to repress. 
These models replicate Models 1 and 2, except that they divide mobilization activities 
into radical and non-radical subtypes as specified above.   
As expected, radical mobilization is related to positive and statistically significant 
increases in both covert and overt repressive activity. Non-radical mobilization, by 
contrast, is not significantly related to an increase in subsequent repression and in one 
case correlates with a sharp decrease in repressive capacity. In other words, government 
forces do not always respond to mobilization with repression. Instead, increases in 
repression are specifically related to mobilization around ideals that most directly 
threaten political order. Government forces aim to anticipate and/or suppress overt 
collective challenges and increase repressive action upon observing mobilization in 
support of radical ideals. On average, an increase in radical mobilization is related to a 





Table SI-II: Robustness Checks: Negative-Binomial Regression Models using the 
AHPN Data 
 Excluding Department-Months Jointly 




to the Onset of 
Overt Collective 
Challenges 
 Model 5 IRR Model 6 IRR Model 7 IRR 










































































































Combined, Models 1 through 4 provide strong evidence that the deployment of 
political repression is significantly related to mobilization, particularly that in support of 
radical ideals. Models 5 through 7 in Table II examine these relationships across different 
model specifications. The previous models examined the effects of mobilization on 
political repression during periods in which there was the potential for mobilization and 
overt collective challenges to co-occur (as when, for example, mobilization is sustaining 
overt challenges or when challenges occur in the department in a different place or time). 
The alternative specifications are designed to identify the relationship between 
mobilization and state repression in settings when no overt collective challenges are 
present. This allows the models to more directly test the theoretical argument that 
governments use mobilization to anticipate overt collective challenges and direct 
repression at mobilization in order undermine challenger behavior. 
Models 5 and 6 identify the effects of mobilization on subsequent repression by 
excluding from the analysis all department-months that jointly experienced both 
mobilization and overt collective challenges. In this analysis, any potential relationship 
between lagged measures of radical or non-radical mobilization and ensuing repression 
are independent from overt collective challenges by construction, as the only periods of 
Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
 (One -Tailed Test). IRR=Incident Risk Ratio. All Lagged Variables Measured at 
 t-1, Twice Lagged Variables Measured at t-2. 
 
 41 
mobilization that are examined occur in department-months in which no overt collective 
challenges were recorded.26  
Model 7 examines whether repression is related to radical mobilization even 
before the first instances of overt collective challenges emerge. For each department, the 
model excludes from the analysis the month in which any overt collective challenges 
were first recorded as well as all subsequent months. While the above analyses examined 
the waxing and waning of conflict and the development of mobilization and overt 
collective challenges across the full time period, Model 7 focuses on department-months 
predating the first observations of overt challenges. As noted above, conflict emerged in 
Guatemala in different departments at different points of time. 27  By exploiting this 
variation, it is possible to see how mobilization and repression function prior to the 
appearance of overt collective challenges. 
It is important to note a few things regarding this analysis before proceeding. 
First, there were no instances of overt collective challenges or electoral campaigns 
recorded in the department months under review and so these variables were dropped 
from the analysis. More interestingly, once overt repression was lagged twice, 
observations of this form of behavior could not be found in the data either. Nor are there 
instances of non-radical mobilization observed during this period. There are acts of overt 
repression that are located between dissident mobilization events and the first observed 
instances of overt collective challenges, but they precede overt collective challenges only 
                                                        
 
26 The analysis was also replicated while including contemporaneous measures of collective challenges. 
Results proved substantively identical and can be found in the Supplemental Information along with several 
other robustness checks. 




by one or two months.28 Finally, during the period that precedes the onset of political 
conflict in each department, there were fewer than a dozen acts of overt repression 
observed and fewer than two-dozen acts of dissident mobilization.29  In essence, the 
period before overt collective challenges is essentially   “pre-conflict.”   As   noted,  
mobilization and overt challenges ebbed and flowed in the different departments over 
time, but Model 7 examines the period before the onset of overt challenges. There was 
less mobilization, less repression, and significantly less variation to leverage. With only 
22 departments and fewer than two-dozen  cases  of  “conflict  onset,”  there  proves  to  be  too  
little variation to employ the maximum-likelihood econometric techniques estimated on 
the previous models on the different forms of repression individually. As a result, Model 
7 estimates the relationship between lagged mobilization and all forms of repressive 
activity (overt and covert) together.  
Interestingly, when department-months jointly experiencing both mobilization 
and overt collective challenges are excluded from the analysis in Models 5 and 6, the 
observed relationship between mobilization and ensuing repressive behavior becomes 
even more pronounced.  This is true for both covert (Model 5) and overt (Model 6) 
repressive behavior. Within this analysis, acts of radical dissident mobilization are 
predicted to increase the amount of subsequent covert repression by 71% and nearly 
double  the  government’s  deployment  of  overt  repression.   
                                                        
 
28  Every instance of overt repression remaining in the sample was predated by at least one act of 
mobilization. 




Analyzing the relationship between mobilizing events and coercive behavior in 
Model 7 provides additional evidence of the strong positive and statistically significant 
correlations between mobilization and the application of repression. In this case, 
following radical dissident mobilization, repression is predicted to increase more than 
eight fold.30  
Within the context of the present study, the evidence strongly supports the 
contention that governments do not wait for overt collective challenges to take place, but 
take repressive action targeting the mobilizing activities that initiate and sustain overt 
collective challenges. The repression of mobilization is targeted specifically at those 
organizations mobilizing in support for ideals that directly threaten the stability of the 
political regime. Government forces appear willing to allow certain forms of non-radical 
mobilization to take place uncoerced, but if an organization mobilizes in support for 
radical changes, government forces escalate political repression. 
 
Replication with Newspaper Data 
In addition to the theoretical biases recognized in the literature, there are issues 
related to the data employed in the empirical analysis of the topic that may have 
contributed   to   the  validation  of   “threat-response”   theories  of  political   repression  within  
previous work.To explore this idea, Table III replicates the analysis from Table I using 
data taken from local and international newspapers.  
                                                        
 
30 Nevertheless, care should be taken when interpreting the results of this model as the magnitude of this is 




Table SI-III: Replication: Negative-Binomial Regression Models using Newspaper Data  
 
 Full Sample of Department-Months, 1975-1985 
 Model 8 IRR Model 9 IRR Model 10 IRR Model 11 IRR 















































































































































N 3568  3568  3568  3568  
Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One -Tailed Test).  




In the analyses, overt collective challenges are highly related to the subsequent 
application of both covert and overt repression actions, while dissident mobilizing 
activities are not significantly related to either dependent variable. An increase in overt 
collective challenges engaged in by the dissidents is expected to increase subsequent 
covert repressive actions by 28% and subsequent overt repressive actions by 29%. At the 
same time, the newspaper data do not show any significant relationships between 
dissident mobilization (of any type) and the repressive behavior of the state. Models 5 
and 6 are replicated in the Supplementary Information and produced similarly 
insignificant results. However, tellingly, it proved impossible to replicate an analysis of 
mobilization and repression prior to the emergence of overt collective challenges because 
the newspapers did not record any instances of repression during this period. When 
months after the first instance of collective recorded in the newspaper data were dropped 
to replicate Model 7, there were no observed instances of either covert or overt repressive 
behavior left in the data. 
The results of this replication analysis shine light on significant biases in analyses 
of repression and dissent conducted using newspaper data. When news sources are used 
in the analysis, the robust correlations between dissident mobilization and repression 
disappear. Analyzed in this fashion, the results would thus fail to identify efforts by 








This study has argued that the range of repressive activity employed to protect 
political order is significantly broader than the conceptualization found in much of the 
literature   on   political   conflict.   While   it   is   often   suggested   that   dissidents’   fear   of  
repression deters them from challenging the state, existing research commonly portrays 
the government as committing repression only in response to some ongoing challenge. 
Instead, the study argues that governments aim to anticipate challenger development by 
monitoring social behavior and claims making in order to identify signals heralding the 
development of the most costly future challenges. Governments direct repression against 
those mobilizing in support of radical redistributions of political power to suppress the 
likelihood that future overt collective challenges to directly threaten their authority. 
Analysis of unique data on the behavior of the Guatemalan security apparatus confirms 
these expectations and reveals how government forces anticipate and/or undermine overt 
collective challenges by repressing radical mobilization. 
Future research will need to examine these relationships in more democratic or 
less violent contexts than those examined in this study. The key to doing this successfully 
will be to collect new and better data on the behavior of government forces and on those 
who would hope to challenge them. The relationship between mobilization and political 
repression was obscured when the analysis was replicated using newspaper data, which 
suggests that the news media incorrectly portray governments as more reactionary and 
less inclined to repress mobilization. Though it is rare to find data that are comparable in 
scope and quality to the documents employed in this study, recent efforts to collect 
conflict data from unconventional sources have the potential to open up new avenues for 
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studying repression and mobilization (.g., Ball et al. 2000; Davenport forthcoming; King 
et al. 2013).  
If the relationship between repression and mobilization does hold, research will 
need to address the implications for theories of political order and conflict. Dominant 
models of repression will need to incorporate signals about future contestation into 
government decision calculi, while social movement theories will have to be amended to 
consider how organizers attempt to outpace government efforts to suppress mobilization. 
Finally, by advancing understandings of early contestation between governments and 
nascent challengers, it could be possible to develop more dynamic models of repression 
and mobilization that can push beyond the existing structural understandings of civil 
conflict to improve forecasts for when such encounters are likely to escalate to 
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Chapter 3: Political Repression and the Dismantling of Opposition Organizations 
 
Abstract: Understandings of political order and conflict are founded on beliefs about the 
central  importance  of  the  state’s  capacity  for  repression.  Yet,  the perception that coercive 
capacity is crucial for understanding the persistence of political order or the occurrence of 
conflict is challenged by the fact that within the scholarly literature there appears to be no 
clear relationship between repression and a reduction in collective challenges. This study 
contends that understanding whether repression escalates or deescalates conflict 
necessitates attention to how repression is linked to the organizational processes 
associated with the development of challenges to political authority. These arguments are 
tested using unique data gathered from a previously confidential archive of Guatemalan 
police documents. Instrumental variables estimates are presented using seemingly 
exogenous variation in repression resulting from the publication of NGO reports. The 
results confirm the expectations of the argument. Implications are drawn for the study of 








Understandings of political order and conflict are founded on beliefs about the 
central importance  of  the  state’s  coercive  capacity,  the  mobilization  potential  of  
challenging groups, and the interaction of these two forces. When repression succeeds in 
limiting dissent, governments strengthen their monopoly over the use of force and limit 
the capacity for organized challenges to political authority. When repression fails, it can 
lead to an escalation of challenger activity and the deterioration of order into civil war or 
revolution. 
Yet, the perception that coercive capacity is crucial for understanding the 
persistence of political order must confront the fact that civil wars and revolutions seem 
to occur at times in spite of the strongest attempts of political authorities to suppress them 
(Goldstone 2001; Beissinger 2013). For decades, scholars have pursued investigations of 
how repression impacts the willingness of individuals to participate in overt, collective 
challenges to political authority, such as protests, strikes or acts of terror. But within the 
scholarly literature, there appears to be no clear relationship between the application of 
political repression and a reduction in collective challenges (see Davenport et al. 2005; 
Davenport 2007a). Within some research, repression appears to operate as a highly 
effective deterrent (e.g., Cunningham and Noakes 2008; Daxecker and Hess 2013). But 
other work presents evidence that repression is often unable to control or eliminate 
dissent, and at times contributes to a backlash (e.g., Moore 1998; Walsh and Piazza 2010; 
Dugan and Chenoweth 2012).31  
                                                        
 
31 Repression  refers  to,  “coercive  actions  political  authorities  take  to  inhibit  the  will  or  capacity  of  people  
within   their   jurisdiction   to   influence   political   outcomes”   (Ritter   2014).   Dissent   refers   to   “a sustained, 
organized…effort  making  collective  claims  of  target  authorities”  (Tilly  2004,  p  53). 
 
 60 
Building on a burgeoning subfield studying the organizational processes 
associated with rebellion (e.g., Weinstein 2007; Staniland 2012; Lewis 2012; Parkinson 
2013), this study identifies distinct processes in the organization of dissent and contends 
that the impact of repression on dissent is conditional on the types of organizational 
behavior governments target with repression. Governments are able to suppress dissent 
when they can direct repression at the clandestine mobilization activities (such as 
recruiting new members, training participants, holding meetings, and campaigning for 
funds) necessary to inspire and sustain challenges against the government. When 
coercion is targeted at these forms of organizational behavior, repression undermines the 
capacity of the organization to coordinate collective action and incentivize participation, 
thereby diminishing collective challenges. Alternatively, when repression is directed at 
overt, collective challenges, such as for example when police respond to an ongoing 
demonstration or riot, repression leads to conflict escalation. In this case, repression 
leaves challenger organizations intact to publicize abuse and deliver the selective 
incentives necessary to promote further challenges.  
To test these arguments, the research design employs highly disaggregated data 
collected from an archive of previously confidential police documents in Guatemala. The 
precise nature of the data enables to study to identify the targets of each repressive action, 
as well as where and when such repression occurs and the type of activity it targets (i.e., 
mobilization activities or overt, collective challenges). An innovative instrumental 
variables design identifies seemingly exogenous variation in repression occurring as a 
response to the publication of international and domestic human rights reports on 
government abuses (e.g., Conrad and DeMeritt 2011; Murdie and Davis 2012; see also 
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Ritter and Conrad 2013). Results disclose that repression directed at dissident 
mobilization activities is strongly correlated with a decrease in challenges against the 
state. Further analysis of the data demonstrates how repression directed at overt, 
collective challenges is, on average, related to increased collective challenges.  
In addition to providing resolution   to   the   puzzle   of   repression’s   impact   on  
behavioral challenges, the results reveal a number of important selection mechanisms 
operating in existing analyses of order and conflict. When governments can disrupt the 
mobilization process, certain types of political expression are systematically censored 
from the public sphere. Alternatively, when dissidents can mobilize without being 
targeted by repression, they are able to recruit and inspire participation in overt, 
collective challenges even as governments attempt to repress those activities. The success 
or   failure  of  mobilizers’  efforts   to  evade   repression  will   shape   the   types  of  movements  
that emerge to challenge the government as well as the issues over which conflict occurs. 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: First, I review the literature on 
repression and dissent. Second, I present a theory on the form and function of repression 
targeting mobilization activities and how it differs from repression targeting overt, 
collective challenges. Third, I provide context to the analysis by detailing the 
development of repression and dissent in Guatemala from 1975-1985. Fourth, I present 
the data and identification strategy. The fifth section presents the analysis. In the 






 On the morning of January 30th, 1980, a group of armed indigenous peasants and 
student activists occupied the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City to protest human 
rights violations taking place in Northern Guatemala. Police forces surrounded the 
building and fired phosphorous gas into the Embassy to disperse the protest. The gas 
ignited and the resulting fire killed 36 people (AHPN 2010a). 
 On that same day, another unit of the Guatemalan police was busy conducting 
surveillance operations on a group of organizers and community leaders in the 
municipality of Chimaltenango, whom police suspected of publishing pamphlets to incite 
the local population to rise up against the regime (AHPN 2010b). Over the next two 
months, organizers in Chimaltenango were steadily kidnapped or disappeared by agents 
of the Guatemalan government (AHPN 2010c).  
These two repressive events epitomize two distinct methods of government 
coercion. In the first, state agents responded to an overt, collective challenge, attempting 
to impose costs on the dissidents. In the second, state agents identified the mobilization 
activities that support overt, collective challenges and directed repression at organizers in 
an effort to limit their capacity for coordinating challenges. Similarly, their effects were 
broadly divergent. In the months following the embassy fire, Guatemala City witnessed a 
surge of insurgent bombings and attacks on the police (e.g., AHPN 2010d; 2010e; 2010f). 
In Chimaltenango, the next collective challenge did take place until nearly a year later 
(e.g., AHPN 2010g). 
 Historically, when looking at the repression of dissent, scholars have been 
principally concerned with events such as those at the Spanish Embassy, in which state 
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forces respond to ongoing challenges, such as riots, protests, acts of terrorism and 
insurgent  attacks.  In  one  of  the  literature’s  most  robust  findings,  states  have  been  shown  
recurrently to increase their use of political repression in response to observed increases 
in overt challenges (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; 2007b). And there exist 
wide swaths of literature on topics concerned with repressive responses to specific forms 
of challenges, including studies on protest policing, counter-terrorism, and 
counterinsurgency.  
Yet across the literature, the results that have emerged from studies estimating the 
effects of repression on dissent have been broadly inconsistent (e.g., Gurr and Moore 
1997; Moore 1998; Linden and Klandermans 2006; Lyall 2009; Walsh and Piazza 2010; 
Dugan and Chenoweth 2012; Daxecker and Hess 2013). 32  In recognition of the 
competing findings, different research trajectories have sought to resolve the paradox in 
various ways. For example, separate lines of research have studied how repression might 
generate opposing effects depending on when exactly it was applied or depending on 
whether the victims were chosen selectively or indiscriminately. Such work demonstrates 
that greater attention needs to be paid to how individual dissident actions build on one 
another   and   how   repression’s   impact  may   vary   depending on when it is applied (e.g., 
Snyder 1976; Lichbach 1987; Koopmans 1997; Moore 1998; Beissinger 2002, ch 7; 
Brocket 2005; Sullivan et al. 2012). It is also apparent that understanding how repression 
shapes challenger behavior necessitates linking individual repressive events to their 
                                                        
 
32 Part of the explanation for the inconsistencies identified in the literature on repression and dissent must 
lie in the fact that studies on the topic analyze rely on a multitude of different datasets to analyze a broadly 
diverse set of cases. Such work has traditionally paid little attention to issues of endogeneity beyond 
lagging the key independent variable. Consequently, it is likely that the spectrum of results identified is 
capturing endogenous repression-dissent dynamics in different locations and times rather than the 
exogenous influences of repression on dissent. 
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targets (e.g., Mason and Krane 1989; Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Lyall 
2009; Wood 2010; Kocher et al. 2012). 
 One path forward is to consider the process of organizing challenges to political 
authority as well as how the effects of repression might be conditional on the types of 
organizational behavior targeted with repression. For example, studies on repressive 
timing give little attention to why dissent might be escalating or decreasing except to say 
that given some initial movement in dissent and the application of political repression, we 
are likely to observe change in the direction of the slope of challenger behavior. At the 
same time, in the literature on the targeting of repression, all selectively targeted acts of 
repression are anticipated to have the same effects regardless of how dissidents were 
behaving at the time they were targeted by the state. Questions remain about whether 
selectively targeted repression might generate different effects conditional on how the 
targets were behaving at the time they were repressed. Below, I outline an approach that 
considers the difficult process of organizing dissent and presents a theory specifying the 
contingent impact of repression directed at different dissident activities. 
 
Mobilization, Repression, and Overt, Collective challenges 
 As Przeworski (1988, 51-52)   observed,   “What   matters   for   the   stability   of   any  
regime is not [a] particular system of domination but the presence or absence of 
preferable  alternatives.”  Consistent with this contention, past research suggests that overt, 
collective challenges (e.g., protests, strikes, acts of terror, or insurgent attacks) cannot 
emerge except out of some preexisting organizational platform that serves to coordinate 
participants, direct strategy, and deliver selective incentives (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 
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1977; Tilly 1978; Morris 1984; Oliver 1984; McAdam 1986; Marwell and Oliver 1993; 
Tarrow 1998; Weinstein 2007; Staniland 2012; Lewis 2012; Parkinson 2013). In the 
absence of organized alternative to the regime, resistance can operate in the form of 
scattered attacks (Tilly 2003, 170-193), such as foot-dragging, sabotage and other 
weapons of the weak (Scott 1985; 1990), but individuals are often unwilling or unable to 
speak collectively against the status quo political order.  
Thus, while mass participation in the end stages of a revolution can appear 
spontaneous (e.g., Kuran 1993; Lohman 1993), such collective action is reliant on a 
smaller group of organizers who sustain the movement during times of quiescence and 
support participation once a protest wave has begun (Taylor 1989). Organizational 
formation, development, and maintenance occur through a series of behaviors that can be 
referred  to  collectively  as  “mobilization  activities.”  Mobilization  activities  (which  include  
actions such as holding clandestine meetings, creating new institutions and roles, 
campaigning for funds or equipment, generating shared symbols and identities, 
disseminating information, recruiting new members, and training participants) are 
generally clandestine, collective behaviors necessary to form a viable organizational 
alternative to the regime that can be used to inspire and support overt, collective 
challenges.  
 Mobilization activities are difficult and require extensive contributions from a 
relatively small set of individuals (Oliver 1984). Yet they fulfill a number of important 
functions necessary for supporting and sustaining participation in overt, collective 
challenges. Three are particularly significant. First, mobilization activities help to 
restructure social affiliations (Lichbach 1998, 149-156). By shaping social ties, 
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influencing communication, directing information and providing collective resources to 
members, such as common symbols, focal points, and values, mobilization activities 
influence the alignment of preexisting social networks and organizations away from the 
state and towards opposition (e.g., Morris 1984, ch. 3; Chong 1991, ch 6; Gould 1995; 
Wood 2003, ch. 3-4; Parkinson 2013). The effect increases shared expectations for 
participation in overt, collective challenges. Second, mobilization activities provide for 
the accumulation of resources that can be redistributed as selective incentives (Lichbach, 
1998, 36-38). Supply networks are established to funnel resources, such as food, funding 
or weapons, into an organization infrastructure that can reallocate the resource flows to 
individuals on the periphery of the movement (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam 1982; 
Morris 1984, ch. 8; Oliver 1984; Chong 1991, 126-141; Staniland 2012; Parkinson 2013). 
The effect is to provide the structural foundation for growth by increasing the incentives 
for individual participation in overt, collective challenges. Finally, mobilization activities 
help institutionalize tit-for-tat reciprocity (Lichbach 1998, 129-146). Mobilization 
activities support an organizational base from which the sustained interactions necessary 
for the evolution of collective monitoring and enforcement can be developed (e.g., 
Hardin 1982, 165-187; Axelrod 1984, 124-142; Ostrom 1990, 94-100; Chong 1991, ch. 
3). The effect is to facilitate the long-term trust necessary to produce cooperation even 
when  any  one  individual’s  participation  is  contingent  on  the  participation  of  others.   
In the presence of sustained mobilization, the possibilities for mass participation 
shift dramatically. Individuals who had previously acquiesced to political authority find 
themselves forced to choose between the demands of the existing government and an 
organized challenger promising a variety of selective and collective goods in exchange 
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for individual participation (Tilly 1978, 192). In this way, mobilization activities must 
begin before overt, collective challenges, but also must persist to sustain overt, collective 
challenges over time. 
 
The Multi-directional Impacts of Political Repression 
For governments seeking to maximize the security of their office, repression is a tool 
commonly utilized to disrupt the development of dissent (Davenport 2007a). 
Sophisticated surveillance apparatuses are established to monitor social behavior and 
detect movements toward overt, collective challenges, while armed security forces are 
trained to direct coercive force at perceived threats.  
Through the development of these instruments of repression and their past 
experience interacting with dissidents, governments come to recognize the organizational 
processes necessary to inspire and sustain challenges to their rule (Sullivan 2013). 
Consequently, as part of repressive efforts to secure their tenures, governments look to 
identify behaviors, such as meetings, seminars, fundraising or recruitment drives, which 
do not directly threaten the government, but involve the coordination of individuals and 
signal organization in support of collective challenges. Employing repression against 
such activities, even when dissidents are not actively challenging the government, can 
prevent overt, collective challenges by depleting the organizations necessary to inspire 
and sustain such activity.33 When mobilization activities are ongoing, individuals share 
common expectations and trust that enables them to overcome internal barriers to 
                                                        
 
33 These predicted effects are expected to hold on average, ceteris paribus. In the conclusion I address some 




participation and to act collectively. However, when mobilization activities are not 
possible because government coercion has disrupted the organization necessary to 
coordinate such behavior, would-be-challengers return to situation in which they view 
participation in overt collective challenges to be personally impractical. 
Repressing mobilization activities can be quite difficult for governments, as this 
behavior typically takes place clandestinely. Challenger organizations attempt to shield 
their behavior from the government, for example by developing safe houses and 
clandestine supply networks. The challenges associated with identifying mobilization 
activities and directing repression at such behavior mean that even while governments 
may prefer to repress mobilization prior to the onset of overt, collective challenges, 
governments can have trouble identifying the initial instances of mobilization activities.34 
But as governments begin to suspect increased mobilization activities (for example when 
movements reveal their capacity for overt, collective challenges by engaging in public 
demonstrations or when government surveillance yields actionable intelligence), 
government forces are redistributed to restrict mobilization activities by directing 
surveillance and repression at suspected mobilization sites. 
When governments are able to identify mobilization activities and direct repression 
at those efforts, repression targets the individuals at the heart of challenger organizations. 
These organizers are responsible for investing disproportionately in developing 
behavioral challenges. Without the rank and file present, the security forces repressing 
mobilization activities can focus coercion on removing these individuals and disrupting 
                                                        
 
34 It suffices to say that there is a minimum amount of state capacity necessary to identify and repress 




their behavior. At the same time, repressing mobilization activities depletes challenger 
organizations of important resources such as weapons, printing presses, and safe houses.  
There are important implications for the production of collective challenges. First, 
targeting mobilization activities with repression can lead members of the collectivity to 
reevaluate decisions to align themselves in opposition to the state. Repressing 
mobilization activities targets the core organizations responsible for sustaining common 
expectations for cooperate behavior, and can disrupt delicate assurances for cooperation. 
Second, repressing mobilization activities can deplete the resources available for 
organizations to fund their activities and incentivize participation. Finally, it can 
destabilize long term trust between individuals. Repressing mobilization activities limits 
the capacity for challenger organizations to fulfill their commitments to members, which 
can push tit-for-tat strategies away from an all cooperate equilibrium to an all defect 
equilibrium. Consequently, when governments engage in political repression targeting 
mobilizing activities, it diminishes the capacity for overt, collective challenges. This 
leads  to  the  study’s  first  hypothesis: 
 
  Hypothesis 1: When mobilization activities are repressed, overt, collective 




By contrast, repression targeting overt, collective challenges, such as protests, strikes 
or ongoing attacks, does little to diminish the capacity for challenges to the state.35 While 
governments commonly employ repression against overt, collective challenges as they 
attempt to suppress dissent (e.g., Davenport 1995; Carey 2010), repressing collective 
challenges leaves in place the organizational infrastructure to facilitate dissent.36 When 
states target ongoing collective challenges with repression, they are able to selectively 
target challengers, but they often target those on the front lines, leaving organizers, and 
their mobilized resources safe behind the scenes.  
In the light of repression, the organization can publicize abuses committed by 
government forces as a focal point or rallying cry to direct new collective action. 
Mobilizers can expose abuses committed during the repression of collective challenges, 
identifying state coercion as a threat to collective interests (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). 
Simultaneously, the organization is able to vouch for existing assurances of cooptation as 
well as dole out the requisite selective incentives to sustain participation. They can 
provide some protections to members, shielding them from some of the personal costs of 
repression (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007).  As a result, in the wake of repression targeting 
overt challenges, backlash waves can emerge that increase overt, collective challenges. 
This discussion yields the second testable hypothesis: 
 
                                                        
 
35 There are no municipality-months in the data that jointly experience mobilization activities and collective 
challenges, and thus no sites in which both mobilization activities and overt, collective challenges are 
repressed.  
36 In addition to increasing the amount of challenges that are observed after the repression of overt, 
collective challenges, repression may influence the form such challenges take (for example, by pushing 
movements underground and away from mass politics [della Porta 1995]). Future work will be necessary to 
investigate the relationship between tactical selection and the number of challenges directed at the 
government in the wake of political repression. 
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Hypothesis 2: When overt, collective challenges are repressed, overt, 
collective challenges will increase. 
 
Case Selection 
The arguments above are evaluated using data on government and challenger 
behavior from Guatemala between 1975 and 1985. Over this period, the government of 
Guatemala employed a wide variety of repressive tactics, from torture and targeted 
assassinations to massacres, against a broad set of challengers and would-be challengers 
that included unions, peasant cooperatives, land rights groups Catholic activists, students, 
urban revolutionaries, and Marxist insurgents (see Carmack 1992; Stoll 1993; Schirmer 
1998; Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999; Ball et al. 1999; Manz 2004; Brocket 2005; 
Garrard-Burnett 2011).  
The form and severity of contentious politics varied widely across both time and 
space. Early on in the period, the conflict was largely isolated to the more urban 
municipalities such as Guatemala City or Escuintla. But as repression escalated, conflict 
spread in to the rural highland and to municipalities such as El Petén and Zacapa. By 
1977, many observers of the county (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Brocket 2005) 
characterize the country as being in a state of civil war. Repression hit its peak between 
1981 and 1983. Human rights organizations identify how rampant abuse occurred during 
this period; tens of thousands were killed and many more displaced from their homes 
(CEH 1999; Ball et al. 1999; Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999; Sanford 2004).  Political 
conflict continued to wax and wane in both territorial scope and intensity during the 
period in review, but eventually conflict between the state and the organized opposition 
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settled into a low level stalemate that persisted for more than a decade before the 1996 
peace negotiations brought an end to a particularly violent phase of Guatemalan history 
(Ball et al. 1999; CEH 1999).  
While many observers see the government’s   pacification   of   the   country   as   a  
victory of indiscriminate violence, particularly the massacres committed by an elite unit 
known as the Kaibiles (e.g., Stoll 1993; Perrera 1993; CEH 1999), it is important to note 
that while massacres are perhaps the most appalling form of government violence, 
repression in Guatemala encompassed an extremely broad variety of tactics deployed by 
several different units within the security apparatus. In the highlands, military massacres 
were commonly combined with two efforts to eradicate the base from which rural 
insurgents were mobilizing—forced   displacement   of   indigenous   peasants   into   “model  
villages”  and  the  organization  of  remaining  communities  into  paramilitary  units  directly  
overseen by the government. Alongside this military effort, the National Police engaged 
in a broad repressive campaign designed to root out individuals believed to be 
“subversives”   throughout   the   country. 37  While the application of repression by the 
National Police has received less attention, the police were no less ferocious in their 
efforts to counter what the government perceived to be a growing communist threat 
perpetrated by a unified front of unions, student activists, indigenous organizers and 
insurgent organizations (e.g., Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999; CEH 1999; Weld 2010).38 
                                                        
 
37 The police archives discussed below contain detailed information on repressive activity engaged in by 
the military as well as the police. 48% of the repressive events identified either exclusively involved the 
military or involved coordinated actions both the military and the police. The National Police committed 
the remaining activities. 
38 In actuality, these groups were fractured and pursued what were often mutually exclusive goals. In future 
analyses of the material studied in this research, it will be possible to disaggregate dyadic interactions 
between government forces and specific social movements. 
 
 73 
In order to track the activities of these groups, target coercive behavior, and evaluate its 
effects, the state developed a sophisticated system of surveillance, reporting, and 
archiving in which the National Police played a large role (Guberek 2012; Weld 2010; 
Schirmer 1998). Guatemala received millions of dollars of aid and direct training in 
intelligence collection from the CIA and the US Army, as well as the Israeli, Argentine, 
Colombian, Chilean, and Taiwanese intelligence forces (McClintock 1985; Jonas 1996; 
Schirmer 1998). Much of this money was devoted to developing a police force (with 
national jurisdiction) that was highly skilled at investigation, intimidation, arrest, 
disappearance, and torture (CEH 1999; Archdiocese 1999).  
Because of the wide variation in repressive behavior occurring in Guatemala, 
studying this case can provide lessons for an encompassing variety of repressive states, 
ranging from those engaged with lower level abuses to those committing more egregious 
violations. In this way the case of Guatemala functions as a unique laboratory for 
examining repressive action. It is certainly an outlier in terms of the amount of repressive 
action employed, which to some may indicate that the case can only be generalized to 
other civil war settings. But that sidesteps the question of how civil wars emerge, 
effectively ignoring the fact that civil war is the result of strategic decisions made by 
governments and challengers. Periods of heightened violence ebbed and flowed over 
different areas of Guatemala during the decade in review. I return to the discussion of 
generalizability in the conclusion. But it is important to note that examining this case 
allows the analysis to study variation across the full spectrum of repressive practices, 
while holding many other important external factors constant. Examining variation within 
this single country can also address the micro-dynamics of challenger organization and 
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government targeting that cannot be identified through studies employing broad cross-
national datasets (e.g., Davenport 1995; 2007b; Nordas and Davenport 2013; Danneman 
and Ritter forthcoming) 
 
Data 
Identifying the impacts of repression targeting mobilization activities or overt, 
collective challenges requires a research strategy that is distinct from the strategy most 
commonly employed in the existing literature. Across the existing research on repression, 
scholars have followed a reasonably consistent methodological sequence. The first step 
has been to collect information on the political actions committed by states and 
challengers and recorded by different ledger sources (e.g., newspapers). These recordings 
are then coded into events data and analyzed to test how repression committed at one 
point in time impacts counts of challenger activity occurring afterwards (e.g., Francisco 
1995; 1996; Moore 1998; Shellman 2006).  
There are two principal concerns with the existing approach. The first is that the 
ledger sources most often employed within existing work tend to be biased towards the 
reporting of specific events—those that are large, urban and violent (Davenport and Ball 
2002; Earl et al. 2004). As a consequence, the empirical records analyzed within the 
existing research often miss the small, private mobilization activities that inspire and 
sustain overt, collective challenges (Sullivan 2013). The second concern has to do with 
the information that is extracted when scholars code the available events records. 
Imprecise information in the existing ledger sources means that the existing work often 
has to rely on crude indicators for their theoretical concepts, for example by proxying 
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challenger development based on increases or decreases in observed overt, collective 
challenges (e.g., Brocket 2005; Sullivan et al. 2012) or using the technology of repression 
as a proxy for its target selection (e.g., Lyall 2009; Kocher et al. 2012).  
 Looking forward, research will require data that are more precise and 
disaggregated across both time and space. Such data will have to be based on alternative 
sources capable of identifying the smaller events that form the basis for organizing overt 
challenges. Lastly, when coding this alternative source material, greater details are 
needed to locate exactly whom or what the government is targeting.  
Data for this study are taken from the Guatemalan National Police Archive 
(AHPN), an archive of police records found in Guatemala City. For nearly a hundred 
years, the Guatemalan National Police stored their records in a large series of warehouses 
located in police compound on the outskirts of the city. In 1996, the National Police were 
disbanded and reformed into the new National Civilian Police, which included members 
of the demobilized insurgent organizations. Documents lingered in the warehouse for 
nearly  ten  years  until  they  were  discovered  by  the  Human  Rights  Ombudsman’s  office  in  
2006 (Doyle 2006).  
What the Ombudsman discovered was a trove of more than 80 million records 
containing information produced during the routine bureaucratic processes that 
accompany police surveillance, arrests, torture as well as other repressive acts carried out 
by the state. With aid from several European governments, the warehouse was 
transformed into the AHPN. Each document was organized, indexed, and archived, the 
approximately 10 million documents dating from 1975-1985 were digitized and entered 
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into an electronic archive. Those documents were released to the public in early 2009 and 
this project was one of the first to access the full digital collection. 
Data generated from the AHPN are employed to track the diverse behavior of 
social movements and members of civil society, identify acts of political repression by 
government forces, and identify the effects of repression on overt, collective challenges. 
For example, records from the AHPN contain information on more than 3,000 events 
participated in by members of civil society or social movements. A similar sample 
collected from the major international and domestic press identified fewer than 1,000 
events (Sullivan 2013). Most importantly, the AHPN data allow for direct observation of 
the targets of political repression.39 Where as other data sets have been forced to draw 
inferences about targeting based on the form of repression applied, such as the weapon 
utilized, or scope of victimization, the police files typically overtly identify both the type 
of activity the engaged in by state forces and the groups or individuals that activity was 
directed against. 
To generate an events database of political activity from 10 million documents 
recorded in the AHPN, a multi-stage sampling procedure was carried out.40 In total, more 
than a quarter million files were read including every file sent to either the Director 
General’s   office   and   the  Office for Coordinating Military and Police Activity. Coders 
                                                        
 
39 With regards to the reporting of repression, it is important be conscious of bias against the reporting of 
atrocities. The Supplemental Appendix contains a discussion detailing case specific information on 
underreporting  as  it  pertains  to  the  study’s  analysis. 
40 Details on the sampling procedure can be found in the Supplemental Appendix and in Sullivan 2013. The 
files were read by myself and two other human coders, and I adjudicated any coding disputes. Inter-coder 
reliability checks consistently demonstrated reliability rates well above 85%. The coding rubric along with 




read each file and coded all politically relevant events into the database using a coding 
rubric that included nearly one hundred event types.41  
 What is unique about the database is the dyadic nature of state-challenger 
interactions that is built into its structure. For each event, variables record how members 
of civil society were behaving and how representatives of the Guatemalan state were 
behaving. For example, for a protest, the protesting organization is coded, as well as their 
behavior during the protest. If the government responded by policing the protest, then the 
relevant policing organization was identified and their behavior was coded. If the protest 
went on but was not policed, then the columns identifying state behavior were coded 0. 
Similarly, if the state engaged in an activity in which there was no identifiable related 
civil society behavior, for example the enforcement of perimeter lines around a public 
square, then the columns for civil society actors were coded 0.   
 
Operationalization and Research Design 
Mobilization activities are operationalized as identified challenger behavior that is 
designed to increase the level of formal organization of a challenger group or to raise the 
resource endowment of existing challenger organizations. Examples of challenger 
mobilization activities that are captured in the data include the distribution of 
information, organizational meetings, training sessions and recruitment efforts. Overt, 
Collective Challenges are operationalized as public efforts by organized challengers to 
                                                        
 
41  The database thus captures all political activity identified by the National Police and the Military 
Coordination office. This corpus can be used as a proxy for the set of political activity the government was 
aware of, but should not be thought of as a complete universe of political actions.  
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press claims against political authority. Examples include strikes, demonstrations, 
marches, roadblocks, targeted killings, arson, kidnapping and the taking of hostages.42 
Political repression is operationalized as politically motivated violence committed 
by representatives of the state against individuals under their political jurisdiction. 
Examples of political repression that are captured in the data include death threats, 
torture, disappearances, shootings, raids, protest policing and politically motivated 
arrests. Each instance of political repression is further coded as to the type of non-state 
action (i.e., mobilization activities or overt collective challenge) it is related to. Through 
this process, it is possible to identify for each incident of political repression whether that 
repression was directed at the mobilizing activities of would be dissidents, at ongoing 
collective challenges, or at no apparent act of dissident behavior.43 
For the analyses below, the units of analysis are monthly measures of political 
activity in   each   of   Guatemala’s   municipalities   from   1975-1985. 44 The analysis 
investigates how repression targeting mobilization activities influenced later rates of 
collective challenges by dissidents as well as how repression targeting overt, collective 
challenges influenced dissident challenges. It is important to note the relevant comparison 
being made in this analysis. The aim not to draw inferences about how rates of challenges 
following the repression of mobilization activities compared to rates of challenges 
                                                        
 
42  This is admittedly a broad categorization. Future analyses might further divide overt, collective 
challenges based on the various tactics employed by challengers.  
43 There were very few incidents of repression (fewer than 50) for which there was no connected or related 
act of non-state behavior. This fact provides some interesting insight into when, how and why repression is 
applied. On the other side, there were a large number (more than 800) incidents of mobilization activities 
and  collective  challenges  for  which  the  state’s  only  identifiable  action  was  the  filing of a report.  
44 Municipalities are the second smallest administrative unit in Guatemala. During the period under review, 
there were 326 municipalities in the country. The smallest was San Jose Chacaya, with 464 inhabitants in 
1981, and the largest was Guatemala City, which held 754,243 inhabitants.   
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following the repression of overt, collective challenges. Instead, the design is attempting 
to draw inferences about how the repression of mobilization activities impacts challenges, 
when compared to situations in which mobilization activities took place but repression 
did not occur. Similarly, for repression directed against overt, collective challenges, the 
study is attempting to draw inferences about how rates of dissident activity compare 
following the repression of overt, challenges relative to when repression was not applied. 
 
Identification Strategy  
This study employs an instrumental-variables (IV) design as its analytic strategy 
to identify how repression targeting mobilization activities or overt, collective challenges 
impacts dissent. The objective is to generate estimates for how different forms of 
repressive behavior affect overt, collective challenges by paying acute attention to how 
collective challenges would have unfolded if repression were not applied. Like most 
social phenomena, repression is (generally) applied non-randomly (Conrad and Ritter 
2014). To the extent that the selection processes associated government decisions to 
apply repression are related to the expected behavior of dissidents, then correlations 
between repression and dissident behavior are likely to be biased (Sullivan et al. 2012).  
 IV regression employs two equations in order to first identify seemingly 
exogenous variation in the independent variable (i.e., repression targeting mobilization 
activities or collective challenges) and then examine how that exogenous variation relates 




NGO reports on governmental human rights abuses are employed as an 
instrument to identify as-if-randomization in the application of political repression. 
Specifically, the study utilizes the percentage of state human rights abuses identified by 
human rights NGOs (calculated as the number of abuses recorded in NGO reports over 
the total number of abuses identified in the data). Data on NGO human rights reporting 
come from the publications of five human rights organizations—Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International and three Guatemalan human rights groups. They were compiled 
by The Center for Human Rights Research (CIIDH), a nongovernmental organization 
based in Guatemala City, during the truth and reconciliation processes that took place in 
Guatemala in the 1990s (Ball et al., 1999; Ball, 1999; Ball, 2001). The project, which was 
directed by the Human Rights Data Analysis Group for the purpose of identifying 
incidents of human rights abuses committed by state forces, insurgents, and other militant 
actors, began with a thorough review of published human rights documents. These 
reports were coded for who committed the act, as well as where and when it took place. 
The CIIDH data were used to generate monthly measures of the percentage of human 
rights abuses recorded by NGOs in a municipality each moth over the preceding six 
months.45  
The core criteria for a valid IV design require that (1) the instrument impact 
variation in the independent variables of interests (the relevance criterion), (2) that the 
                                                        
 
45 Because data on the publication date is not available for a large majority of the human rights reports, the 
date in which the reported violation took place is used to identify the human rights report, rather than the 
date in which the report was published. This seems to be relatively inconsequential as the available data 
suggests that the human rights reporting took place extremely quickly. Among the reports for which data on 
the publication date is available, 85% of the reports were published in the same month in which the 
reported violation took place. 93% were published within two months of the violation occurring. Less than 
2% were reported more than six months after the violation occurred. 
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instrument is independent of other causes of the dependent variable (exogeneity of the 
instrument), (3) and that the instrument only influences the dependent variable through its 
impact on the endogenous treatment (the exclusion restriction). These criteria are not 
directly testable on the data employed on the analysis. However, it is possible to validate 
the instrument’s  plausibility  by   looking  at   qualitative   case   evidence,   along  with   related  
outside research and relevant statistical tests (Dunning 2012). 
 Researchers have recently devoted considerable attention to investigating the 
relationship between NGO reporting and government behavior, with numerous studies 
showing how naming and shaming can have important impacts on human rights 
practices. To begin, there is evidence that naming and shaming can increase international 
pressures to reduce human rights abuses, either in the form of sanctions or in the 
likelihood of humanitarian intervention (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; 
Esarey and DeMeritt 2013; Murdie and Peksen 2013a; 2013b). There is also a variety of 
research that probes the relationship between naming and shaming and repression 
directly. Though results are split between those who see naming and shaming impact as 
reducing repression (e.g., Franklin 2008; DeMeritt 2012; Krain 2012; Murdie and Davis 
2012; Hendrix and Wong 2013) or leading to a shift in tactics (e.g., Ron 1997; Hafner-
Burton 2008; Conrad and DeMeritt 2011), the evidence is consistent in concluding that 
following   the   publication   of   NGO   reports   detailing   a   government’s   abuse   of   human  
rights, there are observable changes in repressive practice. This externally imposed 
variation is all that is necessitated by the relevance criterion. The Supplemental Appendix 
includes a discussion specifically about how human rights reporting influenced repressive 
practices in the case of Guatemala. 
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With regards to dissident behavior and NGO reporting, the exclusion criterion 
necessitates that NGO reporting only influence overt, collective challenges through its 
impact on government repression. While there is a great deal of evidence to suggest the 
government was sensitive to the information reported by human rights NGOs, it is less 
obvious that the publication of NGO reports detailing governmental human rights abuses 
impacted the strategic behavior dissidents engaged in. The presence of human rights 
organizations has been shown to help to boost mobilization (e.g., Murdie and Bhasin 
2011; Bell et al. 2012; Bell et al. forthcoming). This is particularly true if they are active 
in domestic politics, but even from abroad human rights organizations can boost domestic 
protests. But such accounts stress the impact of human rights NGOs on domestic protest 
through their presence, not through their reporting and it is not obvious from existing 
work how variation in the reporting of human rights abuses might influence domestic 
dissent. For human rights reporting to influence dissidents, they would have to possess 
the information, strategic interest, and capacity to respond to its publication (Dunning 
2012). It could be argued that human rights reporting signals to activists that NGO 
community is present and supports their endeavors. To the extent this is true, it would 
bias   the   estimates   of   repression’s   effects   in   an   upward  direction,   effectively   increasing  
the probability of rejecting Hypothesis 1 (regarding the repression of mobilization 
activities) while decreasing the probability of rejecting Hypothesis 2 (regarding the 
repression of overt, collective challenges). The Supplemental Appendix contains greater 
detail on the relationship between human rights NGO reporting and dissent in Guatemala, 
specifically with regards to why information from human rights NGOs was unlikely to 
influence dissident behavior. But in order to guard against any remaining influence 
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transmitted by NGOs through their reporting, the models below include controls for both 
local and regional NGO presence. 
 
Table SII-I: P-Values for Balance Tests of Pre-treatment Covariates 
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Table I presents evidence supporting the as-if randomization in repression yielded 
by the documentation of human rights abuses in NGO reports. The table presents p-
values for balance statistics of pretreatment measures of overt, collective challenges as 
well as a host of other important covariates (see Dunning 2012, 239-241). Two sets of 
equations were estimated. The left two columns represent the results of a series of IV 
regression models regressing instrumented measures of repression targeting mobilization 
activities and repression targeting overt, collective challenges on pre-treatment 
covariates. The right two columns replicate this analysis except that the equations employ 
first-differenced (e.g., ΔXi,t  = Xi,t  - Xi,t-1) changes in time variant independent and 
dependent variables, rather than direct values.  
The first thing to note in looking at the table is that instrumented measures of 
repression targeting mobilization activities and repression targeting overt, collective 
challenges appear uncorrelated with pre-treatment measures of overt, collective 
challenges as well as pre-treatment measures of mobilization. While one cannot directly 
test   the   validity   of   the   instrument’s   exclusion,   the   table   presents   indirect   evidence  
suggesting that prior to the application of treatment the exogenous influence of human 
rights reporting on repression was uncorrelated with dissident behavior. This is true both 
for the equations estimating direct measures (i.e., columns one and two) and for the fird 
equations (i.e., columns three and four).   
Table I also presents evidence of the degree of balance across pre-treatment 
measures of a host of important covariates. Seven distinct covariates are examined. 
Specifically, the analysis investigates the balance across two measures of challenger 
behaviors in neighboring territories—a spatial lag of mobilization activities and a spatial 
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lag of overt, collective challenges. The spatial lags measure ongoing counts of different 
forms of challenger behavior inversely weighted by how far they occurred from a given 
municipality (Ward and Gleditch, 2008). Two measures of democracy are also included. 
The  first  is  an  annual  democracy  score  for  the  country,  measured  using  Vreeland’s  (2008)  
X-polity score. The second is a measure of any electoral campaign activity occurring in 
municipality and recorded in the AHPN. Finally, three time-invariant measures are 
included to identify the strategic value of a particular municipality—the municipal 
population, the percentage of the municipality that was indigenous, and the percentage of 
the municipality that was literate. 
All of the evidence from the balance statistics supports the as-if randomization in 
repression inspired by human rights reporting. For both the equations employing direct 
measures and the first-differenced equations, there is no evidence that the exogenous 
influence of human rights reporting on repression targeting mobilization activities or 
repression targeting overt, collective challenges was correlated with pre-treatment 
measures in any of these important covariates. Once again, this is not a direct test of the 
exogeneity of the instrument, but it does provide evidence supportive of the contention 
that human rights reporting is not influencing the outcome through covariates other than 
repression (Dunning 2012, 239-241). 
One remaining note concerns issues of state capacity. As a general rule, 
repression targeting mobilization activities is positively correlated with state capacity (as 
measured by municipal population and literacy rates), which suggests that such behavior 
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is more likely to be observed in high capacity regions. 46  While the instrumented 
repression of mobilization activities appears uncorrelated with measures of capacity (as 
identified in Table I), several steps were taken to address the general relationship among 
these variables. First, the measures of state capacity are included as control variables in 
the analyses below. Second, in the Supplemental Appendix, the analysis is replicated on 
subsamples   of   ‘high   capacity’   and   ‘low   capacity’   municipalities.   The   implications   for  
generalizing the argument are discussed in the conclusion. 
                                                        
 
46 Capacity appears related to quantity, not occurrence. Regressing repression of mobilization on measures 
of state capacity yields positive and statistically significant results. However, when looking at a zero-
inflated negative-binomial regression, in both cases the state capacity variables are correlated with quantity, 




Table SII-II: Instrumental Variables Second-Stage Estimation of Repression Targeting Mobilization and Overt Collective 
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Controls: overt, collective challenges (single and double lags), mobilization (single and double lags), repression of 
overt, collective challenges (single and double lags), repression of mobilization (single and double lags), spatial lag 
of overt, collective challenges, spatial lag of mobilization, campaign events, % indigenous, % literate, population, 




 Table   II   presents   the   principal   results   estimating   repression’s   impact   on   overt,  
collective challenges, conditional on whether repression targeted mobilization  activities 
or overt, collective challenges. The first stage of these models estimates the repression of 
mobilization activities and the repression of overt, collective challenges as a function of 
the percentage of human rights  abuses  committed  in  Guatemala’s  326  municipalities  that  
were documented in NGO reports during each of the past six months. These results are 
presented in the Supplemental Appendix and demonstrate consistent significant 
relationship between lagged measures of human rights NGO reporting and repression 
targeting mobilization activities as well as repression targeting overt, collective action.  
The second stage in the IV models estimates the local average treatment effect 
(LATE) of seemingly exogenous variation in repression on overt, collective challenges. 
With any instrumental variables model, attention needs to be paid to the types of units 
affected by the exogenous instrument and how they may or may not differ from the 
broader population of potentially treated units. In this case, the balance statistics in Table 
I suggest that there is a high degree of comparability between sites in which repression 
was applied as function of NGO reporting and sites in which it was not. The 
Supplemental Appendix includes a more extensive discussion of the local generalizability 
of the LATE estimates as well as the generalizability of these estimates to cases outside 
Guatemala. 
Model I in Table II estimates the equation with no control variables. If the 
instrumented repression is truly exogenous, and not simply conditionally exogenous, then 
the   model   without   control   variables   should   yield   consistent   estimates   of   repression’s  
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LATE.   The   evidence   above   suggests   that   the   model’s   instrumented   repression   was  
independent of pretreatment measures of the control variables, but to check the validity of 
this assertion Model II includes the control variables from Table I above along with 
controls for lagged repression, (regional and local) NGO presence, and   the   country’s  
annual measure of democracy. Local NGO presence in a municipality is measured as a 
dummy measuring whether an NGO published a report about a given municipality in a 
given year. Regional NGO presence is measured using a spatial lag of the NGO presence 
measure. Model  III  includes  all  of  these  controls  along  with  fixed  effects  for  Guatemala’s  
22 departments and for each year in order to control for any potential confounding factors 
occurring at more aggregate geographic or temporal units.  
Models IV-VI assume the same structure as models I-III, except that they estimate 
first-differenced changes in the time variant independent and dependent variables. Thus 
instead of estimating how many overt, collective challenges occurred in a municipality-
month as a function of how many repressive events occurred, they estimate how changes 
in rates of overt, collective challenges relate to changes in rates of repression targeting 
mobilization activities and repression targeting overt, collective challenges. Importantly, 
controls for lagged overt, collective challenges, mobilization and repression are all first-
differenced as well to capture recent changes in collective challenges that might inspire 
both rates of repressive behavior and overt challenges (compare Berman et al. 2011). 
Across all six models, the standard errors are clustered by municipality (Dunning 2012, 
175-178). Models are estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments, which 
displays greater efficiency for calculating heteroskedastic error terms produced by cross-
sectional time-series research designs (Hansen 1982). 
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Hypothesis 1 predicts that repression directed against mobilization activities will 
be negatively related to overt, collective challenges. Looking at the results of Model I, 
repression targeting mobilization activities is estimated to reduce overt, collective 
challenges at a rate of one fewer challenge for every two mobilization events repressed. 
This effect is substantively significant. Across the full sample, overt, collective 
challenges occurred in just 3% of municipality-months. Of those months experiencing 
overt, collective challenges, 70% experienced only one challenge. If government forces 
were able to repress two mobilization events in those municipalities, the vast majority of 
overt, collective challenges would have been deterred. 
These results are consistent across model specifications. For five of the six 
specifications, repression of mobilization activities is estimated to reduce overt, collective 
challenges at a rate of about one fewer overt, collective challenge for every two 
mobilization events repressed. Model IV estimates a slightly larger impact, with an 
estimated effect of about one fewer overt, collective challenge for every mobilization 
event repressed. First differencing the equations in models IV-VI yields extremely similar 
estimates to the first three models, which suggests the time-series data were reasonably 
stochastic.  
The second hypothesis predicts that repression targeting overt, collective 
challenges will be positively related to overt, collective challenges. Looking at the 
estimated LATE for repression targeting overt, collective challenges, the results support 
this contention. Model I, which includes no controls and did not first-difference the time 
variant variables, estimates the effect to be very large substantively. In this case, 
repressing overt, collective challenges is estimated to lead to 17 more overt, collective 
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challenges than would have occurred had that repression not occurred. While the results 
are consistent across specifications, the substantive size of this affect appears to be 
something of an outlier when looking at the results of the other models. In Models II-VI, 
a single act of repression targeting overt, collective challenges is estimated to lead to 
around four additional overt, collective challenges than would have occurred had that 
repression not taken place. 
 
Conclusion 
 Governments routinely turn to repression as a means for protecting their rule from 
overt, collective challenges, such as strikes, protests, and targeted attacks. At times, these 
efforts appear to succeed, diminishing challenges and helping preserving the existing 
political order. But government coercion appears equally likely to fail, leading to an 
escalation of conflict and potentially civil war or revolution. This study has argued that 
the impact of political repression on dissent is conditional on the types of challenger 
behavior targeted by the government. When governments are able to direct repression at 
the mobilization activities carried out behind the scenes by challenger organizations, 
repression depletes the capacity for the organization to coordinate overt, collective 
challenges, such as demonstrations or strikes. By contrast, when governments direct 
repression against ongoing overt, collective challenges, it leaves challenger organizations 
in place to escalate levels of dissent. 
 The study finds support for these arguments in a statistical analysis of micro-
dynamic variation in political repression in Guatemalan municipalities from 1975-1985. 
Human rights NGO reports are used to identify plausibly exogenous variation in 
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repression (directed against mobilization activities or overt, collective challenges). When 
the impacts of repression are estimated using this technique, the results indicate that 
repression directed against mobilization activities decreases the number of challenges 
committed by dissidents, while repression directed against overt, collective challenges 
increases such activities. 
At the micro-level, the results address limitations in prior efforts to resolve the 
relationship between repression and political challenges. Earlier studies have noted that 
repression’s   effects   might   be   conditional   on   when   it   was   applied   and   suggested   that  
repression that selectively targets dissidents will have divergent effects from coercion 
applied indiscriminately. The present study advances upon such analysis by identifying 
precisely how repression operates at different stages of dissident organization, while also 
providing evidence that even selectively targeted repression may have different effects 
depending on the types of activities it targets.  
There are also clues for understanding the broader phenomena of order and 
conflict. When governments succeed in repressing mobilization activities, it depletes the 
capacity for the public expression of collective claims making. To the extent that this 
form of repression is responsible for stabilizing order, it is important to recognize that 
within apparently peaceful states, there are selection effects operating to limit the public 
articulation of particular ideologies or grievances. At the same time, to the extent that 
dissidents can conceal their mobilization activities and outpace government efforts to 
repress mobilization, their capacity to affect change and potentially overthrow the 
government is improved. Here there are important selection effects to be studied 
regarding the types of movements that are more or less able to avoid the repression of 
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mobilization. Understanding which types of movements succeed and which fail can help 
to explain the onset and escalation of political conflict. 
 Governments are best able to suppress challenges when they can identify 
mobilization activities and target them with repression. There are important structural 
variables, such as democracy, state capacity or civil war, that should impact the 
government’s  capacity  to  identify  and  repress  mobilization,  and  should  thus  be  significant  
predictors of how likely a state is to descend into civil conflict. A study such as this one, 
which investigates micro-dynamic variation within a single case, has the capacity to 
narrow down on and identify challenger responses to individual acts of repression. But it 
has limited capacity to examine the impact of macro-level variables that could condition 
those responses. While it is important to note that many relevant structural factors, such 
as democracy, capacity, or civil war, are likely to be endogenously related to the 
outcomes of government-challenger struggles, greater attention to how these structures 
influence the subsequent strategic choices could provide clues to the broader 
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Chapter 4: Challenger Demands and the Liberalization of Repression 
 
Abstract: This study seeks to account for the liberalization of political repression in 
authoritarian regimes, asking why an authoritarian government would begin to improve 
its respect for human rights. The theory offered challenges widely held conceptions about 
liberalization and the foundation of civil peace. As argued, governments do not limit their 
use of repression in response to domestic democratic pressures or international naming 
and shaming efforts. Instead, repression persists in settings where citizens remain 
ideologically mobilized in support of radical redistributions of political or economic 
power. Repression is curtailed only after the state has removed all organizational efforts 
to mobilize in support of such ideals. This argument is tested against rival hypotheses 
using empirical data on patterns of liberalization in Guatemala between 1975-1985. 
Analysis of unique data collected from the confidential records of Guatemalan National 
Police reveals that repression persists in the face of democratic institutions and 
international pressures as well as settings where the government has monopolized the 
control of force over territory. Liberalization occurs only after radical mobilization has 
ceased. Implications are drawn for how we understand democratization and political 




Coercion is inherent in nearly all contemporary understandings of government (e.g., 
Tilly 1985; Olsen 1993; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Scott 2009). This is particularly 
true for autocratic regimes, which are believed to hold their societies in check through 
force (e.g., Linz 2000; Art 2012; Svolik 2012; Escribà-Folch 2013; Greitens 2013). Not 
only are citizens exposed to the threat of physical violence, but they also face limits on 
their ability to express ideals publically and collectively. 
Yet, while autocratic regimes are substantially more repressive than their democratic 
counterparts, autocratic governments do occasionally liberalize and improve their respect 
for human rights.47 Coercive behaviors such as censorship, disappearances, and torture, 
which had previously been pervasive, become far more limited. Between 2005 and 2010, 
autocratic governments such as Zimbabwe and Uzbekistan moved from situations in 
which  human  rights  violations  were  applied  against  “large  numbers  of  the  population”  to  
policies of repression that were more constrained (Wood and Gibney 2010). Periods of 
autocratic  liberalization  improve  respect  for  citizens’  physical  integrity  rights  and  expand  
opportunities for political participation. Liberalization has also been linked to more 
macro-level outcomes, in particular to improved prospects for democratization  
(O’Donnel  and  Schmitter  1986;;  Geddes  1999).  Many  scholars  continue  to  believe,  first,  
that democratization cannot occur without liberalization, and, second, that liberalization 
sets in motion political dynamics that will produce democratization.  
                                                        
 
47 Repression  refers  to,  “coercive  actions  political  authorities  take  to  inhibit the will or capacity of people 
within  their  jurisdiction  to  influence  political  outcomes”  (Ritter  2014).  For  the  purposes  of  this  article,  the  
terms  repression,  coercion,  and  human  rights  abuse  are  used  interchangeably.  Liberalization  refers  to  “the  
process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or 
illegal  acts  committed  by  the  state  or  third  parties”  (O’Donnell  and  Schmitter  1986,  11).  Liberalization  does  
not refer to the temporary easing of particular restrictions or coercive tactics, but to drastic and lasting 
reductions in the overall levels of human rights abuse. 
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Despite the significance of liberalization, the process remains poorly understood (e.g., 
Conrad and Moore 2010; Moore 2010; Kathman and Wood 2011). There are at least two 
bodies of work that have emerged out of the broader literature on human rights to touch 
on the topic. The first investigates why governments commit repression to begin with. 
Here, following Weber, scholars have argued that governments repress in order to 
counter violent challenges to their rule (e.g., Moore 2000; Earl 2003; Davenport 2007a; 
Carey 2010; Pierskalla 2010; Ritter 2014). Once a government has succeeded in 
monopolizing control over a given piece of territory, one can extend the argument to 
predict that repression will abate. While this may argument may be consistent with many 
realist visions of the state, a second body of research investigates how domestic and 
international regimes can be put in place to constrain repressive leaders. The contention 
here is that given sufficient democratic institutions or NGO naming and shaming efforts, 
governments can be forced into liberalization (e.g., Davenport 2007b; Murdie and Davis 
2012; Conrad and Ritter 2013; Conrad 2014).  
While such arguments may intuitively follow from standard assumptions about state 
behavior, I argue that neither is sufficient for explaining liberalization because neither 
addresses the inherent uncertainty that surrounds government decisions to improve their 
respect for human rights. This paper advances an alternative explanation for liberalization 
that focuses on government forecasts for the types of challenges likely to emerge from 
civil society in the post-liberalization environment. Governments are not simply 
concerned with monopolizing force over a given set of territory, but are preoccupied with 
preventing the public articulation of ideologies that directly challenge the foundations of 
their rule. Despite the most concerted attempts to constrain repression though domestic 
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institutions or naming and shaming efforts, liberalization only becomes attractive for 
authoritarian regimes in sites where there are reasonable assurances that future public 
expressions will not articulate ideas that fundamentally challenge the regime.  
To forecast the types of demands likely to emerge from civil society if the state were 
to lessen its use of coercion, authoritarian governments develop sophisticated 
surveillance apparatuses designed to monitor the clandestine organizational activities that 
support challenges and sustain movements during times of abeyance (e.g., Lewis 2013). 
In sites where governments identify mobilization in support of radical transformations of 
political or economic power, repression is used to remove the underlying organizational 
structures and deter others from organizing around such ideals in the future (Sullivan 
2013; 2014). By targeting mobilization activities that support radical ideals, while leaving 
in place mobilization activities with demands that are less threatening, there is a 
deliberate effort to whittle away at the potential challenges that could emerge following 
liberalization. Improved respect for human rights is likely to occur only after radical 
mobilization activities have been eliminated. 
These arguments are evaluated using micro-level evidence of the liberalization of 
Guatemala’s   human   rights   record   between   1975   and   1985.   This   is   a   case   in  which   an  
autocratic government moved away from the most severe forms of political repression 
and began to improve its respect for human rights slowly, but steadily, across different 
areas of the country. It is also a case in which the government was challenged by a 
violent insurgency, while also facing significant domestic and international pressures to 
improve its respect for human rights. The investigation utilizes original data collected 
from previously confidential records produced by the Guatemalan security forces. A 
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series of event history models examine the relationship between patterns of liberalization 
and hypotheses derived from the above theory as well as its principal alternatives. 
The findings caution against putting faith in the abilities of democratic institutions or 
human rights monitoring to inspire liberalization. Even in regimes classified as semi-
democratic, liberalization is found to be extremely unlikely in settings where the state 
perceives its deterrence efforts as incomplete. And NGO naming and shaming displays 
almost no ability to induce liberalization where the government is concerned with the 
potential public expression of transformative ideals. Respect for human rights does 
improve, but only after the government has assurances that it has purged attempts to 
mobilize in support of radical ideals. 
The rest of the study proceeds in the following manner. First, I review explanations 
for liberalization emerging from the existing literature on human rights. I then present an 
alternative argument that links liberalization to the elimination of radical mobilization 
activities. The third section discusses the details of liberalization in Guatemala and 
presents the data. The analysis then proceeds within an event history framework. In the 
conclusion, I discuss the broader implications of the findings for human rights and 
democratization. 
 
The Liberalization of Human Rights Abuse 
While liberalization has remained at the core of research on democratization for 
nearly three decades, there has been little systematic study focusing specifically on 
governmental decisions to stop committing certain forms of repression and drastically 
 
 108 
improve their respect for human rights (e.g., Conrad and Moore 2010). 48  Instead, 
theoretical and empirical studies of human rights overwhelmingly concentrate on the 
situations conducive to the use of political repression (see Davenport 2007a; Davenport 
and Inman 2012). Effectively inverting the research question at the core of this study, 
such work has concentrated on why governments would apply varying levels of coercion 
rather than why they might reduce or stop repression.  
In accounting for this behavior, the dominant approach relies on government efforts 
to protect itself from observed challenges to its rule (e.g., Carey 2010; Davenport 1995; 
1996; 2007b; 2010; Earl et al. 2003; Moore 2000; Pion-Berlin 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; 
Poe et al. 1999; Valentino et al. 2004).  Often  referred  to  as  “threat  response  theory,”  the  
central argument behind such work is that governments are attempting to control ongoing 
challenges to their rule. The foundations behind the dominant theory lie in a Weberian 
(2009 [1919]) conception of state coercion in which the state is principally interested 
monopolizing the use of force over a given piece of territory. As challenges to the 
government arise, repression is deployed to defeat the challengers and control the 
populace. 
Because governments employ repression in response to ongoing challenges, a 
reasonable extension of the argument can be made to understand why levels of repression 
would decline over time. If the mechanism motivating the use of repression is to control 
                                                        
 
48 Using the above definition, one could focus on de facto or de jure policies of liberalization. The approach 
taken here concerns itself with de facto liberalization, or the observed reduction in the application of 
political repression over a given time and space. While de jure protections are often fought for by domestic 
and international rights groups, legal guarantees are far too often overridden when the government 
perceives its interests lie in continued repression (e.g., Davenport 1996; Hafner-Burton and Ron 2007; 
Keith et al. 2009).  
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challenges, then when challenges abate repression should decline. In this case, the 
prediction is that liberalization should occur in settings where governments are no longer 
facing overt, collective challenges, such as riots, strikes, protests, or acts of terror.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The prospects for liberalization will increase as ongoing challenges 
to the government decline. 
 
Alongside threat response theory, there has been a more recent trend towards 
understanding how various institutions might be put in place to constrain the repressive 
inclinations of authoritarian regimes. Much like the development of threat response 
theory, such work has proceeded by studying variation in levels of repression across 
regimes, rather than examining why any particular regime might liberalize and severely 
curtail its use of coercion (see Davenport 2007a). But the theoretical assumptions 
underlying much of the institutional work on repression are quite distinct. Where threat 
response theory is based on perceptions of a Weberian state that is utilitarian in its use of 
repression to extend control, much of the institutional work examining constraints on 
repression sees coercion as originating within the institutional structure of the state. From 
this perspective, violence is used to take control of the state and is thus inherent within 
autocratic systems of government (e.g., Dallin and Breslauer 1970; Gurr 1986). 
In its strongest formulation, the coercive institutions that constitute authoritarian 
regimes will continue to apply repression until some other institution comes along to 
displace them (e.g., Greitens 2013). Once a regime is put in place, there is a great deal of 
path dependence to the application of political repression. However, during regime 
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change, governments are presented with critical junctures that enable institutional reform 
not possible during more routine political periods. As one regime is replaced with 
another,   the   incoming   regime   has   an   opportunity   to   effectively   ‘reset’   the   repressive  
apparatus and institute one that is (potentially) less repressive.49 
 
Hypothesis 2: The prospects for liberalization will increase during regime 
change. 
 
There is another body of institutional theory that believes coercive institutions are 
capable of being contained, but only if the right set of rival domestic institutions can be 
put in place to restrain the repressive apparatus. Most prominently, in what has been 
dubbed   the   “domestic   democratic   peace,”   regimes   governed   by   more   democratic  
institutions have been found to be significantly less repressive than regimes that do not 
hold such institutions (Davenport 1999; 2007b; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). The 
underlying theory suggests that democratic institutions decrease political repression by 
providing counterbalancing veto institutions and by imposing costs on repressive leaders 
through the possibility of being voted out of office. 
In considering this hypothesis, at least two important points need to be made. First, 
the argument inverts the traditional understanding that liberalization precedes 
democratization.  While   scholars   have   argued   for   the   “end   of   the   transition   paradigm”  
(Corothers 2002), it is still widely held that the openings provided by periods of 
                                                        
 
49 The incoming leader could also choose a more repressive institutional set up. See Greitens (2013) for an 
interesting look at the factors influencing this choice. 
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liberalization dramatically increase the expectations for democratic institutions, such as 
competitive elections (e.g., Geddes 1999; Tilly 2004).50 If respect for human rights must 
improve for democratic   institutions   to   form,   then   the  causal   attribution   of  democracy’s  
capacity to reduce repression may be overstated (compare Przeworski et al. 2000). 
Second, there is the question of whether democratic institutions can improve respect for 
human rights in states that do not qualify as fully democratic. While there is some 
evidence that institutions matter for constraining repression in authoritarian governments 
(e.g., Davenport 2007c; Franz and Kendall-Taylor forthcoming), other evidence suggests 
that democratic institutions within autocracies or semi-democracies are either irrelevant 
(e.g., Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Hill and Jones 2013) or, in the case of electoral 
behavior, can lead to increased repression (Maves Braithwaite and Tanaka 2013; see also 
Davenport 1997). Recognizing these empirical puzzles, it remains important to 
investigate the theoretical claim that institutionalized democracy should promote 
liberalization. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The prospects for liberalization will increase in the presence of 
democratic institutions. 
 
A final argument that can be extracted from the existing literature on human rights 
violations to formulate expectations for liberalization is based in a set of research that 
examines the effectiveness of international pressures to restrain government repression. 
                                                        
 




While scholars have looked at a wide variety of international factors that have the 
potential to influence decisions to commit repression, including economic sanctions (e.g., 
Wood 2008), intervention (e.g., Kathman and Wood 2011), and international law (e.g., 
Conrad and Ritter 2013), one of the more prominent arguments emerging in recent years 
focuses   on   the   effectiveness   of   NGO   ‘naming   and   shaming’   campaigns   for   reducing  
human rights abuses. While not directly addressing liberalization, a series of studies has 
shown that in the presence of naming and shaming efforts, levels of human rights abuse 
are significantly lower than they would be predicted to be otherwise (e.g., Franklin 2008; 
Demeritt 2012; Krain 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012; Hendrix and Wong 2013). The 
general contention holds that by publishing evidence of human rights abuses, NGOs are 
able to pressure states to improve their repressive practices by (1) framing discourse 
about the legitimacy of repressive behavior (e.g., Finemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse and 
Sikkink 1999) and (2) motivating third-party states and international organizations to 
impose costs on repressive regimes, potentially in the form of economic sanctions or 
humanitarian interventions (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Murdie and Peksen 2013; 
2014).  
Such research is suggestive of the potential for naming and shaming to inspire 
liberalization. Still, the exact impact of NGO reporting remains debated (see Hafner-
Burton 2008; Conrad and Moore 2010). A key concern regards the capacity for human 
rights groups to monitor the changes in repressive practices they aim to inspire. In one 
articulation of the argument, NGO naming and shaming might motivate a state to 
increase its restrictions on freedom of expression, limiting future monitoring by the news 
media and human rights organizations scholars so frequently rely on to study repression. 
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Alternatively, NGO reporting can motivate a change in repressive tactics towards 
instruments that are less easily monitored, such as forced disappearances or non-scarring 
torture (e.g., Ron 1997). In either case, questions arise regarding whether liberalization 
can be brought about through naming and shaming activities. Wary of these potentialities, 
the present study investigates the contention that NGO reporting should increase 
liberalization alongside the alternative arguments presented from the existing literature. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The prospects for liberalization will increase in the presence of 
NGO naming and shaming efforts 
 
Demands, Deterrence, and Decisions to Liberalize 
Liberalization is a process fraught with uncertainty. By making effective certain 
rights and liberties that were previously repressed, governments that had been holding 
society in check through coercion effectively generate new openings in the political 
opportunity structure.  If repression is a means of imposing costs on organized social 
forces, then liberalization effectively lowers the costs of collective action, making public 
expression more likely (e.g., Tilly 1978; Przeworski 1986; Tarrow 1998).  As new 
political groups emerge in response to these openings, governments can expect to face 
new challenges from what  O’Donnell  and  Schmitter  (1985,  55)  refer  to  a    “resurrection  of  
civil  society.”   
If managed effectively, these sorts of openings can hold considerable benefits for the 
regime. Coercion is costly, both as measured in terms of the expenditures on soldiers and 
weaponry, but also for its potential impact on human capital and economic productivity 
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(e.g., Yuksel and Yuksel 2013). Governments must constantly make constrained policy 
tradeoffs and continuing with repression can mean that fewer resources are available to 
pursue  other   goals.  And,   as  O’Donnell   and  Schmiter   (1986)  note,   “Authoritarian   rulers  
may tolerate or even promote liberalization in belief that by opening up certain spaces for 
individual and group action, they can relieve various pressures and obtain needed 
information  and  support  without  altering  the  structure  of  authority.”   
But every liberalization decision carries the risk that the newly emergent civil society 
actors   will   outpace   the   government’s   capacity   to   manage   their   demands.   When   this  
occurs, governments face the possibility for widespread civil conflict or revolution (e.g., 
Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Beissinger 2002). While it is true that, as Przeworski (1988, 
61)   notes,   “Liberalization   is   a   controlled   opening   of   the   political   space,   continually  
contingent upon the compatibility of the outcomes of politics with the interests or values 
of   the   authoritarian   power   apparatus,”   every   liberalization   decision   carries   with   it   the  
potential that emergent civil society groups will utilize the available openings to 
challenge the legitimacy of the regime.  
Liberalizing governments have been known to miscalculate. Almeida (2003) details 
how  political  organizations  formed  during  El  Salvador’s  initial  liberalization  in  the  1960s  
helped to sustain challengers during the ensuing civil war. Perhaps more famously, 
following the abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet Union conceded that it 
would no longer use force to ensure that the communist states of Central and Eastern 
Europe remained under the iron curtain. Waves of protests ensued, beginning first in 
Hungary and the German Democratic Republic and then quickly spreading through the 
region (see Beissinger 2002). Soon, one regime after another was brought down, as pro-
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democratic social movements drove their authoritarian rulers to cede power and 
capitulate to democratization.  
Yet such events are rare occurrences. In many more cases liberalization takes place 
without significant regime change (Corothers 2002). China, for example, began a process 
of liberalization under the Fifth Plenum Communique that many commentators believed 
would yield steps towards democratic reform (e.g., Thornton 2008; Gilley 2004). 
Repression was eased and some forms of domestic dissent began to be tolerated (e.g., 
Weiss 2013). But within this new political environment, the government has not been 
seriously challenged by public demands for regime change, nor has it enacted any 
significant democratic reform (Zhao 2003) 
Understanding when liberalization occurs necessitates considering how governments 
calculate the strategic uncertainty that surrounds this process. Because, as is commonly 
assumed, governments aim to maximize their time in office, there are long-term 
considerations that must be satisfied for liberalization to occur. Specifically, in choosing 
to ease repression, governments must consider their capacities to manage the demands of 
the emergent civil society.  
For liberalization to make sense from a cost benefit perspective, governments must 
have reasonable assurances that improved respect for human rights will not spark an 
escalation of mass conflict or revolution. Yet the existing literature on human rights 
provides little understanding for how governments might generate expectations for the 
potential impacts that liberalization might have on future patterns of contention. Existing 
efforts, including those derived from arguments regarding threat response, domestic 
institutions, or international pressures, all focus on contemporaneous decision-making. 
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Governments either choose to liberalize after monopolizing control over existing 
challengers or are compelled into liberalization through the imposition of established 
constraints. In neither conceptualization is attention given to long-term considerations. 
To generate expectations of the potential implications of liberalization for future 
contention, governments must forecast their ability to manage the demands likely to 
emerge from the newly resurrected civil society. Liberalization can mean expanding the 
range of accepted forms of political expression as well as the ideas articulated in the 
public sphere. In lessening their coercive grip on society, there is a deliberate effort on 
behalf of the liberalizing governments to channel previously excluded individuals into 
political organizations the government can manage and negotiate with. Liberalization can 
also expand the range of bargaining solutions available for governments seeking to 
maintain a hold on power most efficiently. Moderate segments of political movements 
can be coopted into the political channels of the state and concessions can be found to 
redress collective demands for reform in a manner that efficiently maintains the stability 
of the established order (e.g., Levitsky and Way 2002; Ghandi and Przeworski 2006; 
Svolik 2012). 
But there is a subset of demands that have the potential to arise from the newly 
emergent civil society that could generate conflict over the nature of the social, political, 
and economic order. Examples would include calls for social revolution, separatism, 
transferring control over the military to a new political organization, or integrating 
excluded minority groups into the political system. These demands, which might be 
labeled   from   the   perspective   of   the   government   as   “radical   ideals”   or   “subversion,”  
fundamentally challenge the political hierarchy as well as the established socio-economic 
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institutions. Conflicts emerging over calls for radical transformations in the political 
order tend to present greater difficulty for government efforts to channel or coopt civil 
society. With radical ideals, the overlap in the bargaining space between the demands of 
potential challengers and the potential concessions of the government is small to non-
existent. As a consequence, conflicts over radical ideals tend to be longer and more costly 
for the government. And unlike disputes over less fundamental issues, they hold the 
potential for governments to be replaced should they lose, leading to possible prosecution 
and punishment for the ruling elite. 
Prior to liberalization, governments can be expected to attempt to expunge attempts to 
organize in support of radical transformation of power in order to remove the base from 
which conflicts over these issues could arise in the post-liberalization environment. 
Sophisticated surveillance apparatuses are developed to detect and weed out the generally 
clandestine mobilization activities of nascent challenger organizations (e.g., Lewis 2012; 
Sullivan 2013). All civil society groups are reliant on an organizational structure 
responsible for accumulating collective resources, planning collective strategies, 
sustaining activist relationships, and delivering selective incentives (e.g., Tilly 1978; 
Chong 1991; Parkinson 2013; Sullivan 2013; 2014). Often referred to in the literature as 
‘mobilizing   structures,’   the   secretive   activities   of   these   organizations are necessary for 
maintaining the movement during times of dormancy as well as directing participation 
during a protest wave (e.g., Taylor 1989; Tarrow 1998).  
Even in the face of pressures emerging from democratic restraints or international 
pressures, governments are unlikely to liberalize when facing sustained efforts by 
clandestine organization supportive of radical transformation in political order. There is 
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recognition that in the presence of such organizational activities there are significant 
prospects for liberalization to open up space that could trigger uncontrollable challenges. 
Organizations supporting radical ideals could spark mass movements surrounding their 
claims or potentially hijack more moderate challenges, radicalizing contention over time 
(e.g., Parsa 1988). By contrast, an absence of organizational activities supporting calls for 
radical transformations of power signals to governments that they are unlikely to face a 
dramatic emergence in calls for such transformations in the sprouting civil society. 
Where the demands around which nascent challenger organizations are mobilizing fall 
short of subversion, governments can make liberalization decisions with greater 
assurances that the emerging civil society will not fundamentally challenge their 
authority.  
Governments look to the organizational activities surrounding mobilization as signals 
for the types of political challenges they can expect to face in the post-liberalization 
environment. In this consideration, the political ideals surrounding the detected 
mobilization activities are at least as significant as contentious behavior (e.g., Tilly 1978; 
Gartner and Regan 2002; Sullivan 2013).51 While the mobilizing organizations may be 
underground fundraising and promoting their ideas rather than publically challenging the 
regime, the ideas around which their activities coalesce provide clues to the government 
about the types of movements that could emerge if repression was abated.52 Governments 
may even liberalize in the face of non-radical violent challenges in the hopes that their 
                                                        
 
51 An alternative argument could contend that ideology is a poor predictor of subsequent demands and what 
governments are trying to do is discourage mobilization activities writ large, rather than just radical 
mobilization activities. The tests below address this potentiality by looking at both radical and non-radical 
mobilization activities. 
52 Governments may be willing to tolerate isolated individual articulations of these ideas. The argument is 
that they are particularly concerned where and when organizations coalesce around radical ideals.  
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liberalization efforts can channel such behavior toward more passive forms of contention 
(e.g.,  Jenkins  and  Eckert  1986;;  Dunning  2011).  But  where  evidence  exists  that  society’s  
mobilization structures would promote ideals that fundamentally contest political or 
economic authority, liberalization becomes a far riskier prospect. 
Recognizing the political uncertainty that surround increasing respect for human 
rights, governments seek to use coercion to manage the types of challenges likely to 
emerge following liberalization. In short, repression is not simply a tool used to respond 
to ongoing challenges, such as riots, strikes, or protests, but a policy deployed against 
mobilization structures to remove the prospects that particular challenges emerge in the 
future—those that are supportive of radical ideals (see Sullivan 2013). By targeting 
organizational structures that support mobilization around subversive ideals, while 
leaving in place mobilization supporting less radical claims, governments attempt to 
shape to types of issues around which post-liberalization politics are practiced.  
Liberalization is thus contingent on the types of mobilization activities detected at any 
given time. Authoritarian governments can consider liberalization in environments where 
they have reasonable assurances that their repressive efforts have successfully removed 
challenger organizing promoting radical challenges as well as deterred other actors from 
considering such goals in the future. But where radical mobilization is detected, 
governments face fears that challenges are likely to emerge in the future over issues 
fundamental to political authority. Concerns over the manner in which such contention 
can threaten the regime is likely to prevent governments from considering liberalization 
where radical mobilization persists. 
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Hypothesis 5: The prospects for liberalization will decrease in the presence of 
mobilization activities supporting radical transformations of political or 
economic power. 
 
Case Selection  
 Decisions   to   liberalize   are   typically   complex   and   multifaceted   (O’Donnel   and  
Schmitter 1986). Discerning the connection between such decisions and the specific 
causal mechanisms articulated in the various hypotheses above necessitates a research 
design capable of directly measuring the concepts articulated in each theory and 
identifying how they connect to patterns of liberalization. Whereas a broad, cross-
national study of a global sample of autocracies could face significant challenges 
identifying theoretical concepts and while ruling out observationally equivalent 
explanations for liberalization, a detailed investigation of liberalization within a single 
case can more closely test for connections between the predictions specified in the above 
hypotheses and the micro-dynamic patterns of behavior that surround decisions to limit 
political repression. By examining how liberalization unfolds over time and space within 
this case, rather than relying on obtuse cross-national indicators that are slow to change 
and difficult to measure, it is possible to tie expectations regarding the end of repression 
to specific behavioral patterns that would validate or invalidate each theory. 
 
Regimes and Repression in Guatemala 1975-1985 
In 1975, Guatemala was ruled by a military backed government that had been 
installed and propped up by a series of U.S. sponsored coups. Using the police, military, 
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and paramilitary units, General Kjell Laugerud García waged a repressive campaign 
against urban labor unions sympathetic to communism and a variety of rural insurgent 
bands, which were holdovers from an earlier coup that fractured the government along 
ideological lines. General Romeo Lucas García took power through a fraudulent election 
in 1978. During Lucas Garcia’s   regime,   the   use   of   extrajudicial   killings,   torture   and  
disappearances escalated as the government began to ramp up repression to deal with 
what  it  perceived  as  the  growing  threat  form  “subversives”  within  the  country.  President  
Carter cut off U.S. military assistance in response to the escalation of repressive violence, 
but  aid  continued  to  pour  in  from  outside  countries.  Beginning  in  1980,  the  government’s  
repressive efforts expanded to include the massacre of entire villages (CEH 1999; 
Sullivan 2012). However, discontent within the military and a belief that repression was 
not doing enough to eliminate a growing subversive threat led to a coup that installed 
General Efrain Rios Montt (Garrard-Burnett 2011). Repression peaked between in 1981 
and1982, during which time the government engaged in a broadly targeted campaign 
applied against large segments of society, particularly the indigenous communities living 




Figure SIII-I: Respect for Human Rights in Guatemala, 1949-2010 
 





Figure I employs data from Farriss (2014) to track the evolution of respect for human 
rights in Guatemala from 1949-2010. As can be seen from the figure, there is a clear shift 
away from the use of political repression beginning around 1983 and continuing through 
the end of the period.  Figure II uses these same data to specifically examine the 1975-
1985 period. The graph identifies movement within Guatemala across a two-dimensional 
space   identified   using   Farriss’   human   rights   measures   and   levels   of   democracy,   as  
measured by the Coppedge et al. (2008) standardized measure of inclusion. Two points of 
reference are provided on the graph. The solid lines represent the sample average levels 
of respect for human rights and levels of democracy for autocratic governments not 
engaged in civil war; the dashed lines present these same averages for autocratic 
governments in civil wars.53 As can be seen from this figure, while levels of repression 
varied significantly over the period and clear movements to liberalize can be identified, 
the country was highly repressive throughout the period. Still, there is a marked changed 
that can be identified in the trajectory of respect for human rights in Guatemala. After a 
long downward trend in repression, respect for human rights improved dramatically 
beginning in 1983 and continued to improve through the end of 1985. By focusing on the 
initial openings and liberalization during this period, the study hopes to generate insight 
into how and why an autocratic government might decide to ease up on the use of 
political repression.  
The historical record has attributed the liberalization of repression in Guatemala to 
each of the different theoretical perspectives articulated above. One dominant narrative 
                                                        
 
53 This division relies on Fearon  and  Laitin’s  (2003)  definition  of  civil  war.  Consistent  with  recent  research,  
autocracies in civil war have higher inclusion rates compared to autocracies not involved in civil war (e.g., 
Hegre 2001; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). 
 
 124 
that has emerged is that government repression was largely successful in containing the 
violent challenges emerging from the insurgent groups (e.g., Stoll 1993). Other research 
has attributed the decline in repression to the removal of Rios Montt in 1983 and the 
democratization efforts that began to take hold in 1984 and 1985 (e.g., Garrard-Burnett 
2011). Still others have contended that human rights groups (in particular the campaign 
centered around indigenous activist Rigoberta Menchu) were able to direct sufficient 
international pressures as to rein in repression (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1999). And there is 
case evidence suggesting that the decline can be attributed to a sense among members of 
the  security  apparatus  that  they  had  succeeded  in  removing  the  “subversive”  elements  of  
society (Schirmer 1998).  
Understood in this way, prior efforts to understand liberalization have over 
determined the decline in repression that occurred in Guatemala beginning in the early to 
mid 1980s. The country dramatically improved its human rights practices over the period, 
and these efforts culminated in a democratic constitution signed in 1986.54 And a broad 
variety of causal forces have been postulated as inducing this process.  
But while liberalization is often conceived as a single decision articulated in the 
capital and applied all at once across the country, the national averages discussed with 
regards to the liberalization of repression are actually the product of an aggregation of a 
wide variety of events occurring in different parts of the country at various times. The 
timing of liberalization   varied   significantly   across   Guatemala’s   326   municipalities. 55 
                                                        
 
54 Democratic institutions continued to evolve in the subsequent decades, though questions remain about 
their ability to impact the established military and financial orders (e.g., Schirmer 1998).  
55  Municipalities   are   the   country’s   second   smallest   administrative   unit.   As   measured in 1981, their 
populations ranged form 464 inhabitants (San Jose Chacaya) to 754,243 inhabitants (Guatemala City).   
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Certain municipalities saw repression end comparatively early on in the period. In some 
sites where repression was applied, improved respect for human rights can be seen as 
early as July 1980. However, several other municipalities continued to experience 
repression up through December 1985.56 This demonstrates that liberalization did not 
occur across the country uniformly, but was instead applied to the various areas of the 
country at different points in time. 25% of municipalities were still experiencing 
repression by the end of 1984 and 15% were still experiencing repression by mid-1985. 
1% experienced repression through the end of 1985.  
To more accurately capture the multitude of decisions surrounding liberalization and 
more precisely assess the competing theories for liberalization, this study pursues an 
investigation of subnational variation in liberalization within the country, while 
recognizing that governments are likely to increase their respect for human rights at 
different points and times depending on a range of local, national, and international 
factors. The analysis examines how the subnational patterns of liberalization correspond 
to the behaviors specified in the theoretical predictions. 
 
Data and Measurement 
The local level measures for liberalization as well as a host of relevant covariates are 
gathered from a unique set of data collected from within the Guatemalan security 
apparatus. For approximately a hundred years leading up to the peace negotiations that 
formally   ended  Guatemala’s   civil   war   in   1996,   the  Guatemalan  National   Police   stored  
their records in a large warehouse on the edge of a police barrack in Guatemala City. 
                                                        
 
56 Further information on the distribution of the liberalization can be found in the Supplemental Appendix. 
 
 126 
When the National Police were disbanded as part of  the  peace  accords’  reorganization  of  
the security apparatus, the warehouse was abandoned along with the 80 million pages of 
internal records it contained. The records sat in various stages of disarray and 
decomposition for nearly ten years until they were discovered by the human rights 
community in 2006.57 
To collect data for this project, a specially selected subset of the approximately 10 
million documents dated between 1975 and 1985 were read and coded into an events 
database. Following a multi-stage sampling procedure, the project read more than a 
quarter million files, including every  file  sent  to  either  the  Director  General’s  Office  and  
the Office for Coordinating Military and Police Activity.58 A team of researchers read 
each file and coded all politically relevant events into the database using a coding rubric 
that included nearly one hundred event types. 
The files were produced by an autocratic bureaucracy that never believed their 
records would be made public. And perhaps more significantly, they were released 
without oversight by the regime responsible for the repression. As a consequence of the 
relatively open access to the documents, the collection represents one of the most 
transparent sources of data on repressive behavior identified to date (Doyle 2007; 
Sullivan 2013). As a reference point for understanding the degree of access provided by 
these documents, a similar set of information collected from the media reveals 883 acts of 
political repression applied during this period (Sullivan 2013). Data coded from the 
                                                        
 
57 More information on the police archive can be found in Doyle (2006), Weld (2010), Guberek (2012), and 
Sullivan (2013; 2014). 
58 Greater detail on the sampling and coding process can be found in Sullivan (2013; 2014). These same 
papers contain greater discussions of potential biases in police data. 
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National Police records identify more than 3,800 repressive events. The issue is not 
simply one of event counts, however. While the majority of studies of repression rely on 
media data of some form, such data have been shown to suffer from biases that 
systematically influence their identification of repression (ibid.). The concern here is that 
a number of these factors are related to the variables presumed to impact liberalization, 
which could lead studies employing media data towards biased results (see Wooley 
2000). For example, the media are more likely to identify repression in areas where 
freedom of the press is secured, which by many measures is related to processes of 
democratization. Similarly, reporting by human rights groups can draw the attention of 
the international press, leading to greater reporting even while rights practices remained 
constant or declined.  
Because reports from the police archive were never intended to be made public and 
were not limited by the same constraints as media reporting, data taken from this archive 
are   less   likely   to   be   influenced   by   the   study’s   primary   independent   variables.   The  
National Police had jurisdiction over the entire country throughout the period under 
review. Their responsibilities included maintaining a vast surveillance operation, of 
which the police archive was a principal component (Weld 2010). In addition, the police 
force was responsible for arresting, torturing, and killing individuals identified as threats 
to the state (Lopez 2013; Sullivan forthcoming). They also carried out more typical police 
operations, such as clearing streets, corralling demonstrations, and monitoring highway 
traffic.  
Throughout the period the police and the military were in close collaboration, and this 
coordination is captured in the police files. 48% of the repressive actions identified in the 
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dataset were either exclusively carried out by the military or involved coordinated 
military-police operations. What is likely missing from the dataset are the roaming 
military operations, which were carried out relatively clandestinely by elite military units. 
In such operations, the military would arrive in a municipality either via helicopter or on 
foot, and would round up the townspeople to forcibly reorganize some and massacre 
others (e.g., Falla 1994). Such massacres have received the bulk of the attention to 
contemporary studies of repression in Guatemala (e.g., Stoll 1993; Valentino 2004). But 
by most accounts, this form of repression was relatively short lived, occurring in 
communities for only brief periods of time (Kobrak 1997) and ending even as other forms 
of repression continued to occur (CEH 1999; Ball et al. 1999). Thus while the massacres 
have deservedly been subjected to rigorous academic study (e.g. Gulden 2002; Sullivan 




The   study’s   principal   dependent   variable—liberalization—is operationalized as the 
final month in which a Guatemalan municipality experienced repression during the time 
between 1975 and 1985.60 While this time period is not exhaustive, it does represent a 
                                                        
 
59 Using the definition of massacres articulated by the Commission for Historical Clarification, 16 such 
events are present in this dataset (compare Sullivan 2012). 
60 The final month of observed repression is taken as a conservative estimate for the timing of liberalization 
occurred.  The  study  was  alternatively  replicated  using  the  definition  of  liberalization  as  ‘a  period  of  over  




critical opening in which to view decisions to reduce the use of political repression.61 
Examining variation in liberalization within this important window can provide micro-
level evidence to probe the principal mechanisms of liberalization identified above.  
Repression is operationalized as discreet actions committed by representatives of the 
government to diminish the will or capacity of individuals under their political 
jurisdiction to influence political outcomes. To measure this variable, the study 
incorporates a broad range of tactics, including overt acts of government coercion, such 
as beatings, torture, politically motivated arrests, or disappearances, as well as more 
discreet forms of repression, including surveillance, police investigations, and the use of 
agents provocateur.62 In each case, liberalization is identified as the final month in which 
any form of repressive behavior was applied in a given municipality.  
 
Mobilization Activities 
To  test  the  study’s  primary  hypothesis—that decisions to liberalize are diminishing in 
the presence of mobilization supporting radical ideals—this   work’s   first   measurement  
task was to identify all mobilization activities present in the police data. Mobilization 
activities are operationalized challenger behavior that is designed to increase the level of 
formal organization of a challenger group or to raise the resource endowment of existing 
challenger organizations. Examples of challenger mobilization that are captured in the 
                                                        
 
61 A relevant consideration was whether to treat the repressive period as beginning during the first month of 
the  study  or   to  examine   ‘repressive  spells’  beginning  with   the   first  act  of   repression  and   lasting  until   the  
final act. The study chose to focus on liberalization as potentially occurring at any point from the beginning 
of   the  period  until   the   final  act  of   repression  because   this  approach  was  more  consistent  with   the  study’s  
conceptualization  of  ‘liberalization.’     
62 Following from the focus on de facto liberalization, the study does not examine legal restrictions, such as 
bans on political opposition groups. It does, however, capture the types of politically motivated arrests that 
might be justified by legal restrictions. 
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data include the distribution of information, organizational meetings, training sessions 
and recruitment efforts.63  
Mobilization activities were then divided based on the claims around which the 
individuals were organizing. Specifically, in dividing mobilization activities the analysis 
aims to examine how liberalization decisions might be related to a preoccupation with 
deterring certain forms of public expression—those that demand radical redistributions of 
political or economic power. 64  Radical Mobilization Activities are operationalized as 
those activities carried out in support of expressed demands for overthrowing or 
displacing   the  political   system  and/or  dividing   the  state’s   territorial   integrity.  Examples  
include student and labor organizations calling for fundamental redistributions of wealth, 
organizers with separatist demands, and Marxist insurgent groups. 65  Non-radical 
Mobilization Activities are operationalized as those events carried out in support of 
demands that do not directly call for overthrowing the political system and/or a division 
of   the   state’s   territorial   integrity.   Examples   of   non-radical mobilization include 
mobilization to support ideals and demands such as community development, land rights, 
and freedom from persecution. Mobilization activities (as well as the subsets of radical 
and non-radical mobilization) are measured as a monthly count of the number of such 
events identified in the AHPN data for each municipality. 
                                                        
 
63 Greater detail on the coding procedures for mobilization and the other AHPN variables can be found in 
Sullivan (2013).  
64 More accurately, given the data, these are mobilization activities that the government associated with 
support for radical ideals. There is evidence that the Guatemalan government conceived of radical ideals in 
dichotomous terms akin to this operationalization. For example, a famous government strategy document 
known   as   Plan   Victoria   82   proclaimed,   “The commands involved will conduct operations of security, 
development,  countersubversive  and   ideological  warfare   in   their   respective  areas  of   responsibility…  with  
the  objective  to  locate,  capture  or  destroy  subversive  groups  or  elements  [individuals]”  (Schirmer  1998;;  see  
also Lopez 2013). 
65 Though the coding schema allowed for this form of activity, no examples of separatist mobilization were 




Attacks and Challenges 
Having identified the principal independent variables associated with the primary 
theoretical argument, the study then moved to operationalize key variables to test key 
independent variables emerging form the literature. The first set of these are related to 
government efforts to control challenges and monopolize force over territory. Insurgent 
attacks is a variable examining armed attacks by organized groups challenging the 
government.66 They are measured as monthly count for each municipality based on the 
events recorded in the AHPN data. A second related variable, protests, measures 
challenges to the government that take the form of mass demonstrations. These are 
organized and public demonstrations making claims against the government. The protest 
variable is derived from the AHPN data and represents monthly event counts identified 
for each municipality. 
 
Regime Change 
Regime Change is a variable measuring large scale institutional reform. It is 
operationalized as the disposition of the existing government through military force or 
other extra institutional means. There were two such events occurring during the decade 
under review—the coup by General Rios Montt in February, 1982, and the subsequent 
coup by Defense Minister Mejira Victores in August 1983. The variable is measured 
                                                        
 
66 Some may be concerned that radical mobilization might be highly collinear with insurgent attacks. 
Lagged radical mobilization is indeed correlated with insurgent attacks (which is consistent with the theory 
that mobilization is expected to be a necessary precursor to collective challenges), but no more so than non-




dichotomously, with months in which regime change occurred scored 1 and all other 
months scored 0.  
 
Democracy 
Two measures of democracy are investigated in this study. The first, Democratic 
Inclusion, focuses  on  Dahl’s  (1971,  4)  understanding of inclusion, by which he referred 
to  “the  proportion  of  the  population  entitled  to  participate  on  a  more  or  less  equal  plane  in  
controlling   and   contesting   the   conduct   of   the   government.”67 Democracy is measured 
using the Coppedge et al. (2008) standardized inclusion metric that identifies annual 
changes in national indicators of inclusion, such as suffrage rights and the selection 
processes for legislatures and executives.68 Within the sample, the variable ranges from a 
minimum of -2.23 to a maximum inclusion value of 0.89. 
A second variable, Campaign Activity, measures all public activities organized by 
representatives of political parties to test whether the actions surrounding political 
campaigns improve or reduce the prospects for liberalization (see Davenport 1997). 
Monthly, municipal level measures of campaign activity are derived based on events 
identified in the AHPN data (see Sullivan 2013). The variable is measured as an event 
count and seeks to identify local level variation in the behaviors of political parties. 
 
                                                        
 
67 Earlier work on democracy and repression investigated the impacts of both contestation and inclusion 
(e.g., Davenport 2007b). A similar approach was not possible in this case because of the high degree of 
collinearity between measures of contestation and inclusion in Guatemala between 1975 and 1985 
(P<0.0001). In this case the decision was made to focus on inclusion, but replications utilizing contestation 
proved substantively identical.  
68 When compared to many alternative democracy metrics, the inclusion measure is both (a) less likely to 
capture civil liberties restrictions (see Coppedge et al. 1998) and (b) less sensitive to biases resulting from 
conflict and missing data (see Vreeland 2008). 
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NGO Naming and Shaming 
NGO naming and shaming is measured using two variables. Local NGO Reports is a 
monthly measure of the percentage of total human rights abuses committed that were 
recorded in publications by international and domestic NGOs. The data are taken from 
Ball et al. (1999) and capture reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
and the three largest Guatemalan human rights groups (see Sullivan 2014). The data are 
recorded at the municipal level.  
Regional NGO Reports is a spatial lag of the NGO Reports measure. The regional 
measure is generated by taking all the NGO documents reported in the various 
municipalities in Guatemala and weighting their influence by multiplying the local NGO 
Reports variable by an inverted distance matrix measuring how far a report occurred from 
any particular municipality (see Sullivan 2014). This is done to capture the possibility 
that NGO naming and shaming has both local and regional impacts (see Bell et al. 2012).  
 
Empirical Analysis 
To test the hypotheses specified above this analysis estimates a series of 
semiparametric models for the duration of political repression and the onset of 
liberalization.  As noted above, the duration of repression applied in Guatemala varied 
considerably across space. The analysis identifies the duration of repressive spells down 
to municipality-month level, with the liberalization identified as the final month in which 
repression occurred.69 80 municipalities experienced did not experience repression and 
                                                        
 
69 Greater detail on the duration of repressive spells can be found in the Supplemental Appendix. 
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thus had no experience with liberalization.70 They are dropped from the analysis. Out of 
the 246 remaining spells, 3 were right censored. 
Estimates are obtained using a series of Cox proportional hazards models. Cox 
models were chosen because the theoretical expectations do not specify the functional 
form of the underlying hazard function.71 This approach estimates how the covariates 
shift the baseline hazard of liberalization, while leaving the duration dependence 
unspecified.72 
In each case, the results are reported in terms of hazard ratios representing the 
estimated impact of the variable on the baseline hazard of liberalization. In this case, 
hazards refer to the instantaneous event rate of repression ending (i.e., liberalization). 
Hazard ratios above one represent an increase in expectation that liberalization will occur 
(at any given time t), while a hazard ratio below one represents a decreased expectation 
that liberalization will take place. For example, if the hazard rate for a given covariate is 
estimated to be 1.75, then for every one unit change in that variable we can expect a 75% 
increase in the expected rate of liberalization to occur at any given time period.  
                                                        
 
70 Municipalities spared from repression tended to have relatively low levels of mobilization, protests, and 
insurgent attacks. They also tended to have fewer campaign activity, higher populations, and a greater ratio 
of ladinos to indigenous. Further comparison between these municipalities and those included in the 
analysis can be found in the Supplemental Appendix.  
71 The models and all of the included variables were tested for possible violations of the proportionality 
assumption. The models were also replicated using the Weibul approach and results proved substantively 
identical.  
72 The Efron method is used for ties. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. All models were tested 
for violations of the proportional hazard assumption using scaled Schoenfeld residuals and no violations 
were identified (see Grambsch and Therneau 1994). 
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Table SIII-I: Cox Proportional Hazards Models of Liberalization 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Mobilization  1.049 
(0.340) 
      
























Insurgent Attacks 0.767* 
(0.102) 
  0.744** 
(0.075) 




  0.371 
0.222 
   0.333 
(0.194) 
Regime Change 0.369 
(2.232) 
   0.038 
(0.222) 
  0.095*** 
(0.037) 
Democratic Inclusion 4848.346 
(24408.9
9) 




Campaign Activity 0.845 
(0.168) 




Local NGO Reports 0.782 
(0.491) 




Regional NGO Reports 3.574 
(4.186) 




Number of Municipalities 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
Number of Failures 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 
Time at Risk 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 




The analysis begins by reviewing hypotheses H1-H4, which derive expectations for 
liberalization based on the existing research on human rights. These arguments were 
broad ranging, but were broadly based in two sets of understandings for state repression. 
The first contends that governments repress to control challenges to their rule, and should 
liberalize their human rights practices once challenges have abated. The second believes 
governments are inherently repressive and investigates different forms of restraint that 
can be put in place to limit coercion. Model 1 in Table I focuses on the association 
between variables based on these arguments and the hazard of liberalization.  
From the initial evidence, there appears to be some significant relationship between 
violent challenges to the state and the hazard of liberalization, providing support for H1. 
In this case, insurgent attacks were predicted to depreciate the hazard of liberalization by 
23%. Protests were not significantly related to the duration of repressive spells, however, 
which suggests that to the extent that the control theory of repression is correct, violent 
challenges to the state (rather than organized demonstrations) are principally responsible 
for delaying liberalization.  
Examining the remaining hypotheses (H2-H4), there is less support for arguments 
originating in existing research on political repression. To begin, the variable measuring 
regime change does not approach conventional standards of statistical significance. The 
variables measuring democracy do not fare much better. Democratic campaigns have a 
reasonably small, negative predicted effect on liberalization, but this relationship is 
insignificant. The coefficient for the national democratic institutions variable is positive 
and dramatically large. But there is a tremendous amount of error surrounding this 
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estimate, so much so that the 95% confidence interval for the expected hazard also 
includes values considerably below zero. Finally, neither the local or regional NGO 
reporting measure is significantly related to liberalization. This challenges some recent 
findings regarding NGO naming and shaming efforts and patterns of repression (e.g., 
Franklin 2008; Demeritt 2012; Sullivan 2014; see also Murdie and Davis 2012).73   
 
Principal Hypothesis  
The evidence presented thus far suggests that arguments derived from existing 
research on human rights fare reasonably poorly as explanations for empirical patterns of 
liberalization. Before   comparing   the   existing   explanations   to   the   study’s   primary 
hypothes9s (H5), the analysis examines the relationship between mobilization and 
liberalization in isolation. Model 2 in Table I includes all mobilization activities 
occurring in a given municipality month. In this first step, no effort is made to distinguish 
between different forms of mobilization activities based on the claims around which 
would be challengers are mobilizing.  
As can be seen from the results of Model 2, the hazard of liberalization occurring is 
not significantly related to the measure of mobilization activities. Graphical depictions of 
the predicted hazards rates for sites in which mobilization activities are and are not 
occurring can be seen in the left hand side of Figure III. When all forms of mobilization 
are grouped together, the likelihood of liberalization occurring at any given time is no 
                                                        
 
73 Prior results linking NGO reporting to a decline in abuse may have also been capturing a move to more 
discreet methods (e.g., Ron 1997). Because the data included in this paper come from within the security 
apparatus, they are more likely to capture repression that was strategically applied in a manner that was less 
likely to be identified by human rights groups or the press. 
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different in the presence of mobilization activities compared to when mobilization 
activities are not taking place. And while Model 2 does not include any additional 
covariates, if one were to examine a series of models including covariates derived from 
the literature, there is no consistent relationship between mobilization and the hazard of 
liberalization (the results of such models can be found in the Supplemental Appendix). 
Accordingly, if one were to only look at mobilization activities without considering the 
ideas around which the activities were organized, it would appear as though liberalization 
were unrelated to government concerns with deterring challenges to their rule.  
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To further investigate the theory, Model 3 more directly tests H5, which speculates a 
relationship between mobilization activities and liberalization that is conditional on the 
ideals around which activists are organizing. The principal difference between Model 2 
and the earlier results is that in Model 3 mobilization activities are divided into two 
subsets: (1) radical mobilization activities organized around ideals that would radically 
transform political or economic power and (2) non-radical mobilization activities, which 
are organized around non-transformative ideals.  
As can be seen from the results, radical mobilization activities are related to 
significantly longer periods of repression. In any given time period, the expected hazard 
of a municipality liberalizing is approximately 45% higher if that municipality had no 
radical mobilization compared to that a similar municipality experiencing a single act of 
radical mobilization. These results are consistent with hypothesis H5. Non-radical 
mobilization activities are correlated with slightly shorter periods of repression, but this 
relationship is not statistically significant.  
The results surrounding these relationships can be seen graphically in the right hand 
side of Figure III. Three sets of forecasts are generated. In the solid line, municipalities 
experienced no mobilization activities of any sort. In the dotted line, municipalities 
experienced a standard deviation increase in non-radical mobilization for any given 
month. As can be seen, areas with non-radical mobilization are expected to have a 
slightly higher expectation for liberalization in any given time period, though again this 
effect is not statistically significant. The dashed line at the bottom holds forecasts for the 
hazard of liberalization across municipalities experiencing a standard deviation increase 
in radical mobilization activities. As can be seen, the expectations for liberalization for 
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municipalities experiencing radical mobilization activities remain below 10% for the 
entire time period. It thus appears extremely unlikely that the government would choose 
to liberalize in areas where radical mobilization activities are ongoing.   
 
 Alternative Explanations 
In considering the contention that governments liberalize following the demise of 
radical mobilization activities, an important question concerns how this argument fairs 
against alternative propositions drawn from the existing literature on repression. Models 
4-7 in Table I evaluate each of these alternative explanations in turn. Model 8 examines 
all of the variables in a single formulation.  
Across all of the formulations, radical mobilization activities remain negatively and 
statistically significantly related to the hazard of liberalization. The substantive size of the 
estimated impact of radical mobilization activities on liberalization remains remarkably 
constant. Across each of the estimations, a single act of radical mobilization is expected 
to decrease expectations for liberalization by between 43% and 47%. By contrast, non-
radical mobilization activities remain insignificantly correlated with liberalization. 
Consistent with H5, all of this evidence suggests that governments are particularly 
concerned with deterring individuals from organizing around ideals that fundamentally 
threaten the political order.  
There are some interesting results that emerge from the additional variables included 
in these model specifications. As above, and consistent with the threat response model, 
insurgent attacks are significantly related to longer periods of repression and a decreased 
hazard of liberalization. Though the negative predicted effect is robust across model 
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specifications, the substantive effect of this variable is smaller than that for mobilization. 
A single insurgent attack is predicted to reduce the hazard of liberalization in a period by 
between 25% and 30%.  
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Both the domestic institutional changes surrounding Regime Change and measure of 
Democratic Inclusion are statistically significant predictors of liberalization. Regime 
change is expected to have a strong downward pull on expectations for liberalization, 
while democratic institutions are predicted to substantially shorten periods of repression 
and heighten expectations for liberalization. Figure IV presents a graphical depiction of 
the predicted impacts of challenger behavior on liberalization in two sets of institutional 
regimes. The figure on the left examines how a standard deviation increase in radical 
mobilization   or   insurgent   attacks   impact   predictions   for   liberalization   in   a   “Semi-
Democratic   Regime,”   as   measured   by   the   historic   maximum   value   for   Democratic 
Inclusion during this time period. The figure on the right represents these same forecasts 
for   an   “Autocratic   Regime,”   as   identified   using   the   historical   minimum   value   for  
Democratic Inclusion. As can be seen, semi-democratic regimes do have a substantially 
larger hazard of liberalization, when compared to autocratic regimes. However, 
expectations for liberalization are significantly reduced during radical mobilization. This 
is true even in comparison to how these regimes fare in the presence of insurgent attacks. 
In the presence of radical mobilization, the hazard of liberalization in semi-democratic 
regimes does not dip above 10% over the entire estimated duration of the sample. For 
autocratic regimes, radical mobilization decreases the expected hazards of liberalization 
practically to zero. 
Finally, international pressures as measured by NGO naming and shaming efforts 
once again appear to have no significant impact on decisions to liberalize. Though neither 
estimate is statistically significant, local NGO naming and shaming has a coefficient that 
is associated with longer periods of repression, while regional naming and shaming is 
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predicted to be positively associated with liberalization. These results cast further 
challenge on the capacity for naming and shaming efforts to inspire significant reductions 
in government coercion. 
 
Robustness Checks 
 The results thus far support the contention that liberalization decisions are made 
once the state has assurances that future forms of public expression will not 
fundamentally challenge the established order. Across all of the model specifications, 
radical mobilization activities were related to longer periods of repression and a 
decreased hazard for liberalization. This section investigates a series of alternative 
models to assess the robustness of the results. In particular, the design investigates a 
variety of alternative mechanisms or selection processes that could potentially confound 
the results.  
 Table II presents the results of the robustness checks. The core specification 
corresponds to Model 8 in Table I.  
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Table SIII-II: Robustness Checks 





































































































































































State Capacity 0.282* 
(0.169) 
       
Ethnic Divisions  1.273 
(0.358) 
      
US-Guatemalan Military 
Aid 
  1.088 
(0.722) 
     




Regional Human Rights 
Scores  
   0.001** 
(0.000) 
    
Democracy*Local NGO 
Reports 
    0.652 
(13.413) 
     
Democracy*Regional 
NGO Reports 
    0.022 
(0.114) 
     
Courts      0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Courts * Local NGO 
Reports 
     0.104 
(15.562) 
  
Courts * Regional NGO 
Reports 
     0.000 
(0.000) 
  






246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
Number of Failures 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 
Time at Risk 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 
Municipal-Clustered Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (Two-Tailed Test).  
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 The first robustness check, which is presented in Model 9, investigates the 
potential for variation in state capacity to confound the results of the study. As noted in 
the theoretical section, governments develop sophisticated surveillance systems to 
monitor society and detect mobilization. If variance in monitoring capabilities were 
determined by state capacity, that capacity could also influence the ability of the 
government to deploy other forms of repression. To investigate this relationship, Model 9 
includes as a measure of the capacity of the state as operationalized as the percentage of a 
municipality that was literate in 1973. This measure provides a seemingly exogenous 
measure for the capacity of the state in any given area. 74  While this measure is 
significantly related to longer periods of repression, the inclusion of the state capacity 
measure does not appear to influence the core results of the model.  
Another potential cofounder concerns the role of ethnicity. The deep divisions 
between the ladino elite who ruled the Guatemalan government and the indigenous 
majority was endemic in patterns of violence (e.g., Grandin 2000; Jonas 2012). For 
potential challengers, ethnic concentrations can provide the networks necessary to 
support mobilizing structures, while for government forces they can provide a potential 
source of information leading to categorically targeted repression. To examine how 
ethnicity holds the potential to influence the above results, Model 10 includes the 
percentage of each municipality that was listed as indigenous in the 1973 census. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the variable appears uncorrelated with liberalization, suggesting that while 
the deployment repressive tactics may have  been  related  to  the  country’s  ethnic  divisions  
                                                        
 
74  The variable ranges from 4% literacy to nearly 90%. Results were also robust to an alternative 
specification that used log population as a measure of state capacity. 
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(e.g.,   Sullivan   2012),   the   decision   to   liberalize   repression   was   not.   The   study’s   core  
results concerning radical mobilization activities and liberalization remain unaffected in 
this model. 
The analysis next addresses other forms of international influence outside of NGO 
reporting. Model 11 examines the role of the international system, while Model 12 looks 
at regional patterns of repression. Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) note the connection 
between Cold War politics and specific technologies of rebellion (i.e., irregular war) that 
promote longer conflicts. Two measures are used investigate the influence of Cold War 
on liberalization: logged annual U.S. military aid to Guatemala and logged total annual 
U.S. military aid. Both measures are taken from the USAID Greenbook. Neither variable 
appears significantly related to liberalization. Looking at a more localized international 
influence, others have postulated that the human rights practices of neighboring states can 
influence human rights practice as countries try to emulate their neighbors while avoiding 
the spread of rebellion (e.g., Gleditch 2002; Danneman and Ritter forthcoming). A 
regional repression score was added to the analysis by averaging annual measures of the 
Farriss   (2014)   latent   human   rights   scores   for   Guatemala’s   contiguous   neighbors.   This  
variable is statistically significant, but in the opposite predicted direction, indicating that 
as neighboring countries became more repressive, municipalities in Guatemala were 
more likely to liberalize. Similar to the international system variables, the inclusion of the 
regional repression measure does not appear to influence the substantive effect or 
significance  of  the  study’s  core  results. 
Another potentiality is that to impact liberalization international and domestic 
pressures must overlap. In one formulation, international pressures are dependent on the 
 
 150 
ability of local actors to utilize their reports to press claims on power through the 
institutional pathways of power (e.g., Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; see also Hendrix 
and Wong 2013). Model 13 examines this possibility by interacting the local and regional 
NGO variables with measures of democratic inclusion. In another formulation on the 
overlap of international and domestic pressures, international efforts are only able to 
inspire changes in human rights practice in areas where the domestic courts possess 
sufficient independence to hold the government accountable (e.g., Powel and Staton 
2009; Conrad 2014). Model 14 examines this possibility by including annual measures of 
the  country’s  judicial  independence  taken  from  Ríos-Figueroa and Staton (2013) as well 
as interaction terms multiplying that metric and the NGO measures. In these 
formulations, the variables associated with international and domestic pressures remain 
insignificant, while radical mobilization activities retain their inverse relationship with 
liberalization.  
Finally, the study examines the sensitivity of the model with respect to potential 
unobserved heterogeneity. The prior models relied on parametric specification and 
observed covariates to account for the variability in time to liberalization. The remaining 
variability can be accounted for by incorporating either cluster- or unit-specific frailty 
terms. Models 15 and 16 incorporate gamma frailty terms included as random effects 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). In Model 15, the frailty term is specified at the 
department, one level of spatial aggregation above the municipality. Here the potential 
unaccounted   for  variability   in   frailty   is   “shared”   for   all  municipalities   in   a  department.  
Model 16 includes municipal specific frailty terms. In both cases, the variance of these 
terms is statistically significant. However, the core results are not substantively impacted.  
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Radical mobilization activities remain negatively and statistically significantly related 
to the hazard of liberalization. Municipalities in which radical mobilization activities 
were not occurring were more likely to liberalize overall and to liberalize sooner. 
Municipalities experiencing radical mobilization activities experienced much longer 
periods of repression and were less likely to liberalize overall. 
Interestingly, across the robustness checks, levels of democratic inclusion do not 
retain a robust relationship with liberalization. Democratic institutions had previously 
been shown to be significantly correlated with a decreased duration of repression. But the 
additional specifications cast some doubt on this relationship.  The  study’s  core  variable,  
radical mobilization activities, continues to be robustly related to liberalization, as does 
the variable measuring insurgent attacks. By contrast, democratic institutions are 
insignificant, and in some cases predicted in the wrong direction, in all but one of the 
robustness specifications. And across the robustness checks, there remains no evidence to 
suggest that NGO naming and shaming is effective for inducing liberalization. 
 
Conclusion 
This study has argued that government decisions to limit the use of political 
repression can be attributed to perceptions that repression has succeeded in eliminating 
civil society efforts to organize around ideologies that threaten the political-economic 
order. Repression, in other words, persists until those who would consider challenging 
the existing order no longer organize collectively in support of such ideals. Hypotheses 
derived from the literature on human rights and democratization do not account for most 
of the variation in decisions to limit repression. The study found that liberalizations were 
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largely unaffected by international naming and shaming pressures. Repression did persist 
longer in the face of armed attacks on the state and, in some specifications, was 
increasingly likely in the presence of democratic institutions. However, the strongest 
effect on the duration of repression had to do with the ideals around which potential 
actors were organizing, rather than the tactics employed by existing challengers. 
Evidence presented from the internal records of the Guatemalan security apparatus 
reveals that repression persists where the government perceived ongoing attempts to 
organize around ideologies threatening the political order.  This insight provides new 
clues to understanding decisions to repress as well as decision to limit abuses of human 
rights. If repression only persisted in settings where observable threats were ongoing, it 
could plausibly be argued that the government was employing repression to impose 
control against existing threats. But the persistence of repression in areas where the 
government is not directly being challenged, yet has reason to expect potential 
mobilization in support of ideals threatening the political order, suggests both a 
coordinated effort to destroy mobilization in support of such ideologies and an effort to 
deter the emergence of public support for these ideals in the post-liberalization period. 
There are, of course, other forces that could provoke liberalization. Dissidents can, in 
rare instances, gain the upper hand in their struggles against authoritarian governments. 
But while challenger victory does sometimes lead to an immediate reduction in levels of 
repression (e.g., Czechosovakia 1989), more typically it is the case that when regime 
change is pushed through via challenger victory, the revolutionary government continues 
or   even   escalates   campaigns   of   repression   in   order   to   purge   the   country   of   “counter-
revolutionaries”   (e.g.,   Iran   1979,   Rwanda   1994,   Egypt   2011   [see   also   Tilly   1964]).  
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Liberalization, in such cases, occurs once the revolutionary movement has removed 
attempts to mobilize around ideals that would threaten their newly established order. 
Although this singular study is unable to test these arguments on cases outside 
Guatemala, evidence from other periods of repression and liberalization support these 
contentions. Recent research on electronic censorship in China, for example, indicates the 
government is far more willing to limit civil liberties when dissidents are involved in 
coordinated, collective claims making, while allowing claims making when challenges 
against the government are isolated and individualized (King et al. 2013a; 2013b). And 
then there is case evidence from countries as diverse as Malaysia, Cambodia, Jordan, and 
Paraguay that liberalization occurred only after the different governments felt relieved 
from would-be challengers hoping to overturn the political system (Corothers 2002). 
Finally, and perhaps most famously, in South Africa the Apartheid government only 
agreed to liberalize and negotiate with the African National Congress (ANC) only after 
the ANC abandoned calls for nationalizing industries and radically redistributing wealth 
(Davenport and Sullivan 2013). Through auxiliary examination of additional cases as 
well as through cross-national comparisons, it will be possible to further investigate the 
generalizability of the findings presented in this study. 
While the focus of this study has been on understanding the liberalization of 
repression in authoritarian states, the argument presents complications for existing 
understandings   of   the   “domestic   democratic   peace”   (e.g.,   Davenport   and   Armstrong  
2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007b). While there is little doubt that 
full democracies commit less repression than their authoritarian counterparts, existing 
explanations (which tend to focus on electoral institutions and veto points) are not yet 
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paying sufficient attention to the selection processes operating with regards to the types 
of regimes that democratize. If liberalization precedes democratization and only takes 
place once the government has secured itself against radical mobilization, democratic 
states likely have fewer public claims-making efforts directed at radically redistributing 
political or economic power. To understand this process better, research on repression in 
democratic states (e.g., Davenport 2007b; Davenport et al. 2007; Moore 2010) would 
benefit from turning their attention to the variation in demands expressed by challengers 
under various institutional settings. To the extent that challengers within democratic 
regimes are less willing to express claims that publically challenge the political-economic 
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Appendix AI: Supplementary Appendix For   “Undermining   Resistance:  
Mobilization,  Repression,  and  the  Enforcement  of  Political  Order” 
 
Section I: Data Sources 
Event Types by Source 
Table AI-I reports the types of events recorded by type of activity and source. Both 
the AHPN and the newspapers appear highly interested in identifying acts of dissident 
collective action (i.e., collective violence and protests), which makes up more than 50% 
of the dissident events recorded by the AHPN and more than 90% of the dissident events 
recorded by the press. However, the AHPN still records more than 300 more acts of 
collective action than the newspapers. Comparing the identification of mobilization 
activities between the two sources reveals even starker differences. Nearly 50% of the 
AHPN records (more than 1,500 individual events) area identified mobilizing activities 
by the dissidents. Newspapers showed far less interest in recording these actions and 






Table AI-I: Events Recorded by Type and Source 










































With regards to the identified repressive activities in each source, covert repressive 
actions feature much more prominently in the AHPN data. In terms of sheer numbers, the 
two sources report similar quantities of overt repressive actions (772 in the AHPN, 660 in 
the newspapers), but covert repressive actions are recorded with much greater frequency 
in the AHPN data. More than 3,000 covert repressive actions are identified in the AHPN 
data, compared to fewer than 30 in the newspaper data. 
 
Temporal and Geographic Coverage by Source 
 
 Figure AI-I displays monthly counts of political activity (the sum of incidents of 







Figure AI-I: Time Series of Political Activity by Source 
 
 
Newspaper coverage appears to be temporally over-distributed in the first five 
years of the conflict. Following consistent coverage during the early years there is a sharp 
drop off in coverage beginning in the beginning of 1981. The AHPN records take almost 
the exact opposite distribution. For the first five years under review, coverage appears 
episodic. Then beginning at the same time as the rapid decline in newspaper coverage 
there is a rapid uptick in the number of events recorded by the AHPN. From 1981 
through 1985 coverage by the AHPN remains high, while there is very little political 
activity reported in the press. 
These two shifts (the decline in newspaper coverage and the increase in AHPN 
coverage that took place in early 1981) correspond with trends identified in repressive 
activity identified by the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH 
1998), an alternative truth and reconciliation effort organized by the Catholic Church 














country (Ball et al. 1999). The rapid escalation of political repression documented by 
outside sources corresponds closely to both the increase repressive activity recorded by 
the AHPN and the decrease in similar activity recorded by the newspapers. The drop off 
in newspaper records is likely related to the intensification of attacks on the press 
(Brocket 2005; Guberek 2012). At least 42 Guatemalan journalists were murdered or 
disappeared between 1977 and 1981, while another 49 were killed between 1981 and 
1982 (Garrard-Burnett 2011; Ball et al. 1999). Many more fled the country out of fear of 
persecution (Garrard-Burnett 2011). The censorship of the press was solidified through a 
state of siege instituted in 1982 that suspended civil liberties, curtailed freedom of the 
press and prohibited divulging news of political violence. Just as repressive action was 
beginning to take off, newspaper reports become almost nonexistent.75 
An interesting question concerns whether the differences in reporting by time 
period across the two datasets influences the results found in this study. One might 
wonder, for example, whether the divergent findings resulting from the analysis of the 
news data and the AHPN data reflect different repression and dissent dynamics operating 
during different phases of the conflict. If one assumes that reporting in the two data 
sources is equally valid and that the two simply capture behavior at two different time 
points, then there is an interesting pattern to be revealed in the analysis. During the early 
years of the conflict, state repression is not significantly related to mobilization. The 
                                                        
 
75 Limitations in Guatemalan press coverage resulted from more than just censorship however. In many 
cases the government was able to guarantee favorable coverage by bribing faferos. As Garrard-Burnett 
(2011, 164) notes, faferos were  “poorly  paid  reporters  and  employees  who  accepted  money  in  exchange  for  
publishing articles favorable to the government and for suppressing negative news in   their   news  outlet.”  






preemptive repression of mobilization does not occur until after the state and dissidents 
have engaged in some initial sparring and the state has had time to build up its security 
apparatus. During the earlier years, which are most effectively captured by the media, the 
state is repressive, but only following collective action, not following mobilization. 
During the later years, as the states repressive capacity increases, we see repression of 
mobilization as well as the repression of collective action.  
Another way of interpreting the divergence of findings as a function of reporting 
over time is to question the assumption that the reporting of political repression is equally 
valid across sources. As noted in the text, existing research on reporting patterns in the 
media leads to questions regarding the capacity or interest of news organizations to report 
the types of preemptive repressive behavior this study is most interested in. Here, the 
divergent results found across the two news sources occur because the repression of 
mobilization is not recorded by the media during the earlier or later time periods.  
One way of deciphering which of these interpretations is more plausible is to 
compare the temporal distributions to existing data on repressive behavior in Guatemala. 
Ball, Kobrak and Spirer (1999) engaged in what is likely the most extensive collection of 
quantitative data on state killings in Guatemala completed to date. Compiled across 
multiple data sources, including the media, human rights reports and survivor interviews, 








As can be seen from Figure 1.1 in Ball et al., state killings remained relatively low 
and comparatively constant from 1975-1979. During this year, there is a sharp increase. 
Comparing the figure to Figure AI-I above we see that this pattern is to some extent 
captured in the media data, lending credibility to the argument that at least during the 
initial period of the conflict the media data did a reasonable job reflecting patterns of 
political behavior in the country.76 However, if the Ball et al. data can be taken as a 
reliable indicator for what repression actually looked like during this period, the uptick in 
repression reported in the newspapers through 1979 and into 1980 is not nearly as sharp 
as it should be. When we compare general trends for the AHPN data during this time, the 
patterns appear more consistent with the increase in repressive behavior beginning just 
before 1979 and continuing through 1980 and 1981. One way of interpreting such 
evidence is that the AHPN data and the newspaper data are not doing an equally good job 
at capturing repressive behavior at two different time periods, but that the AHPN data do 
a better job of reflecting patterns of political repression across the entire period of 
interest. This leads to questions regarding how repression was reported in the paper and 
whether we can actually infer from media data any knowledge regarding what patterns of 
repression looked like in actuality. Still, it is hard to draw firm conclusions without a 
more qualitative investigation of how repression might have varied across the decade 
under review. This is the topic of future research.  
 
  
                                                        
 
76 Of course such data are imprecise and refer only to reported counts, not to the description biases 












Figure AI-II displays the distribution of incidents of political activity identified in 
the two datasets based by source and Guatemalan department. Examining the spatial 
distribution   of   the   data   across   Guatemala’s   departments,   both   the   AHPN   and   the  
newspapers recorded the highest number of event in the capital department of Guatemala. 
Beyond that, there appears to be better spatial representation by the AHPN data, which 
records more events than the newspapers in 15 of the 22 departments. Most notably, the 
AHPN does a better job recording violence in departments such as Quiche, which 
experienced the worst reported acts of state repression and dissident violence during the 
war (CEH 1998). The AHPN also captures appreciably more events in Peten, which has 
been identified principal mobilizing site for the insurgency (Stohl 1993). One of the 
reasons why violence was so allegedly severe in Quiche and why the dissidents 
apparently mobilized in Peten is because these departments are areas with high elevation, 
dense jungle and sparse population settlements. Such evidence is consistent with 
arguments predicting undercounts of political activity from the newspapers in places far 
from urban settings with little state presence. All of this suggests that analysis of the 
AHPN data should provide a more representative assessment of political conflict in 
Guatemala.  
 
Section II: Onset Table 
Table AI-II details the month and year in which the first instance of collective 
challenges  was   reported   in   each   of  Guatemala’s   22   departments.   This  month and each 






Table AI-II: Month of First Recorded Collective Challenges 
Department 
Month of First Recorded 
Collective Challenges 
Alta Verapaz May, 1980 
Baja Verapaz March, 1980 
Chimaltenango Feb-79 
Chiquimula Sep-78 
El Progreso Apr-80 
El Peten No Reported CA 










San Marcos Nov-79 












Section III: Additional Robustness Checks 
At least three critical challenges can be made against the results presented in the 
main text. The first argues that the models are capturing a relation between ongoing 
collective challenges and repression rather than a relationship between lagged 
mobilization and repression. The second critical challenge that can be made against the 
main text results charges that repression and dissent are so intricately connected that the 
models are simply identifying an endogenous process, rather than an the exogenous 
influence of dissident mobilization on repressive activity. The third charges that the 
models above are essentially retrospective in orientation and fail to directly test 
propositions of prospective decision making that were articulated in the theoretical 
arguments. 
 To test the validity of the results against such claims, three sets of robustness 
checks are examined. The first replicates the analysis while controlling for a 
contemporaneous measure of collective challenges. The second employs instrumental 
variables (IV) regression to identify exogenous variation in dissent and then estimate the 
effect of that exogenous variable on repression. The third employs vector error corrected 
(VEC) models to examine whether the state was forward-looking when deciding to 
engage in political repression.  
 
 
Controlling for Contemporaneous Challenges 
First, it could be argued that the results are being driven not by state authorities 





responding to ongoing collective challenges. Since mobilization is theorized to increase 
both levels of collective challenges and repression, and since repression is intricately 
linked to collective challenges, it may be that the observed correlation between past 
values of mobilization and contemporaneous measures of repression is spurious.  
To guard against this possibility, the results were replicated while including a 
contemporaneous measure of collective challenges in the model. The results are 
displayed in table AI-III. 
Results prove that even if we control for ongoing collective action, that the 
amount of revolutionary mobilization engaged in in the department during the previous 
month still correlates with a strongly significant and positive increase in the predicated 
amount of repression committed during the subsequent month.  Models A1 and A2 
replicate models 3 and 4 in the main text, while models A3 and A4 replicate models 5 
and 6. Across each of these models, the analysis predicts that engaging in revolutionary 





Table AI-III: Replication with Contemporaneous Challenges 
 AHPN Dataset AHPN Dataset 
 Full Sample of Department-Months, 
1975-1985 
Excluding Department-Months Jointly 
Experiencing Mobilization and Collective 
Challenges 
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N 3568  3568  3568  3568  







 To examine the robustness of these findings, the results were first replicated using 
an instrumental-variables approach to control for endogeneity in the relationship between 
repression and dissent. Bias can result from the fact that the application of dissent is non-
randomly assigned. Dissent may be related to prior levels of repression that can 
simultaneously subsequent levels of repression. As a result, the variable whose effect we 
are trying to determine (dissent) cannot be assumed to be unrelated to prior experiences 
with the dependent variable (repression). In such settings, non-random assignment of the 
treatment can lead to selection effects that may bias the results.  
To  generate  unbiased  estimates  of  how  the  state’s  responses  to  dissent   influence  
repression, we must be able to identify exogenous variation in dissent.77 One method for 
doing so is instrumental variables regression (IV). IV uses a first stage assignment 
equation to separate out the selection of the independent variable from the presence of the 
dependent variable. A second stage equation then estimates the effects of dissent on 
repression. For the models to successfully identify exogenous effects, independent 
variables in the assignment equation must be strongly correlated with dissent, but 
disassociated with subsequent repression (Angrist and Pischkey 2009).  
The analyses below exploit the temporal disaggregation of the data used in this 
study to identify these first stage independent variables, which are often referred to as 
instruments. Follow a procedure common in labor economics (e.g., Porterba 1991) and 
                                                        
 
77 This concern is what underlies the inclusion of the twice-lagged repression control variable in Tables I 
and II. The IV approach adds a more nuanced examination of potential selection effects to concerns with 





recently expropriated to study counter-insurgent violence (e.g., Kocher et al. 2011), it is 
possible to exploit the time series component of the data to generate an effective 
instrument that is simultaneously related to the independent variable and conditionally 
independent of the dependent variable. This paper uses a lagged version of the dependent 
variable to identify exogenous variation in the independent variable so long as the model 
can extricate any direct influence from the lagged dependent variable to the value of the 
dependent variable at the time point the model is ultimately trying to estimate (i.e., time 
t). The first stage models instrument lagged dissent mobilization (Di, t-1) as a function of 
levels of covert and overt repressive action measured three and four periods before (Ri, t-3, 
Ri, t-4,). The second stage equation include measures of repression that exist between these 
prior periods and the dependent variable measured at time t. Including these variables (Ri, 
t-2) along with the instrumented measure of dissent in the second stage equation 
effectively removes the endogenous selection processes that may bias our results. The 
strategy allows the model to identify exactly those levels of dissent inspired by previous 
levels of repressive and non-repressive policies, while extracting from those variables the 
endogenous relationship between prior acts of repression and current levels of repression 
(which are controlled for through the inclusion of Ri, t-2 in the second stage equation). For 
selection effects to persist in biasing our results there would have to be artifact 
influencing the conflict processes during the earlier periods of repression used as 
instruments and repression measured as the dependent variable, but not influencing the 
middle levels of repression employed as control variables in the second stage equation. 






Table AI-IV: Instrumental Variables Equations Estimating Collective Challenges’ 
Influence on Repressive Behavior 
 
  AHPN Dataset 
  Model A5 Model A6 
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 N 1848 1848 
Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses.  
p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One -Tailed Test) 
Instruments-Covert Repressive Actiont-3, Covert Repressive Actiont-4,  







Results from IV estimations provide further evidence supporting the contention 
that states engage in political repression targeting mobilization. The second stage models, 
which are presented in Table AI-IV, estimate whether exogenous variation in dissident 
mobilization is significantly related to subsequent counts of overt and covert repressive 
activities. From the analysis, mobilizing activities again appear to be strong and robust 
predictors of repressive action. This confirms that states do not simply act to repress their 
population in response to preexisting collective action, but also commit repressive action 
targeting early mobilization attempts.  
 
Vector Error Corrected Models 
A second robustness check employed is to estimate the integrated effects of 
dissent and repression. If states are anticipating dissident behavior in real time then 
modeling the effects of lagged dissent alone will not accurately capture this process 
(Moore 1995; Shellman 2006; Carey 2006). To check the robustness of the findings to a 
model in which states are forward looking in their application of repression, the second 
robustness check employs a form of dynamic time-series analysis known as vector-error 
corrected (VEC) models.  
For the time-series models, the spatial components of the data are ignored but the 
temporal components remain disaggregated into monthly event counts. VEC models are 
similar to vector auto-regressive models (VAR) often used to study dynamic interactions 
between repression and dissent (e.g., Shellman 2006). But where VAR models are 
retrospective in orientation, such that repression and dissent variables respond to past 





repression and dissent are expected to converge into a long term stationary equilibrium as 
dissidents   and   state   forces   learn   to   anticipate   one   another’s   behavior   and   choose   their  
actions accordingly (Reeves et al. 2011). In other words, the VEC models allow the two 
variables to respond stochastically to one another while predicting that they will converge 
into a stable relationship over time (Johansen 1995).  
VEC models use maximum-likelihood techniques to estimate the cointegration of 
two or more variables with short-run dynamic properties and a long-run equilibrium 
(Johansen 1995). In expectation, the two variables are cointegrated such that they should 
jointly produce a stationary time series. These models are used when two time series X 
and Y follow different random walks in the short run, but are cointegrated series in the 
long run. A series Z is cointegrated if both series X and Y become stationary after 
differencing the series by the same order d, such that Yt – Yt-d makes both series 
stationary.  
VEC regression produces parameters for three separate equations: a cointegration 
equation and two equations estimating repression and dissent. If states and dissidents 
employ prospective decision-making   and   anticipate   one   another’s   behavior   before  
deciding when and where to act, then they can be expected to share a long-run stationary 
relationship. Evidence of cointegration suggests that the two variables anticipate one 
another and converge in the future. In the case of repression and dissent such evidence 
suggests  that  states  and  dissidents  are  anticipating  one  another’s  behavior  and  reacting to 






Table AI-V: VEC Cointegration Equations for Repression and Mobilization 
 AHPN Dataset 

















p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One -Tailed Test) 
All models run with constants—constants omitted from presentation. 
  
  
Table AI-V displays the results from the cointegration equations of two VEC 
regressions.78 Negative and statistically significant parameters indicate that the two actors 
are   anticipating   one   another’s   behavior   and   adapting   their   own   accordingly. 79 
Interestingly, both models displayed in Table AI-V show evidence of cointegration and 
suggest that the government is thinking prospectively and anticipating dissident actions 
when deciding when and where to commit repression. The evidence suggests that over 
time the state learned to anticipate mobilization and engaged in repressive action to 
counter such behavior. 
 
  
                                                        
 
78 Each model estimated the mutual effects of repressive action and dissident mobilization or collective 
action using a first and second order lag, as suggested by the Dickie-Fuller (DF) method (Enders 2004). 
Stationarity was achieved with an auto-regressive model employing first and second order temporal lags of 
repression and no moving average components.  
79 As  Reeves  et  al.  (2011,  17)  point  out,  “The  sign  will  be  negative  because  the  constant  has  a  positive  sign.  





Table AI-VI: Replication with Newspaper Data 
 Excluding Department-Months Jointly 
Experiencing Mobilization and Collective 
Challenges 
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N 3503  3503  
Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001  








Section V: Extensions of the Newspaper Replication 
Models A9 and A10 in Table AI-VI replicate Models 5 and 6 in the main text 
using newspaper data. In this analysis, all months jointly experiencing mobilization and 
collective action are dropped from the analysis. The results of this replication analysis 
shine light on significant biases in analyses of repression and dissent conducted using 
newspaper data. When news sources are instead used in the analysis, the robust 
correlations between revolutionary mobilization and repression disappear. Analyzed in 
this fashion, the results would thus fail to identify efforts by state forces to repress would-
be revolutionaries before they can commit collective challenges. This suggests that much 
of the evidence supporting existing models theory may derive from the samples used to 
evaluate the theory.  
 
 
Part VI: Sampling and Coding Procedures  
To generate an events database of political activity from 10 million documents 
recorded in the AHPN, a multi-stage sampling procedure was carried out. First, I 
conducted a pilot study of the police archive in March 2010. Given the vast trove of 
documents, it would be impossible to read the full collection (compare Guzman et al. 
2009; Price et al. 2009). It was also recognized that of the 10 million, the vast majority 
contained matters pertaining to criminal, rather than political, investigations (Morales 
Alvarado 2009). The pilot study was carried out to identify a sampling process that would 
allow the full study to efficiently identify the most relevant information. To conduct the 





information was recorded in different portions of the archive.80 Information in the AHPN 
is archived based on the organizational structure of the police force. Each file is indexed 
based on the office that the file was created for or sent to and there exists separate archive 
locations for each of the different offices of the police ranging from the 10 cuerpos that 
formed operational units of the police force, through the different specialized offices and 
up to the Director General (chief of police). Records produced by the various divisions of 
the police and stored in the AHPN cover the full spectrum of police activities. On one 
end lie the most intensive acts of political repression, such as a directive to capture a list 
of suspected subversives with their last known whereabouts, to the most mundane, such 
as the hundreds of thousands of orders for officers to appear before the court at a given 
time and place.81  
Within this archive structure, the pilot study sampled documents at random from 
each of the different offices and cuerpos. Through this process, it was possible to 
decipher which office was receiving which type of information and how that information 
could be accessed. We discovered that more than 95% of the relevant documents 
(documents containing information on political behavior committed by members of civil 
society, social movements, political parties, security forces or members of the 
government) were located in two offices—the  Director  General’s  office  and  the  Office 
for Coordinating Military and Police Activity. 
                                                        
 
80 The pilot study also engaged in other sampling procedures, including clustered random sampling and 
truly random sampling. Results proved substantively similar. 
81 The reports vary significantly in length, from short missives from the field to lengthy investigations or 
security plans. Some of the longer documents contained multiple political activities, which enter into the 





With this knowledge, the next stage in the process was to generate an events 
database recording information on political activity identified in the records of these two 
offices. I began the full study in October 2010. Over the next eight months, the full study 
of the document read each of the more than 120,000 documents indexed by the archive 
under these two offices. In total, more than a quarter million pages were read 
encapsulating  every  file  sent  to  either  the  Director  General’s  office  and  the  Office for 
Coordinating Military and Police Activity. From each file, the full study coded all 
politically relevant events into the database using a coding rubric that included nearly one 
hundred event types.82Each event entered into the dataset as individual rows, with the 
columns registering the different characteristics coded. 
The final coding protocol is detailed below: 
Guatemala Coding Protocol  
08/10/10 
Note: The coding protocol employed in this study built upon an early study of the archive 
by  a  team  of  researchers  lead  by  Benetec’s  Human  Rights  Data  Analysis  Group  
(HRDAG). Consequently,  parts  of  the  coding  protocol  refer  to  Benetec’s  protocol,  which  
can be found below the main protocol. Details of the Benetec study can be found here: 
EL DERECHO A SABER 
 
A. Coder 
                                                        
 
82 In our reading of the documents from the police archive, we found that nearly all of the files could be 
classified   as   either   ‘political’   or   ‘criminal/personal’   in   nature.   Events   in   the   latter   category,   included  
criminal investigations and procedures as well as personal struggles such as household conflict, were 





B. Event Number 
C. File Reference 
D. Document Number 








   To 
   From 
G. Date of Report–  
 Day  
 Month 
 Year 














J.  Police Behavior – Select from the event list below 
Note:  
Overt Repression was measured using the following codes: 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 54, 55, 57, 58, 
78, 84, 85. 
Covert Repression was measured using the following codes: 38, 
41, 42, 44, 71, 74, 86. 
K.  Joint Operations with Operations 
L. Number of Police Units 
 1 – 9 = Actual # 
 10 = 10 or more 
M. Principal Unit of National Police – See Benetec Appendix 12, 
http://archivohistoricopn.org/media/informes/Gu%C3%ADa%20Usuario%2014_11_201
2_Anexo_art%C3%ADculos.pdf 
 Notes – 
   POPA are not part of the police structure 
  Add – TOCD= Todos los cuerpos en la capital 
 





O. Number of Subjects Identified – See the Benetec Appendix 20, 
http://archivohistoricopn.org/media/informes/Gu%C3%ADa%20Usuario%2014_11_201
2_Anexo_art%C3%ADculos.pdf 
 Notes -  
  Add  POL = Political Parties 
   MIL = Military 
   PNGT= Police 
   PRIV = Private Security 
   JOUR = Journalists 
 
P.  Principal of Subject Identified – Select the main target from Benetec Appendix 20, 
http://archivohistoricopn.org/media/informes/Gu%C3%ADa%20Usuario%2014_11_201
2_Anexo_art%C3%ADculos.pdf 
 Notes -  
  Add  POL = Political Parties 
   MIL = Military 
   PNGT= Police 
   PRIV = Private Security 
   JOUR = Journalists 
 
Note Radical Mobilization was defined as mobilization with the 





well  as  when  column  Q  (“subject  suspected  of  ties  to  the  
insurgency”  was  coded  YES). 
Q. Subject Suspected of ties to the Insurgency 
R. Number of Subject Actions Identified 
S. Subject Behavior – Select the main behavior type from event list below  
Note:  
Mobilization was measured using the following codes: 21, 61, 71, 
75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 87  
Overt Collective Challenges were measured using the following 
codes: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 16, 19, 23, 25, 55, 57, 58, 78. 
T. Number of Individuals Identified 
U. Names of Individuals Identified 
V. Information Source -  
1 Other 
2 Civilian informant 
3 Police/Military informant 
4 Wiretap/Other Covert Surveillance 
5 Observation, Monitoring or Other Direct Surveillance 
6 Neighborhood hearsay/public knowledge 
7 Information  Provided  by  Other  members  of  the  victim’s  
organization 
8 Entrapment 





 1)  Baja – sólo nombre o descripción o dirección 
 2)  Mediana –descripción, dirección 
 3)  Alta – nombre, descripción, dirección 
 0)  Ninguna 
X. # of State Agents Injured 
Y. # of State Agents Killed 
Z. # of Civilians Injured 
AA. # of Civilians Killed 
AB. Additional notes 
AC. Number of DIGE records referencing the event 
AD. Number of COC records referencing the event 
AE. Total Number of Records Referencing the event 
AF. De-duplicated records 
 
Event Types 
0- Unknown  
1- Other (coding to be used sparingly; email Chris if you think you 
have an example) 
2- Accident  
3- Verbal Harassment/Written Harassment/Death Threat 
(Perpetrator may be a civilian, a soldier, or a policeman) 
4- Warning (more benign) 





5- Indiscriminate violence /Massacre: Organized violence carried out 
intentionally and without regard for the individual identities of 
those killed.  Generally involves the violation of multiple 
individuals simultaneously. 
6- Targeted Attacks/Killings—Political or Military Target: 
Organized violence directed at an individual because of actions 
they took related to their political or organizational affiliations.  
The violated individual was unable or unlikely to retaliate. 
(Includes assassinations) 
7- Targeted Attacks/Killings—Sectarian Target: Organized violence 
directed at an individual because of actions they took related to 
their sect.  The violated individual was unable or unlikely to 
retaliate. (Includes assassinations) 
8- Brawl/Clash: Two groups at protests; tumultuous back and forth 
(less than a battle); brawls happen in places like lunchrooms, bars, 
etc 
9- Battle: Two organized bodies engaging in armed combat Shootout: 
Violence between two disorganized bodies, or between one 
organized body and one disorganized body 
10- Riot/Mob violence/Looting 
 





11- Debate/verbal argument/Non-violent confrontation (more of a 
back and forth between parties) 
12- Political March (usually focused on civil rights issues) 
13- Sectarian March (focused primarily on the Catholic/Protestant 
divide) 
14- Vigil  
15- Speech  - Public or Private 
16- Strike/Picket (specifically about labor issues) 
17- Public gathering/Meeting 
18- Ceremony/Symbolic display by Government 
19- Ceremony/Symbolic display by protestors/dissidents 
20- Funeral Procession (usually more of a preceding event)   
21- Information distribution: tabling, press conference, graffiti 
22- Hunger strike  
23- Protest/Civil Disobedience/Barricades (organized; e.g., sit-ins, 
smaller gatherings) 
24- Protest Ban (political ban) 
25- Counter-protest (acts  in  a  sequential  manner:  “This  group  is  
protesting—so will we!) 
26- Complaint filing/Seeking legal advice 
27- National Policy Change  
28- Local Level Policy Change: at the neighborhood, city level, etc. 





30- Ceasefire/Peace talks/negotiations/international negotiations  
31- Release of hostages/prisoners  
32- Elections  
Policing 
33- Selective Arrest/Attempted Arrest  
34- Non-Selective Arrest/Non-Selective Attempted Arrest 
35- Mass Arrest (indiscriminate in nature) 
36- Informed/cooperated with Police/Military or Asked to 
inform/cooperate with Police/Military  
37- operations con junta con el exercisio  
38- Police (or Army) Road Block/Checkpoint/Patrol [a patrol is not 
defined as harassment] 
39- Police Search  
40- Police curfew (usually more of a preceding event) 
41- Chase/Police Chase  
42- State Surveillance  
43- Police Abuse during detention/arrest 
44- Protest Policing/Riot policing- No Live Rounds (the policing in 
question must be within the bounds of legal protest/riot police 
work, even if distasteful) 
45- Protest Policing—Live Rounds  






47- Intra-communal violence/social control: Paramilitary groups 
imposing sanctions on their own communities for behavior deemed 
anti-social.  The difference between internal policing and social 
control is that internal policing has to do with the politics internal 
to an organization, while social control has to do with sanctioning 
an individual for allegedly violating social norms 
48- Turf war/Territorial dispute  
49- Gang violence  
50- Ethnic derogation/Ethnic violence  
51- Intra-organizational violence/internal policing  
Other Forms of Violence 
52- Torture, mental or physical  
53- Beating (seen as 1 guy being attacked by multiple assailants; either 
civilian or police) 
54- Suicide/Attempted Suicide 
55- Hijacking/Kidnapping 
56- Rape/Sexual Assault/Sexual Harassment 
57- Raid/Siege: can be carried out by police, but does not have to be 
(raid and siege are distinguished by differing levels of violence) 
58- Robbery 
59- Provocation by Victim  
60- Provocation by Perpetrator  





62- Arms Purchase by State, or State Friends/Kin   
63- Victim Taken to Hospital/Doctor  
64- Public Sympathy for Victim  
65- Ethnic Migration  
66- Public Sympathy of Perpetrator 
67- Forcibly Evicted  
Miscellaneous 
68- Non-Violent Trauma 
69- Initiate an investigation 
70- secure a perimeter 
71-  combat training 
72- inform superiors 
73-  legal procedures/trial 
74- solicited international actions 
75- “non-violent  mobilization”  activities  designed  to  encourage  
people to participate in political protest 
76- Violent mobilization 
77- Formation of an armed group 
78- Terrorism 
79- Membership in insurgent organizations/Contributing to the 
insurgency 





81- Membership in a social movement organization/contributing to a 
social movement organization 
82- Violent Trauma 
83- Pre-emptive Security Measures 
84- Subject Dissapeared/kidnapped 
85- Subject murdered 
86- Inform inferiors/rank and file 
87- Planning Violent Actions 
88- Defection to Army – No Amnesty 
89- Defection to Army – Amnesty 
90- Return of Refugees 
91- Refugees flee across border  
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Appendix AII: Supplementary Appendix for  “Political  Repression  and  the  
Dismantling  of  Opposition  Organizations” 
 
Section I: Human Rights Reporting and Repression in Guatemala 
With regards to the particular case of Guatemala, it is well documented how 
publication of human rights abuses threatened to end the flow of aid from the United 
States (e.g., Schirmer 1998; Doyle 1999; Grandin 2004). Carter, for example, cut off US 
military aid following the publication of widespread human rights abuses by the 
Guatemalan Government. And while Regan famously increased US economic aid along 
with the provision of munitions and training to the Guatemalan Army, members of the 
state department began to actively pressure for a complete cessation of US aid  as greater 
evidence of the ongoing human rights abuses became public (Grandin 2004; Doyle 
1999). Pressure further increased when the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights of the Organization of American States began actively researching human rights 
abuses in Guatemala in 1982, using survivor interviews documented by human rights 
NGOs as a principal source of evidence (Carmack 1988).  
The case evidence suggests that while international pressures were not sufficient 
for ending repression in Guatemala, the Guatemalan government was acutely aware of 
pressures from human rights groups and actively adjusted its strategy in order to 
minimize the documentation of repressive behavior. Information from within the 





department (Doyle 1999) identify both the awareness of the Guatemalan government to 
NGO monitoring of human rights abuses and conscientious attempts to limit publications 
of abuse. Schirmer (1998, 247) documents a particularly telling example from an 
interview with a former army officer: 
- This   [squatting]   must   be   dealt   with   intelligently   so   it   doesn’t   cause  
waves in the international press. 
- Q:  How  do  you  mean  “intelligently” 
- Such as paying them off and not as they have been dealt with before—
you know, cleansed. 
- Q: Why the shift in tactic? 
- Because we are more conscious of the international coverage now. For 
the loans. But we are not so certain that this [less repressive method] 
will in fact work. 
In many cases, the shift in strategy that followed NGO reporting involved efforts 
to conceal repression, either through shifting its timing or location, or through adopting 
tactics that were less easily monitored (Guberek 2012). For example, Schirmer (1998, 
247) notes how following the case discussed in the interview, twelve leaders of the 
squatting  movement  were  abducted,  and  “their   tortured  bodies  were   later  discovered   in  
garbage  bags  in  the  city  dump.”  The  Guatemalan  government also turned its repression to 
target human rights monitors (Anderson 1989). Human rights organizations were 
severely repressed that in 1978 international human rights NGOs began to pull out of the 
country and establish their offices in Mexico or Costa Rica (Sikkink 2007, 138) 
 
Section II: Human Rights Reporting and Dissent in Guatemala 
 
With regards to the Guatemalan case, in many instances, dissent operated in 
extremely rural regions of the country, where news of the publication of an NGO report 
might take months to reach. When news of an NGO report did reach dissidents, it is not 





measuring the number of reports or even the number of abuses reported (though these 
variables are surely related), but the percentage of abuses committed that were recorded 
by human rights organizations. Whereas NGO human rights reports informs the state that 
there are human rights groups operating in a local with the capacity to monitor repressive 
behavior, the publication of a report does not provide similar strategic information for 
dissidents. It is perhaps plausible that the publication of information on human rights 
abuses might (a) incentivize dissidents to move into a local to engage in challenges where 
they might use the publication as a rallying call or (b) incentivize dissidents to move out 
of a local to avoid future repression. But these two potential outcomes are founded on the 
belief that without the publication of the report, dissidents and their potential supporters 
would remain ignorant of repression. Because dissidents are the targets of both repression 
targeting mobilization and repression targeting overt, collective challenges, they are 
likely to have first hand knowledge of human rights violations that supersedes the 
publication of any human rights reports. Then there is a question of capacity. 
Mobilization is a highly localized activity that is highly dependent on both prior activity 
and context (e.g., McAdam 1983; Gould 1995). As a result, mobilizers have limited 
capacity for picking up and strategically transplanting themselves to protest sites that 
might appear superior.  
 
Section III: Sampling Protocol 
First, a pilot study was carried out that engaged in stratified random sampling 
process to identify what information was recorded in the archive. Information in the 





indexed based on the office that the file was created for or sent to and there exists 
separate archive locations for each of the different offices of the police ranging from the 
10 cuerpos that formed operational units of the police force, through the different 
specialized offices and up to the Director General (chief of police). Within this archive 
structure, documents were sampled at random from each of the different offices and 
cuerpos.83 Through this process, it was possible to decipher which office was receiving 
which type of information and how that information could be accessed. We discovered 
that more than 95% of the relevant documents (documents containing information on 
political behavior committed by members of civil society, social movements, political 
parties, security forces or members of the government) were located in two offices—the 
Director  General’s  office   and   the  Office for Coordinating Military and Police Activity. 
With this knowledge, the next stage in the process was to generate an events database 
recording information on political activity identified in the records of these two offices.84 
 
Section IV: A Note on Data Bias 
Data from the AHPN are relatively unique. During the period in which they were 
composed, the authors had little belief that they would ever be made public. Moreover, 
they were discovered on accident and released without any form of Freedom of 
Information process through which sensitive information could be withheld or redacted. 
Like any data source, there remain potentials for bias. With data from the police, one 
needs to be conscious of parochial incentives that could lead to biased reporting for 
                                                        
 
83 The pilot study also engaged in other sampling procedures, including clustered random sampling and 
truly random sampling. Results proved substantively similar. 
84 In our reading of the documents from the police archive, we found that nearly all of the files could be 
classified   as   either   ‘political’   or   ‘criminal/personal’   in   nature.   Events   in   the   latter   category,   included  
criminal investigations and procedures as well as personal struggles such as household conflict, were 





professional gains. With regards to the reporting of repression, we should be conscious of 
bias against the reporting of atrocities.   Given   the   Carter   administrations’   emphasis   on  
human rights, it is clear that the regime was consciously trying to improve its 
international human rights reputation by concealing evidence of massacres (Guberek 
2012).85 But with regards to the reporting of social movement behavior, the direction of 
bias is less clear. Individuals might develop an interest in overestimating the threat of the 
movement in order to increase their budget or justify their budget. 86  Or they might 
develop an interest downplaying movement behavior to demonstrate professional 
success. What is clear is that as a data source, the AHPN provides better detail on a far 
larger spectrum of political activity than other sources of information on the Guatemala 
conflict.  
 
Section V: Local Average Treatment Effects  
The models estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) of seemingly 
exogenous variation in repression on overt, collective challenges. With any instrumental 
variables model, attention needs to be paid to the types of units affected by the exogenous 
instrument and how they may or may not differ from the broader population of 
potentially treated units. In this case, the models estimate the effect of only those types of 
                                                        
 
85 In part because the police did not carry out these activities and in part because of potential reporting bias, 
there are few massacres captured in the police data. It is important to keep this in mind when interpreting 
the results. That said, one of the reasons that indiscriminate forms of state repression, like massacres, are 
said to have succeeded in Guatemala (Kalyvsas 2006; Valentino 2004) is because they were directed at 
villages identified as sites of insurgent mobilization (Stohl 1993; Kobrack 1996; Sullivan 2012). Upon 
learning of an insurgent presence in a village, the army would arrive with an ultimatum: either the village 
reformed itself into a civil defense unit under direct supervision of the military or the inhabitants would be 
killed. 
86 With this in mind, careful attention is paid in the research design to identify seemingly exogenous 





repression that could have been stochastically influenced by human rights reporting. In 
the  language  of  IV  analysis,  this  estimates  the  LATE  for  “compliers”  (Dunnig  2012,  136-
143; 290-293; Imbens 2009). Units in which repression would have been applied 
regardless of how much NGOs had documented past human rights abuses (e.g., large 
military operations that were underway or covert and undetectable activities) as well as 
repression that would never have been applied conditional on NGO reporting are not 
affected by our instrument and thus do not factor in the analysis (e.g., pacified sites). 
It is important also to consider the context of the case when discussing the 
implications  of  the  “local”  on  the  estimated  LATE.  In  this  case  two  structural  variables  
appear to be potentially significant. The first is the regime structure. Throughout the ten 
years under review, the country oscillated between a hybrid regime type and autocracy. 
As democracy has been shown to significantly reduce human rights abuses (e.g., 
Davenport 2007a; 2007b; Davenport and Armstrong 2004), the estimated impact of the 
types of repression being analyzed in this study might differ from those employed in 
democracies. Similarly, past research indicates that civil war is a strong predictor of 
escalated repressive behavior (e.g., Davenport 2007b; Valentino et al. 2004). Yet, while 
the Guatemalan government was severely repressive and relatively unchecked by 
democratic institutions, it does appear to have been responsive to the publication of 
human rights abuses. It is an empirical question whether their responsiveness to NGO 
publications is relatively consistent with more democratic or less conflict ridden states 
(thus yielding more generalizable LATE estimates), though there is evidence to suggest 
that non-democratic  regimes  such  as  Guatemala’s  are  more responsive to NGO reporting 





Hafner-Burton 2008). To the extent that these two issues overlap (i.e., the potential 
differences between complier repression and other repression, and the responsiveness of 
conflict ridden, autocratic states to alter repressive practices following NGO reporting), 
the LATE estimates become less generalizable. Clearly, additional research needs to be 
done on this topic, but one should consider these   issues   as   the   results   of   the   study’s  
analysis are interpreted. 
 
Section VI: First Stage Results 
Table AII-I presents the first stage results for two instrumental variables equations 
employing lagged measures of the percentage of human rights abuses documented in 
NGO reports to instrument how repression (targeting mobilization or overt, collective 





Table AII-I: Instrumental Variables First-Stage Impacts of Human Rights Reporting on Repression 
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0.097 0.061 0.031 0.032 
F-Stat 
 
91.08 14.13 60.89 9.73 
Municipal-Clustered Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (Two-






 For each of the six lags employed as instruments, the table presents their 
coefficients, standard errors, and levels of statistical significance. The table also presents 
adjusted r2 statistics and F-stats for the joint significance of the six instruments. As in 
Table I, the left two columns present evidence from equations employing direct 
measures, while the right two present results from first differenced equations.87 Across 
the models, the majority of the lagged instruments appear significantly correlated with 
measures of political repression. The models capture a relatively small, but important 
slice of the variance in political repression, as recorded in the adjusted r2 statistics. And 
the F-statistics for joint significance are highly significant across the four equations.  
These measures range from 9.75-91.08. While Sovey and Green (2012) recommend an F-
statistic of at least ten to have confidence in the combined significance of multiple 
instruments, this metric is admittedly arbitrary as it is impacted by both the number of 
instruments and the number of observations (see Dunning 2012, 241). For this particular 
test, the first-differenced equation for repression targeting overt collective challenges 
falls just slightly below ten, while the other three equations have F-statistics well above 
this cut off. 
 
Section VII: Replication in High/Low Capacity Municipalities  
State Capacity in Guatemala was extremely unevenly distributed. In some 
sections, such as the capital region, the coastal shipping areas, and the lowlands, the state 
                                                        
 
87 As in Table I, the left two columns were estimated simultaneously as were the right two. These results 





was extremely present. But in other areas, such as the indigenous highlands, the 
Guatemalan government only first emerged during the decade under study.  
Figure AII-I presents evidence to this effect. Looking at a key indicator of state 
presence—the literacy rate of municipalities in 1981—the figure presents a histogram 
displaying the bi-modal distribution of state capacity. One cluster of municipalities has a 
literacy rate centering around 25%, while a larger segment of the country can be 
represented by the cluster of municipalities with literacy around 60%.  
Because repression requires a state presence (and because repression targeting 
mobilization may require an even greater degree of state capacity), it is important to 
investigate the generalizability of the argument into cases of both high and low state 
capacity. Table AII-II represents a replication of Models V and VI in Table II in the main 
text. In Models LV and LVI, this replication is conducted exclusively for municipalities 
with literacy less than the mean (50%). Models HV and HVI represent this same analysis 
exclusively for municipalities with literacy rates above the mean. 







Table AII-II: High/Low Capacity Replication of Instrumental Variables Second-
Stage Estimation of Repression Targeting Mobilization and Overt Collective 
Challenges  
 LV LVI HV HVI 
 Low Capacity High Capacity 
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Y Y Y Y 
N 18,522 18,522 22,428 22,428 
Municipal-Clustered Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. + p<.10, * p<.05, ** 
p<.01, ***p<.001 (One-Tailed Test).  
Instruments: % of Human Rights Abuses Reported by Human Rights NGOs (six lags, 
t-1 – t-6) 
Controls: overt, collective challenges (single and double lags), mobilization (single 
and double lags), repression of overt, collective challenges (single and double lags), 
repression of mobilization (single and double lags), spatial lag of overt, collective 
challenges, spatial lag of mobilization, campaign events, % indigenous, % literate, 







The results from the two subsample replications prove substantively interesting. 
Across all four replications, the point estimates are in the direction predicted by the 
theory, consistent with the results presented in the main text. But when the sample is 
restricted to only municipalities with below average, the significance of the negative 
impact of repression targeting mobilization disappears. In this replication, repressing 
overt, collective challenges is still associated with significant increases in challenges, but 
there is so much noise associated with the estimate of the impact of repression targeting 
mobilization that it is impossible to distinguish the impact of this variable from zero.  
 When looking at the subsample of high capacity municipalities, the results are 
exactly the opposite. In this sample, repressing mobilization is associated with significant 
reductions in future challenges, while repressing overt collective action does not appear 
to significantly increase collective challenges.  
 The results do not critically threaten the theoretical predictions identified in the 
main text analyses, but they do provide some important clues about context that are 
useful when thinking about extensions emerging from this work. It appears to be the case 
that repression directed at mobilization is most consistently associated with decreases in 
overt collective challenges when mobilization is repressed in sites where the state has the 
greatest capacity. In such settings repressing overt, collective challenges does not 
significantly increase collective challenges, but it does not significantly decrease them 
either. Conversely, when looking at low capacity municipalities, the repression of 
mobilization does not appear to have its same significant negative relationship with overt 





change in challenger behavior. But when overt, collective challenges are repressed in low 
capacity areas, we see significant positive increases in future challenges.  
As noted in the conclusion of the main text measures of state capacity are 
somewhat endogenous to the success or failure of repression. But the results emerging 
from this replication suggest that the impact of various repressive campaigns may be 
contingent on the underlying amount of state capacity operating in an area. Repression is 
most effective from the perspective of the government when it (a) is targeted at 
mobilization and (b) occurs in a high capacity area. Repression leads to its greatest 
increase in challenger behavior when it is (a) targeted at overt, collective challenges and 
(b) occurs in a low capacity area. Future research will need to investigate how 
governments make particular decisions about applying repressive force under different 
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Appendix AIII: Supplementary Appendix for  “Challenger  Demands  and  the  
Liberalization  of  Repression” 
 
Section I: Variation in Liberalization at the Municipal Level 
 
Table AIII-I displays descriptive statistics for municipal measures of 
liberalization as well as a host of variables relevant to theories of liberalization. The table 
displays three metrics for identifying liberalization. The first identifies the last month in 
which a municipality in Guatemala experienced any form repression. The second and 
third divide repression into two forms—overt and covert. Overt repression refers to acts 
in which the target of repression is made to be aware of the repression directed against 
them. It includes activities commonly associated with repression, such as torture, 
politically motivated arrests, and disappearances. The second liberalization metric 
identifies the last month in which a municipality experienced covert political repression. 
Covert repression represents acts in which the target is meant to be unaware of the action, 
and includes events such are surveillance, the use of civilian informants, agents 
provocateur, and the composition of investigative reports.88 An interesting facet that 
emerges is the relative multitude of covert repressive acts compared to overt forms of 
political repression. For every act of overt repression identified, more than four acts of 
covert repression can be identified. This likely results from the fact that much covert 
                                                        
 
88 This distinction follows a division commonly made in the literature (see Davenport 2005). For greater 





repression was applied behind the scenes, and, as in the case of initiating investigations 
and writing reports, often does not involve the direct participation of movement actors. 
An approach focused exclusively on overt repression would fail to identify the majority 






Table AIII-I: Temporal Distribution of Liberalization and Political Activity in 
Guatemala, 1975-1985 
 Earliest Observation Median Observation Latest Observation 
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Figure AIII-I gives a more complete accounting of the distribution of the duration 
of  repressive  spells  in  Guatemala’s  municipalities.  As  can  be  seen  from  the  figure,  among  
those municipalities where repression was applied, there were relatively few in which 
liberalization occurred within the first 50 months of the study. This evidence is consistent 
with the macro-level descriptions of repressive behavior in Guatemala documented in the 
main text.  
Then over the next two years, there is some more liberalization occurring, though 
this is still slight in comparison to what would follow. During the final four years under 
review there is an expansive opening of liberalization. What is significant to note is the 
variation in timing surrounding when different liberalizing municipalities experience 
their final act of repression. In some sites, liberalization occurs around what would be the 
beginning of 1982, many more drop off between 1983 and 1984, and some hold on 





Section II: Selection in the Use of Political Repression 
 Table AIII-II displays descriptive statistics for two different sets of municipalities. 
The first column contains a set of variables that are important for understanding the 
application of repression and decisions to liberalize. Column two presents values for each 
of these variables for municipalities in which not a single act of government repression 
was observed in the police data. Because these variables did not experience repression, it 
was impossible to specify a liberalization date and they are consequently excluded from 
the analyses presented in the main text and below. Column three presents values across 
the different variables for the municipalities in which repression was committed. 
Comparing across the table reveals some interesting patterns. Municipalities 
experiencing repression had consistently higher rates of mobilization, protests, and 
insurgent attacks. They were also more populous and had a larger number of campaign 
events. Interestingly, there appears to be little variation in the mean rate of literacy and 
percentage of indigenous persons residing in these two sets of municipalities.  
Table AIII-II: Comparing Municipalities With and Without Repression 




Mobilization  0.001 0.031 
Protests 0 0.018 
Insurgent Attacks 0.001 0.007 
Campaign Events 0.001 0.003 
Population 9,393 21,602 
% Indigenous 49 51 
% Literate 50 50 
N 80 246 
Monthly averages presented for Mobilization, Protests, Insurgent Attacks and 







Section III: Replication Using All Types of Mobilization 
 Table AIII-III presents a series of examinations estimating the relationship 
between all forms of mobilization and liberalization. Unlike the principal results 
presented in the main text, in this case no effort is made to differentiate mobilization 
based on the ideals around which activists were organizing.  
As a general rule, the results support the contention that when mobilization is not 
differentiated based on the ideals around which activists are organizing, there is no robust 
relationship between mobilization activities and decisions to liberalize. Consistent with 
the results presented in Model 2 of Table I in the main text, across three of the five 
additional specifications presented in table AIII, mobilization is insignificantly correlated 
with liberalization. Here, we see a negative point estimate, but that estimate is very small 
and the confidence bounds overlap with zero. Two of the models (Models A1 and A5) in 
Table AIII suggest that mobilization is negatively, and statistically significantly related to 
liberalization. This would suggest that governments are concerned over all forms of 
potential contention that may arise in the post liberalization period. However, when 
compared to the results surrounding radical mobilization, the results surrounding the 
undifferentiated mobilization variable are inconsistent. Taken together, this evidence 
suggests that some mobilization may be related to longer periods of repression and 
decreased expectations for liberalization. When the mobilization variable is differentiated 
into its radical and non-radical subcomponents, as it is in the principal reports presented 
in the main text, a much clearer picture emerges. Here, radical mobilization activities are 
related to longer periods of repression, while non-radical mobilization activities have no 






Table AIII-III: Cox Proportional Hazards Models of Liberalization with All Forms 
of Mobilization Undifferentiated 











Insurgent Attacks 0.742** 
(0.074) 




   0.334 
(4.367) 
Regime Change  0.570 
(1.849) 
   0.267 
(0.196) 
















Municipal-Clustered Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, 
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